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1
Performance Standards and
the Potential to Improve
Government Performance
James J. Heckman
Carolyn J. Heinrich
Jeffrey Smith
A number of recently implemented reforms to public sector incentive systems have sought to reorient them toward a focus on measuring
results and inducing public agencies to become more efficient, responsive, and accountable to the public. They share at least two features.
The first is a system of performance measures and standards designed
to create clear expectations for government performance and to assess
results. A second feature is a means for rewarding individuals, teams,
or entire organizations for achievement relative to the established performance goals, primarily through budgetary allocations. By clearly
defining goals and developing explicit rewards for their attainment,
these systems have aimed to replicate, in a nonmarket setting, the incentive structures, competition, and resulting high performance and
efficiency of private markets (Light 2005).
Among its first steps in advancing these reforms, the Obama administration has required federal agencies to identify a limited number
of high-priority performance goals for which performance trends will
be tracked, and through its new Open Government initiative, it will
make these data publicly available and promote the use of new methods in the analysis of them. The government is also now compelling
the private sector to provide more information on its performance for
transparency and accountability (beyond longer-standing areas of public scrutiny such as health care and the environment), and has devised
incentives for cooperation and penalties for withholding information
(Cukier 2010). For example, it is now possible for the public to get sta-
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tistics on job-related deaths that name employers and to see restaurants’
health inspection scores online.
As the use of performance measurement and incentive systems
has expanded in the public sector, so has the number of studies calling
attention to their problems and unintended effects (Bevan and Hood
2006; Brooks 2000; Courty and Marschke 2004; Heckman and Smith
2004; Heinrich 2004, 2007; Heinrich and Marschke 2010; Koning and
Heinrich 2010; Propper and Wilson 2003; Radin 2000; Smith 1995;
General Accounting Office [GAO] 2002). Performance standards systems and bonuses are (or have been) used in Food Stamps (now the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) and welfare-to-work
programs, employment and training programs, public school accountability systems under No Child Left Behind, child welfare agencies and
child support enforcement programs, Medicaid and SCHIP programs,
and other social programs, although not without some degree of controversy and ongoing challenges in their design and implementation.
The development of performance incentive systems in public bureaucracies also continues to advance in Europe, led by Great Britain’s
early exploration, and with some governments (such as Australia and
the Netherlands) now implementing incentive systems with fully (100
percent) performance-contingent pay/contracting arrangements (Finn
2008; Struyven and Steurs 2005).
While the broad introduction of incentive systems in many government agencies is new, U.S. employment and training programs
have used both performance standards and monetary bonuses for over
two decades. Klerman (2005, p. 347) describes the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)/Workforce Investment Act (WIA) performance
measurement system as one of the “most mature implementations of
performance-based management.” It is also one of the most studied
systems, in part because of the randomized experimental evaluation of
the JTPA program that produced important information for assessing
the performance of these performance standards systems in measuring
program impacts (Bloom et al. 1993; Dickinson et al. 1988; Heckman,
Heinrich, and Smith 2002; Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith 1999; Orr
et al. 1995). Policymakers have looked to the results of these studies to
guide changes to these systems in employment and training programs
and to also inform the design and operation of performance standards
systems in other government programs.
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At the same time, one of our motivations for assembling the research
presented in this book is that despite decades of study and practice,
some of the important lessons that have been learned are not reflected
in the current design and implementation of performance standards systems. Bevan and Hood (2006), for example, describe the development
and use of performance targets in the English public health care system,
along with the perverse incentives they generated, as “hitting the target
and missing the point.”1 And despite the long tenure of performance
standards in U.S. employment and training programs, a 2002 GAO report (p. 14) confirms the persistence of gaming responses that influence
who gets access to program services as well as service intensity, concluding that “the need to meet performance levels may be the driving
factor in deciding who receives WIA-funded services at the local level.”
It may be that some of the more rigorous empirical evidence from
past studies has not been effectively communicated or penetrated
policymaking and public management circles deeply enough.2 Or, as
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith comment in Chapter 3, it may be that
policymakers who have mandated such systems (and administrators
involved in their implementation) have not fully appreciated the challenges of designing a performance management system that generates
incentives for improving program impacts. Research in this area has
also continued to evolve, with advances in theoretical conceptions,
modeling, and data, and of course, changes in the incentive systems
over time have facilitated analysis of their implications for performance
standards system design and functioning. The chapters included in this
volume embody a number of these important advancements, and yet
our primary aim is to make the lessons of our research clear to those
who design and implement these incentive systems in the public sector.
The nine chapters that follow use U.S. employment and training
programs as a “laboratory” for investigation. They draw extensively
from the data and experiences of the earlier JTPA performance standards system, both because of its longer tenure and the availability of
experimental data. Using a variety of data sources on these incentives
systems, the authors of these chapters explore how performance standards and incentives affect the behavior of public managers and agency
employees, their approaches to service delivery, and ultimately, the outcomes for participants. Both the JTPA and WIA programs have allowed
state and local administrators and their governing boards substantial
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discretion, within broad limits, to determine performance goals, standards, and bonus systems. This administrative flexibility is reflected in
the range of incentive systems that have been implemented by different
states and by the same states over time. It is this variation that serves as
the grist for our empirical mill and is used to extract general lessons that
can be applied on a wider scale to both existing and newly developing
performance incentive systems.

KEy qUESTIOnS AnD ChARACTERISTICS OF
PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS SySTEMS In U.S.
EMPLOyMEnT AnD TRAInInG PROGRAMS
While investigating formal incentive structures and organizational
behavior within U.S. employment and training programs, the authors in
this volume address the following six fundamental questions:
1) How do performance standards and measures operate to include or exclude individuals with different characteristics in
these programs?
2) How do performance standards and measures affect the types
of services offered?
3) How do the processes for setting standards and weights for
performance goals and for recognizing and rewarding performance affect system incentives and bureaucratic responses?
4) Are the performance standards, measures, and incentives
effective in motivating bureaucratic behavior toward the
achievement of program goals?
5) Do short-term outcome measures used in the performance standards systems predict long-term impacts of the programs on
participants?
6) What general lessons can be learned from a study of these
performance standards systems and the variation in the rules
governing their administration over time?
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In the next chapter, the JTPA and WIA performance standards
systems are described in greater detail. Below, we briefly list four key
features of the programs that are pertinent to understanding the contributions of this volume. We follow with an overview of the chapters and
their salient findings.
1) Federal job training programs (formerly JTPA and currently
WIA) are highly decentralized. Local level governing boards
include local business officials along with other government,
community, and labor leaders. States control most aspects of
the performance standards system that guides training activities, including determining the rules that govern how outcome
measures count and how performance awards are made.
2) Workforce development programs generate relatively easily
measured outcomes such as employment, wages, completion of
education programs, enrollment in the military, and continued
schooling. More difficult to assess, however, is the value added
produced by the programs, which, as we show, does not necessarily correlate strongly with shorter-term outcome measures.
3) Most performance standards have been formulated in terms
of levels of achievement, rather than in terms of achievement
gains resulting from program participation. This practice gives
rise to the potential for “cream skimming,” which results when
centers enroll persons who are likely to have high outcome
levels rather than those whose outcomes would improve most
through participation in the program.
4) Training centers (or states under WIA) that meet or exceed their
performance standards typically receive budgetary rewards.
Training centers have shown, however, that they can manipulate the performance standards system in ways that improve
measured performance but may not contribute to value-added
or individual gains. The ability of program managers and staff
to manipulate the data used to monitor them poses a major
challenge to the successful design of performance standards
systems.
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OvERvIEw OF ThE ChAPTERS AnD ThEIR
RELATIOnShIP TO PREvIOUS RESEARCh
The studies in this volume take advantage of data that are superior
in scope and detail to some of the data used in the existing literature or
available on a regular basis for assessing program performance. The
research described in Chapters 4, 6, 8, and 9 benefitted from detailed
longitudinal, microlevel data that were collected in the National JTPA
Study (NJS) and through other administrative data sources. The NJS
data also include information on JTPA-eligible nonparticipants in four
experimental sites. These data have two important advantages over
samples of eligible populations constructed from large public-use data
sets: 1) they are collected from eligible nonparticipants residing in the
same geographical area as participants, and 2) the data are gathered using the same survey instruments as those used for participants.
In addition, the authors collect and analyze complete information
about state-level variation in the JTPA and WIA performance standards
systems. Chapters 4 and 5 show that state incentive systems are highly
complex and differ widely across states and over time within states. They
are not easily characterized by small dimensional summary measures as
used in previous studies (see, for example, Anderson, Burkhauser, and
Raymond [1993] and Dickinson et al. [1988]). This wealth of data is
very helpful in assessing the implications of changes and differences in
performance standard regimes, and a variety of analytical strategies are
applied to learn from these data.
Before addressing the key questions listed above, the contributing
authors provide some basic information in Chapter 2 about the design
and implementation of the JTPA and WIA programs to aid our readers’
understanding of the research that follows. Chapter 2 describes the origins and organizational structure of these programs, eligibility rules and
the types of services made available to participants, details of the performance measures, and other aspects of these performance standards
systems’ design. Chapter 2 also highlights some of the changes in these
systems over time, particularly in the shift from JTPA to WIA.
In Chapter 3, James Heckman, Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey Smith
set up a formal model of a performance standards system that theoretically frames many of the fundamental questions and issues that are
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addressed in this book. For example, their model demonstrates how the
JTPA and WIA program goals to promote equity and efficiency interact with a performance standards system based on short-term outcome
measures. As such, they show that whether or not cream skimming is
at odds with equity or efficiency (or both) is an empirical question that
depends on the relationship between the benefits of program services
and the location of trainees in the skill distribution of applicants. Importantly, the broad conceptual framework that they develop provides
a foundation for future investigation about when (and if) performance
standards systems in active labor market programs will increase labor
market impacts, and when (and if) they are more likely to have unintended consequences due to responses by program staff to the incentives
they provide.
In Chapter 4, Courty and Marschke describe the structure of the
JTPA performance standards system and highlight important details
that go into developing a performance-contingent budgeting scheme.
They describe the performance measures upon which awards were contingent, the nature of the awards, and how performance awards were
computed in JTPA; they also show how crucial the handling of these details can be to the success of performance funding. Courty and Marschke
find that interstate differences in the implementation of the performance
incentives system grew over time, reflecting the substantial discretion
federal authorities gave to state and local agencies in its management.
Their findings suggest that the objectives of states’ incentive systems
increasingly diverged from the original federal ones, leading to some
unintended consequences.
Courty, Heinrich, and Marschke draw from the information economics, contract theory, and public administration literatures to derive
theoretical implications for the establishment of appropriate benchmark
levels of performance (i.e., performance standards) in Chapter 5. They
then assess alternative methods that are commonly used to construct
performance standards and evaluate their application in the JTPA and
WIA systems. They find evidence that performance measurement system designers have attempted to “level the playing field” over time to
provide equivalent performance incentives across states and localities.
However, they also identify some negative dynamic properties of the
JTPA and WIA performance measurement systems. The dynamics of
performance benchmarking, and the politically motivated ambition to
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demonstrate continuous performance improvement, likely introduced
inefficiencies and generated incentives to influence performance in
ways other than increasing effort. These potentially harmful behaviors
include selecting trainees according to observed characteristics associated with their labor market success, limiting the availability of more
intensive training services and demonstrating lower performance early
on to allow for performance improvements over time.
In Chapter 6, Heckman and Smith present a detailed, step-by-step
analysis of the process by which individuals become participants in
employment and training programs. Using data from the JTPA system,
the goal of their analysis is to determine the sources of demographic
disparities in participation rates and to isolate the roles of personal information, program eligibility rules, and administrative discretion in
determining the probability of program participation. Disparities arising from voluntary decisions not to participate by informed persons
raise different policy concerns from disparities arising from inequitable
administrative practices or bureaucratic treatment. Models for the determination of eligibility, awareness of the program, and application
and acceptance into the program are estimated. Bureaucratic discretion
is assumed to play the major role in the final stage of the process. The
evidence reported in this chapter indicates that while cream skimming
is an important feature of the JTPA program, program eligibility rules,
the personal choices of potential participants, and informational constraints are also important determinants of demographic disparities in
JTPA participation.
Another important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit unintended and dysfunctional responses,
also known as gaming responses. In Chapter 7, Courty and Marschke
present a comprehensive overview of the literature on dysfunctional
responses and develop a theoretical framework to classify the various dysfunctional responses that have been identified in practice.
They distinguish three types of dysfunctional responses: 1) accounting manipulations that have no impact on the organization, 2) gaming
responses that boost performance outcomes but have a negative impact
on the organization, and 3) marginal misallocations that have positive
impacts but are suboptimal because alternative allocations would have
a higher impact. They then summarize the empirical evidence of dysfunctional responses in the JTPA system and assess the extent to which
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such responses may impede the effective functioning of performance
measurement systems.
A widely cited GAO report (1991) claims that the JTPA performance standard system produced inequities by encouraging frequent
routing of minorities and women into the least productive training activities and by denying them training altogether. The GAO alleges that
training centers’ pursuit of incentive payments and recognition for high
performance has a perverse effect on participant selection as well as on
trainees’ access to services. In Chapter 8, through an extensive analysis
of a JTPA training center in Illinois, Heinrich shows that bureaucratic
decisions involving the selection of participants and their assignments
to JTPA program services are frequently interdependent. She combines
case-study and econometric approaches to investigate the screening
decisions made by program staff and the influence of performance standards on these decisions. Heinrich finds evidence that these frontline
staff cream-skim in making their enrollment and treatment-assignment
decisions, and she also documents how shifts in federal policy fostered
a movement away from more costly but higher value-added services
toward less costly services. In the face of declining JTPA budgets, it
appears that bureaucrats sought to preserve their client load and maintain low costs by offering cheaper but less cost-effective services. The
resulting effect, most likely unintended, is that bureaucrats cut service
quality to keep program costs low and maintain service quantity.
In Chapter 9, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith use data from the
NJS to examine the relationship between the short-run performance
measures used in the JTPA performance standards system, such as employment and wages at termination from the program (or 13 weeks after
termination), and experimental estimates of the impact or value added
of the program on employment and earnings. In most cases, the data
reveal a very weak relationship between the short-run measures and
the long-run impacts. In fact, this relationship is often perverse, so that
higher short-run measures are associated with lower long-term impacts
from training. The JTPA performance standards system was, and the
current WIA system is, based on measures that are not highly correlated
with the gains from the program. Thus, evidence presented in the other
chapters that the performance standards system “works” in the sense
that it motivates bureaucrats to achieve certain standards does not imply
that the performance standards system leads training centers to choose
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the combination of persons served and services offered that maximizes
total gains obtained from the program.
In Chapter 10, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith summarize three
main lessons of the volume regarding the effectiveness of performance
standards in public organizations and the need for further research.
First, organizations respond to incentives, but sometimes the responses
are perverse. In the first iteration of an incentive system’s design, wellmeaning designers of the performance standards system are unlikely to
anticipate the shrewd responses of program administrators and frontline
workers to system incentives, or the many possible ways they might
influence measured performance without necessarily adding to (or possibly even detracting from) program value or impact. For example,
individuals’ access to program services and the nature and duration of
the services participants receive are sometimes adversely affected by
bureaucrats’ responses to the performance incentives.
Second, the short-term outcome measures that continue to be used
in the WIA performance standards system are only weakly related to
the true long-run impacts of the program on earnings and employment.
Measures of changes in earnings were tried under WIA but were discontinued, and the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) continues with
measures of entry into unsubsidized employment, retention in unsubsidized employment six months after entry into the employment, and
earnings levels six months after entry into the employment. Researchers and policymakers have yet to identify performance measures that
will promote key, long-term program objectives while simultaneously
generating more readily available performance information for ongoing
program management.
Third, the importance of the cream skimming issue has been overstated in popular discussions. In the provision of employment and
training services, the trade-off between efficiency and equity is modest at best. Personal choices and informational constraints play an
important role in accounting for demographic differences in program
participation among those eligible, while the effect of administrative
discretion in accounting for demographic disparities among the eligible
population is relatively limited. Chapter 10 includes a brief discussion
of some policy implications of these findings.
In his book The Dynamics of Performance Management, Donald
Moynihan (2008, pp. 4–5) argues that performance management re-
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forms have become so central to recent public management agendas
that it “is only a slight exaggeration to say that we are betting the future of governance on the use of performance information.” Clearly,
the design and implementation of performance standards and incentive
systems in the public sector will continue to be a dynamic pursuit, and
it is our hope that the lessons distilled in this volume will have a role in
shaping and speeding their evolution and the improvement of government performance.

notes
1. In the effort to achieve hospital accident and emergency waiting time targets, hospitals cancelled operations and required patients to wait in ambulance queues outside
the hospital until they were confident the patients could be seen within the targeted
(four-hour) time. Bevan and Hood also find discrepancies between official reported
levels of performance and those from independent surveys of patients.
2. Or, it may be the case that some of the fundamental lessons from studies to date
have been ignored or deferred in pursuit of other objectives (political or otherwise); see, for example, Radin (2000).
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U.S. Employment and Training
Programs and Performance
Standards System Design
Pascal Courty
Carolyn J. Heinrich
Gerald Marschke
Jeffrey Smith

Prior to the recession that began in 2007, public expenditures on
employment and training services were declining. For example, in fiscal year 2007, the total U.S. federal government appropriations for WIA
programs—youth employment, adult job training, dislocated worker
assistance, Job Corps, and other national activities—was $4.4 billion,
down 18 percent from fiscal year 2005. Within the WIA program, the
number of adults receiving training was likewise declining appreciably
relative to its predecessor, JTPA (Frank and Minoff 2005). Furthermore, the JTPA program had substantially reduced the size and scope
of federal public employment and training programs relative to its predecessors, the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) and
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).
In 2009, the Obama administration reversed these trends of diminishing public expenditures on employment and training. The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) injected an unprecedented
level of funding (an addition of more than $3.5 billion) into the public workforce development system and associated employment and
training programs.1 This infusion of resources to aid unemployed and
underemployed workers nearly doubled U.S. federal government funding for WIA programs and rejuvenated public interest in improving the
effectiveness of the workforce development system.
This book focuses on the two most recent workforce development
programs, JTPA and WIA. JTPA is widely known for having intro-
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duced outcomes-based performance standards to public employment
and training programs (in 1982). WIA has retained the basic structure
of its predecessor while making important operational changes in the
performance standards system (in 2000).2 This chapter aims to provide
basic information about U.S. employment and training programs to aid
our readers in understanding the research and analyses presented in this
book. In the following sections, essential features of these programs are
described, including their origins and organizational structures, eligibility rules and the types of services made available to participants, and the
design of the performance standards systems.

ORIGInS AnD ORGAnIzATIOnAL STRUCTURE
OF JTPA AnD wIA
During the period in which it operated, JTPA constituted the largest federal employment and training program for disadvantaged U.S.
workers. The act mandated the provision of employment and training services to “those who can benefit from, and are most in need of,
such opportunities.” It also required that the basic return on training
investments “be measured by the increased employment and earnings
of participants and the reduction in welfare dependency” (U.S. Congress 1982). Designed in the Reagan era of New Federalism, JTPA
was distinguished by a more decentralized administrative structure that
included a larger role for the private sector; a performance standards
system developed to measure program outcomes, increase local-level
accountability, and encourage more efficient program management; and
lower program costs per participant, in part due to elimination of public
service employment and participant stipend components. Dickinson et
al. (1988), LaLonde (1995), and O’Leary, Straits, and Wandner (2004)
provide more detail on the history of employment and training programs in the United States.
The original titles of the JTPA legislation established four different programs.3 Title IIA authorized the largest of these programs to
serve economically disadvantaged youths and adults, accounting for
the majority of JTPA client enrollments and training expenditures.4 The
primary services provided under JTPA Title IIA—vocational training,
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on-the-job training, basic/remedial education, job search assistance,
work experience, and other services such as counseling and assessment, job-readiness activities, and case management—continue to be
available in WIA, although training priorities and service access have
changed. While amendments to JTPA had shifted service provision
away from low-cost job search activities and toward more intensive
(e.g., classroom) training, WIA made important changes to refocus
the program toward assessment and job search assistance services that
are made available to a broader population. WIA, enacted in 1998, officially superseded the JTPA program in July 2000. See O’Shea and
King (2001) for a comprehensive discussion of the WIA provisions and
changes, Social Policy Research Associates (2004) for a comprehensive
report on WIA implementation.
In both JTPA and WIA, responsibility for the interpretation and implementation of program provisions was delegated to the USDOL. The
USDOL communicates some specific policy directives to states, but the
interpretation of many critical provisions and the major responsibility
for program administration and service delivery lie with state and local
job training agencies. Under JTPA, the distinct (nonoverlapping and exhaustive) program jurisdictions were known as service delivery areas;
in WIA, they are called workforce investment areas.
Federal funding for these programs is allocated to states in proportion to measures of economic need, e.g., the number of unemployed
and economically disadvantaged individuals residing within them.5
And although states are required to expend the recent federal stimulus
funding by the end of June 2011, the Obama administration encouraged
them to spend the funds in “transformational efforts” to realize the “full
capacity” of the system to innovate and improve the effectiveness of
workforce development programs (USDOL 2009a).
The organizational forms of the job training centers and their approaches to service delivery have varied across states and localities
under both JTPA and WIA.6 Some job training centers are public entities at the state, county, or municipal government level, and others are
private, not-for-profit, or for-profit organizations. Under WIA, states
are required to establish a State Workforce Investment Board, including the governor, members of the state legislature, and representatives
of business, labor, educational entities, economic development agencies, and community-based organizations. A major responsibility of the
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board is to develop a state plan that outlines a five-year strategy for
the statewide workforce investment system. At the local level, all job
training centers are directed and supervised by a board of representatives from business, labor, the community, and local elected officials,
known formerly as Private Industry Councils under JTPA and currently
as Workforce Investment Boards under WIA. These boards determine
who is served, the types of services made available, and who should
provide the services (within the limitations of the statute).
The particular structure of local program administration depends
on a number of factors, including the size of the job training jurisdiction and its population, urban versus rural location, local political
configurations, and state-level administrative policies. In the JTPA
program, some agencies provided training services directly to eligible
clients, while a majority contracted with independent service provider
organizations to select participants and deliver program services (see
Dickinson et al. 1988). Workforce Investment Boards in the current
program are required to operate at least one One-Stop Career Center
in their service area, with the objective of colocating programs of the
USDOL, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human
Services, and Department of Housing and Urban Development (e.g.,
employment services, unemployment insurance, vocational rehabilitation, adult education, welfare-to-work, and postsecondary vocational
education). The local boards develop and enter into a “memorandum of
understanding” with the One-Stop partners that specifies the services to
be provided through the One-Stop delivery system, how the service and
operating costs of the system will be funded, and methods for referral of
customers between the One-Stop operator and the partners.
WIA also uses a form of vouchers for some participants, called
individual training accounts (ITAs), which allows them to purchase
training services directly from certified providers, a provision intended
to increase “customer choice” over the JTPA approach of using subcontracted providers. Implementation of ITAs varies on several dimensions,
including how the amount of the ITAs (or customers’ spending) is
determined, whether counseling in the use of the ITAs is required or
voluntary, and how much local staff restrict customers’ training choices.
D’Amico and Salzman (2004), Decker and Perez-Johnson (2004), and
McConnell et al. (2006) provide more detail on ITAs and also describe
an experimental evaluation of alternative ITA implementations.
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The research presented in the subsequent chapters of this book
conveys how critical these structures and processes are (as well as the
allocation of authority and discretion within them) in determining service access and program effectiveness.

PROGRAM ELIGIBILITy AnD SERvICES
Although JTPA and WIA differ considerably in their eligibility criteria, they have in common the voluntary nature of program participation.
The JTPA Title IIA program was more narrowly focused on serving the
disadvantaged, requiring 90 percent of all enrollees to be disadvantaged
and minimum levels of service to particular segments of the population, including youths, high school dropouts, and welfare recipients.7
At the same time, Devine and Heckman (1996) show that the federal
eligibility rules defined a fairly broad JTPA-eligible population, and local job training centers retained discretion to enroll noneconomically
disadvantaged persons who satisfied other “hardship” criteria defined
in the act (e.g., displaced homemakers, persons with limited English
proficiency, etc.) for the other 10 percent of their participant populations. Because annual program funding levels afforded services to less
than 3 percent of the JTPA-eligible population (Heckman and Smith
1999), state and local administrative entities had considerable leeway in
identifying specific target groups and developing additional participant
selection criteria within the eligibility guidelines (i.e., being eligible did
not guarantee one the opportunity to participate).
Under WIA, the most basic “core” services—outreach, intake/
assessment, job search assistance/placement, and labor market information—are made available to the general public with no qualifying
criteria/eligibility requirements. The USDOL does not require monitoring and tracking of participants using the self-directed core services or
non-WIA services at the One-Stop centers, but rather only those participants who receive substantial staff assistance in the WIA programs.
Individuals’ access to intensive or training services (e.g., comprehensive
assessment and case management, vocational, or on-the-job training)
proceeds sequentially if they are “unemployed and are unable to obtain
employment through core services provided” (WIA, Section 134 3.A.i).
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However, as Eberts, O’Leary, and DeRango (2002) note, the USDOL
offers little guidance to One-Stop center workers on how to identify the
needs of this broader target population and how to refer customers to
the various levels of service in a cost-effective manner. Wandner (2002)
nicely summarizes the differences in JTPA and WIA “service referral
principles,” and argues that there is a greater need for the use of targeting tools under WIA to aid frontline staff in determining appropriate
service levels for customers.

PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS SySTEM DESIGn
Under both JTPA and WIA, the performance standards system is
designed to reward job training centers or state workforce development
programs, respectively, that achieve performance goals with incentive
(budgetary) awards and external recognition. The USDOL, state job
training agencies, and local job training centers have together defined
and enforced these incentive policies.
The federal government is primarily involved in defining the basic
structure of the performance standards system in public employment
and training programs. These responsibilities of the USDOL include
defining mandatory performance measures to be used by states and local areas, setting state accounting and reporting rules, and monitoring,
rewarding, and/or sanctioning job training center performance. Table
2.1 shows the performance measures currently in effect under WIA and
also indicates which of these are new to WIA (i.e., were not used in
JTPA). Though the majority of these measures are common to JTPA
and WIA, there were a number of changes made in JTPA that shifted the
focal point of performance measurement from enrollees’ labor market
status at the time of program completion to three months after termination from the program. Under WIA, the follow-up period has been
extended to six months after program completion. Chapter 4 includes
additional discussion of the evolution of the performance measures under JTPA.
States are also now required to calculate performance outcomes using Unemployment Insurance (UI) data. An earlier GAO report (2002)
indicated that some states were experiencing difficulties in getting
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access to these records and developing or modifying data systems to
produce this information. The USDOL has since been working to promote data exchange between states via the Wage Record Interchange
System (WRIS), which specifically facilitates the exchange of wage
data for the purpose of assessing and reporting on state and local employment and training program and provider performance. As of August
2009, all states were participating in the WRIS.8
Performance standards are the numerical goals that job training
centers must achieve to become eligible for incentive awards and to
avoid sanctions. In JTPA, the USDOL exercised greater authority in
the determination of performance standard levels (or targets). It established expected performance levels in JTPA using a regression-based
model with national departure points. States could use the optional
Labor Department adjustment model or develop their own adjustment
procedures, although state-developed procedures and adjustments had
to conform to the department’s parameters (Social Policy Research
Associates 1999). A majority of states adopted the optional USDOL adjustment model and used the USDOL-provided performance standards
worksheets to determine performance targets, although sometimes with
modifications. Chapters 4 and 5 present additional information about
how performance standards were adjusted under the JTPA program.
Under WIA, states negotiate with the USDOL and local service delivery areas to establish performance targets, using estimates based on
historical data that are similarly intended to take into account differences in economic conditions, participant characteristics, and services
delivered. Since performance data were collected in JTPA, more than
half of the states used these baseline data to determine appropriate levels
for the WIA-negotiated performance standards or to inform negotiations with local workforce development officials. The informal process
of making these adjustments during negotiations in WIA contrasts noticeably with the standardized regression-based approach used by states
under JTPA. States’ own reports of procedures used to determine WIA
performance standards suggest that there is substantially greater discretion and variation in both the processes and types of information used
to establish the state-level standards (Heinrich 2004). The pretext for
making this change to a system of negotiated standards was to promote
“shared accountability,” described as one of the “guiding principles” of
WIA (USDOL 2001, p. 8).9

Performance measure
Adults
Entered employment rate
Employment retention rate at 6 months
Average earnings change in 6 months
Employment and credential ratea
Dislocated workers
Entered employment rate
Employment retention rate at 6 months
Earnings replacement rate in 6 months
Employment and credential ratea
Older youths (19–21)
Entered employment rate

Description
The percentage of adults who obtained a job by the end of the first quarter after program
exit (excluding participants employed at registration).
Of adults who had a job in the first quarter after exit, percentage with a job in the third
quarter after exit.
Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit, the postprogram earnings increases
relative to preprogram earnings.
Of those adults who received WIA training services, the percentage who were employed in
the first quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the third quarter after exit.
The percentage of dislocated workers who obtained a job by the end of the first quarter
after program exit (excluding those employed at registration).
Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit, the percentage of dislocated workers
who have a job in the third quarter after exit.
Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit, the percentage of preprogram earnings
that are earned postprogram.
Of those dislocated workers who received WIA training services, the percentage who were
employed in the first quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the third
quarter after exit.
The percentage of older youths who were not enrolled in postsecondary education or
advanced training in the first quarter after program exit and obtained a job by the end of
the first quarter after exit (excluding those employed at registration).
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Table 2.1 Performance Measures—JTPA and wIA

Employment retention rate at 6 months

Older youths employment/education/
training and credential ratea
Younger youths
Retention rate
Skill attainment rate
Diploma rate
Customer satisfaction
Participant satisfactiona
Employer satisfactiona

New to WIA.

a

In employment, postsecondary education, advanced training, apprenticeships in third
quarter after exit.
Attain at least two goals relating to basic skills, work readiness, skill attainment, entered
employment and skill training.
Earn a secondary school diploma or its recognized equivalent (GED).
The average of three statewide survey questions, rated 1 to 10 (1 = very dissatisfied to 10 =
very satisfied), asking if participants were satisfied with services, if services met customer
expectations, and how the services compared to the “ideal set” of services.
The average of three statewide survey questions, rated 1 to 10 (1 = very dissatisfied to 10 =
very satisfied), asking if employers were satisfied with services, if services met customer
expectations, and how the services compared to the “ideal set” of services.

Training Programs and Performance Standards System Design 23

Average earnings change in 6 months

Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit and were not enrolled in postsecondary
education or advanced training in the third quarter after program exit, the percentage of
older youths who have a job in the third quarter after exit.
Of those who had a job in the first quarter after exit and were not enrolled in postsecondary
education or advanced training, the postprogram earnings increases relative to preprogram
earnings.
The percentage of older youths who are in employment, postsecondary education, or
advanced training in the first quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the
third quarter after exit.
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In JTPA, 6 percent of the federal government’s JTPA appropriation
to states was designated for performance incentive awards to local job
training centers. Some states made the incentive awards for job training centers dependent on their performance relative to other service
delivery areas. Other states defined a maximum incentive payment for
each job training center, with the fraction awarded depending on the
difference between the center’s measured performance and the state
standards. Until recently in the WIA program, the Secretary of Labor
awarded incentive grants to states that achieve at least 80 percent of
their negotiated performance levels on each performance measure and
at least a 100 percent cumulative program area score for each of the
program areas (adults, dislocated workers, and youths) and the customer satisfaction measures.10 States were required to apply for the
incentive grants and may receive a minimum grant award of $750,000,
up to a maximum amount of $3,000,000 (conditional on the availability of funds), for use in innovative programs. States that did not meet
their performance goals for two consecutive years may be sanctioned
with a 5 percent reduction in their WIA grants. In addition to the monetary incentives and penalties under JTPA and WIA, states have also
recognized high performers and innovative programs with special nonmonetary awards. In general, the performance standards system serves
as the primary means for federal- and state-level monitoring and motivation of local job training center operations and performance.

SUMMARy
The goal of this chapter is to provide the basic information essential to understanding the more in-depth and rigorous analyses of
the performance standards systems in U.S. employment and training
programs that follow in this book. The subsequent chapters delve into
the complexities and challenges of operating an efficient, informative,
and accurate performance standards system, and the implications of
basic program design elements—i.e., legislative objectives, organizational structures, accountability requirements, reporting relationships,
and funding—for the effective functioning of a performance standards
system. And importantly, the research presented in this book also ad-
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dresses the implications of these systems for the programs’ outcomes
and impacts on participants’ employment and earnings. The majority of
the following chapters focus primarily on JTPA, in part because it was
the longest running public sector employment and training program in
the United States and has had the longest history of any public sector program with an outcomes-based performance standard system; in
part because of the unique data available from the experimental evaluation of the JTPA program; and in part because it is similar enough
to yield important lessons for current WIA programs and their future
adaptations.

notes
1. “Agency Reported Data,” Recovery.gov, accessed February 22, 2010, http://www
.recovery.gov/Transparency/agency/reporting/agency_reporting3.aspx?agency_
code=16&dt=02/12/2010.
2. According to Franklin and Ripley (1984, pp. 176–177), performance standards
were under development for JTPA’s predecessor, CETA, but were not implemented
prior to CETA’s replacement by JTPA.
3. Title IIB authorized a summer youth program, Title III funded a program for dislocated workers, and Title IV governed various federally administered programs.
Title I of the act described JTPA’s administrative structures, and Title V contained
amendments and miscellaneous provisions relating to the interaction between
JTPA and other programs such as the former Aid to Families with Dependent
Children.
4. In the early 1990s, Title IIA was split, and a new Title IIC was created specifically
for economically disadvantaged youth, while IIA was reauthorized to serve adults
only.
5. In both the JTPA and WIA programs, one-third of the funds received by states
depends on the relative number of unemployed individuals in the state; another
third depends on the relative excess number of unemployed individuals (over 4.5
percent), and the final third depends on the number of economically disadvantaged
persons (as defined by the act).
6. The term job training center is used interchangeably with service delivery area and
workforce investment area in this book.
7. Section 4.8 of JTPA specifically defined economic “disadvantage” and was the
basis from which the program eligibility criteria were derived. An individual was
eligible for JTPA services if 1) the person or another member of his or her family
received cash public assistance; 2) the person’s family income did not exceed the
higher of the poverty level, or 70 percent of the lower living standard level; 3) the
person was a handicapped adult whose own income met these criteria even though
his/her family income may not have; 4) the person was eligible for food stamps
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sometime during the six months prior to applying to JTPA; or 5) the person (a
youth applicant) was a foster child.
8. “WRIS Membership, August 7, 2009,” accessed March 4, 2010, http://www.doleta
.gov/performance/pfdocs/WRIS_MAP_08_07_09.pdf.
9. The USDOL is currently testing regression models for the WIA performance
standards with the goal of returning to a system of regression-based adjustments
beginning in July 2011 (USDOL 2009b).
10. For example, if a state negotiates a 70 percent adult entered employment rate
standard and then achieves actual entered employment rate performance of 75
percent, it will have a score of 107 percent for that measure. If it does less well
on its adult employment retention rate, say, achieving 60 percent instead of the 62
percent standard, its score of only 96.8 percent on this measure will be offset by
its exceptional achievement on the entered employment rate measure (or possibly
one of the other two adult measures as well). Among the four adult performance
measures, the cumulative score must be 100 percent (determined “by simple or
weighted averaging”).
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A Formal Model of a
Performance Incentive System
James J. Heckman
Carolyn J. Heinrich
Jeffrey Smith

This chapter presents a model of training center behavior in an environment that includes a generic performance management system for
active labor market programs (ALMPs), such as those funded under
JTPA and WIA in the United States. The model builds on the work of
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) and provides more intuition and
discussion of the model and its implications, along with some useful
extensions.1 Additionally, our model offers an essential conceptual context for the detailed analyses of the JTPA and WIA programs that follow
in the remaining chapters of this volume.
The model we develop assumes that training (or workforce development) centers seek to maximize the present discounted value of
earnings (or employment) impacts from the services they provide, as
well as, potentially, goals related to the characteristics of participants
and to the effort levels exerted by program staff.2 The JTPA and WIA
programs both have formally stated equity (service to particular subgroups) and efficiency (improving labor market outcomes relative to
what would have occurred without the program) goals. Our model demonstrates how these objectives interact with a performance standards
system based on short-term outcome measures, and we discuss in detail why all of the performance standards systems we know of rely on
performance measures based on outcome levels measured in the short
term rather than on impacts (“value added”) over the long run. The use
of short-term outcomes as performance measures has the potential to
misdirect activity by focusing training center attention on criteria only
loosely (or even perversely) related to long-run net benefits, long-run
equity criteria, or both. For example, if program activities encourage
29

30 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith

further training and schooling, they may reduce employment and earnings in the short run but raise them in the long run.
Most discussions of performance standards focus on cream skimming, sometimes defined as selecting persons into a program who
would have done well without it. Anderson et al. (1992) and Barnow
(1992) represent early examples of this literature, while Courty, Kim,
and Marschke (forthcoming) provide an important recent contribution.
In the context of a system of performance standards, cream skimming
occurs when training centers serve individuals who will increase their
measured performance rather than basing service provision decisions
on individuals’ expected long-run benefits from participation. In this
chapter, we provide a concise formal definition of cream skimming in
terms of our model notation, show how performance standards based
on participant outcomes in the short run encourage it, and discuss the
conditions under which it does or does not lead centers away from the
goal of maximizing discounted impacts.
The model we introduce allows responses to performance standards in terms of who gets selected into the program from among the
eligible population and how program resources get allocated among
participants, as well as strategic responses that seek to increase measured performance conditional on actual performance, such as those
considered in Chapter 7. More generally, this model provides a clear
conceptual framework within which to think about when (and if) performance standards systems in ALMPs will increase the labor market
impacts they produce, and when (and if) they will have unintended
consequences due to responses by program staff to the sometimes misguided incentives they provide.

A MODEL OF TRAInInG CEnTER ChOICES
Training centers face three choices in each period: 1) how many
people to train, 2) which particular people to train, and 3) how many
resources to devote to each trainee. In the current WIA program, access to “core” workforce development services (such as labor market
information and job search assistance) is universal, but access to more
intensive levels of service (such as comprehensive assessment and case
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management, vocational training, and subsidized on-the-job training)
still involves some degree of selection by caseworkers in light of the
available training resources for individual clients and services (see Social Policy Research Associates [2004] for more institutional details on
WIA). Thus, in the WIA context, our model applies to these more intensive services. Adding a requirement that all eligible individuals receive
some very small level of service would not change any of the basic
results from the model.
For simplicity, we assume that training centers face a completely
new cohort of potential trainees in each period; this avoids potential
complications associated with training centers making choices about
when to serve particular people. More generally, we assume that training centers operate in a “stationary” environment, which means that
the center’s decision rules do not change over time. Put differently, if
a center faces the same set of potential trainees, the same technology
for producing trainee outcomes, and the same budget constraint in two
different periods, it will make exactly the same choices in those two
periods. We assume that the set of potential trainees and the technology
stay the same, and, in later sections, that the budget varies only as a
result of performance awards.
We ignore the individual application decision in our model and simply assume that the training center can choose to serve any or all of the
eligible individuals in each cohort (given its budget constraint). In so
doing, we abstract from center choices regarding marketing, outreach,
contractor selection, and other factors that might affect who applies to
the program, even though the presence or details of a performance standards system might affect these choices.
We also assume that individuals participate or not in the first period of their adult lives, which we denote age zero, and that training
takes exactly one period for all trainees. Thus, we implicitly ignore
individual choices regarding the timing of training.3 Each individual
has two potential outcomes at each age: a benchmark (or untreated)
outcome that arises if the individual does not participate (at age zero),
and a treated outcome that arises if the individual does participate (at
age zero). In terms of the usual notation, we denote the participant outcomes by Ya1 , a = 0,, A, where A is the final period of the person’s
life, and denote the nonparticipant outcomes by Ya0 , a = 0,, A. The
per-period treatment effect equals Ya1 − Ya0 = D a . The treatment effect
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can be negative in the short run if, for example, program participation
leads to additional schooling or distracts the individual from useful job
search.4 We abstract from potential general equilibrium effects in our
discussion.5 In the language of the treatment effects literature, we make
the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA), which means that
the treated and untreated outcomes just defined do not depend on who
participates or on how many individuals participate.
To allow our analysis to fit into a standard cost-benefit framework,
let Y denote earnings; we can easily generalize the model to include
employment or education outcomes. The net (of costs) present value of
the program impacts (hereinafter just “net impacts”) measured at time
zero for participant i then equals
(3.1)

D ai
− ci ,
a
a=0 (1+ r)
A

PVi = ∑

where ci denotes the costs associated with participant i. We assume that
(D a , c) varies among individuals but the interest rate r does not.6
The model assumes that training centers can apply different amounts
of input, e, to each participant. In the context of JTPA or WIA (or similar programs), the input variable represents the value of staff time and
the direct costs of the services provided. The inputs affect the outcomes
experienced by participants. In particular, input e yields
(3.2)

Ya1 = f (Ya0 , e) ,

at cost c(e), where c(0) = 0. The total cost for participant i is given by
ci = ci (ei ) + k , where k denotes a per-participant fixed cost. Note that
we allow both the amount of the inputs and the marginal cost of the
inputs to vary among participants.
By choosing to model a continuous input e, we abstract from reality
on two important dimensions. First, most of the services provided by
ALMPs come in discrete chunks of a particular type. For example, JTPA
offered, and WIA currently offers, classroom training in occupational
skills, job search assistance, and subsidized on-the-job training at private firms, among other services. Classroom training consists of various
types of courses, each aimed at a particular occupation and each having
a specific duration. The other service types vary in a similar way. Representing this complex mix of discrete services by a continuous input
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simplifies our model considerably, but at the cost of abstracting from
the potential impact of performance standards not only on the amount of
services provided but on their type and duration. For example, Heinrich
(1999), Barnow and Gubits (2002), and D’Amico and Salzman (2004)
(and many others) have argued that a focus on short-term outcomes
in performance standards pushes training centers toward providing
shorter, less-intensive services such as job search assistance to a larger
number of trainees. Second, we ignore the fact that inputs often get allocated to participants dynamically in response to their experiences in
particular treatments and in response to their labor market outcomes.
For example, at the end of a classroom training course, participants with
a job lined up do not receive job search assistance, while those without
a job lined up often do. Our simplifying assumption means that our
model also fails to capture any effects of performance standards on this
dynamic service allocation process.
Given these assumptions, training centers have several degrees of
freedom in regard to whom to serve and how many inputs to devote
to each participant. First, for a fixed set of inputs, a training center
can choose to serve individuals with different (D a , c) combinations.
Second, holding the set of participants fixed, the training center can
choose the inputs it provides to each participant, which has the effect of
changing their potential outcomes given participation (and, necessarily,
changing their impacts of participation as well). Third, a training center
can choose the number of participants by trading off between the fixed
cost k and the variable input cost ci (ei ).
If the training center maximizes the ex post present value of the
net earnings impacts realized by its trainees, it solves a constrained optimization problem. Maximizing the present value of the net impacts
corresponds to a social goal of efficiency in the economic sense; it means
making the economic “pie” as large as possible while ignoring equity
concerns other than those implicit in the program’s eligibility rules. In
the absence of a budget constraint, the center would simply find the e
that maximizes the present value of net impacts for each participant:
(3.3)

A

ê = arg max ∑
e

a=0

(Ya1 − Ya0 )

(1+ r )

a

− c(e) − k.

In the real world, and in our model, training centers operate under a
budget constraint. Let B denote the center budget in each period. With a
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budget constraint, centers face a trade-off between serving more clients
and devoting more inputs to each client. Let {1,..., I} be the index set
of eligible individuals; put differently, label each eligible person with
a number from 1 to I. Person i has associated variable costs ci(ei) and
fixed cost k. We assume that technology (3.2) is common across persons
although this assumption can easily be relaxed.
The training center solves its maximization problem in two steps.
In the first step, for each possible set of trainees S ⊆ {1,..., I} in the current cohort it determines the optimal choice of inputs to devote to each
member of the set. Formally, for each possible set S, the center solves
the problem
(3.4)

(

)

1
 A Ya,i

− Ya,i0

−
c
−
k
,
max ∑  ∑
e
(
)
i
i
a
ei ,i∈S

i∈S  a=0 (1+ r )



subject to Equation (3.2), and
(3.5)

B ≥ ∑ ( ci (ei ) + k ) .
i∈S

For LaGrange multiplier λ attached to the constraint in (3.5), solving the optimization problem produces the first order condition
(3.6)



 f Yi,0a , ei


ei
a0 

A

 

1

 1 r 

a



ci  ei 
ei

for each observation i ∈ S . Condition (3.6) represents the standard efficiency condition for ei which sets marginal benefit equal to marginal
cost. In the absence of a budget constraint, λ = 1 at an interior optimum.
In general, λ ≥ 1, reflecting the scarcity of the resources available to the
center, and the center invests less in each person than it would in the
absence of resource constraints.7
The second step to solving the overall optimization problem for
each cohort consists of comparing the optimal value of the present value
of net impacts for each subset S and choosing the subset S * that has the
highest one. Formally, write the maximized present value implied by
the solution to the constrained optimization problem in Equation (3.4)
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as ψ(S,B), where this notation shows the dependence of the optimum on
both the set S of participants selected and the available budget B. The
center chooses the optimal S, which we denote by S*, so that
ψ(S*,B) = arg max ψ (S,B).8
S

Implementing this ex post optimal solution requires information
that both the centers and (to a lesser extent) the individuals themselves
do not possess at the time of participation. In particular, they do not
know future values of (Ya1 ,Ya0 ), although they may have other information useful for predicting these values. For example, most ALMPs
collect information on observable characteristics associated with outcomes from prospective participants, and some may also have access to
administrative data on past labor market outcomes.
The available evidence suggests the difficulty of forecasting future
Da. In particular, Bell and Orr (2002) show that caseworkers do a very
poor job of predicting Da in a program that provides job training to
welfare recipients, and Lechner and Smith (2007) show that Swiss caseworkers also do not perform well at this task. Carneiro, Hansen, and
Heckman (2003) demonstrate that individuals cannot forecast most of
the variation in the earnings impact associated with attending college.
Let J i denote the center’s information set for individual i. Taking
into account the lack of complete information, the criterion for ex ante
optimality for each S becomes
(3.7)

(

1
0

  A E Ya,i − Ya,i | J i
Max ∑   ∑
a
ei
i∈S   a=0
(1+ r )


)  − c (e ) − k 


i

i

,


subject to Equation (3.2), Equation (3.5), and the individual-specific
information sets { J i }i∈S . For each S, { J i }i∈S , B, and r, we may write the
solution to this present value maximization problem as ψ ( S, B, J ) ,
where J = {J1 ,..., J I }. The training center seeks to maximize this criterion with respect to S, so that

ψ ( S * , B, J ) = arg maxψ ( S, B, J ) .
S
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In this model, training centers adjust at three margins: 1) which eligible individuals become trainees (in WIA, which participants receive
intense services), 2) the amount of inputs devoted to each trainee, and
3) the number of trainees. While the exact trade-offs depend on the
specifications of the technology for producing outcomes in Equation
(3.2), the marginal cost functions, and the level of fixed costs k, a set
of intuitive comparative static results follow directly from the model.
For example, increasing the slope of the marginal cost function c(e),
all else equal, leads centers to increase the number of participants and
to serve each one less intensively. Increases in the fixed cost k have the
opposite effect, reducing the number of participants and increasing the
amount of resources devoted to each one. Individuals with higher marginal costs—i.e., larger values of ci′(ei ) —will, all else equal, receive
fewer inputs. Increasing the amount of complementarity between the
untreated outcome and the costs in the production function in Equation
(3.2) leads centers to devote relatively more inputs to participants with
good untreated outcomes. Increases in the budget lead, in general, to
both more participants and more inputs per participant. Finally, in a
stationary environment, the training center makes the same decision in
every period.9

MOTIvATInG PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS
The model in the preceding section assumes that training centers
maximize the net present value of impacts and nothing else. In fact,
training centers exist in a political context and they employ caseworkers
and managers who care about outcomes other than just the maximization of the present value of net impacts. Consider the politicians first.
Politicians care about what training centers do. In particular, they care
not only about present value maximization but also about other aspects
of who, and how many, get served. For example, politicians may care
about the absolute number of participants, based on the view that each
participant will feel that he or she has received something from the
politician, and so, perhaps, will vote accordingly. Politicians may also
care about serving members of particular groups whose leaders support
them or about serving highly visible individuals, such as those who lose
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their jobs when a major plant closes; see, e.g., Heinrich (1999) on the
role of politics in JTPA contract award decisions.
We can summarize politicians’ preferences by the utility function
[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S)],
UP
where ψ(S) denotes the expected present value
of net impacts for participant cohort S (with the other arguments suppressed for simplicity), and N(S) denotes the number of participants
(≤ I ) served in cohort S. Q(S) denotes other qualities of the persons
served such as demographic characteristics or their untreated outcomes,
with the latter motivated by a desire to serve those least well off in the
absence of the program due to equity concerns.
Training center staff members also care about aspects of their work
other than just present value maximization. For example, as discussed
in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996), caseworkers may prefer to serve
the most disadvantaged (those with the lowest benchmark outcomes Ya0 )
or members of particular subgroups among the eligible. At the same
time, they may prefer to serve fewer individuals than present value
maximization would imply if, for example, they get utility from getting
to know their clients in depth. Abstracting for simplicity from the fact
that training center managers (some of them future politicians) may
have different preferences than the line workers they manage, we can
summarize the training center utility function by UT[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S)].
Given either utility function, we can define a constrained optimization problem similar to that defined in the preceding section. The
problem consists of maximizing the utility function subject to the technology for producing participant outcomes in Equation (3.2) and the
budget constraint in Equation (3.5) through choices about how many
people to serve, which ones to serve, and how to allocate the inputs
among those served. The equilibrium from this modified optimization
problem will differ in simple and intuitive ways from that obtained under present value maximization in the preceding section. For example,
if we consider maximizing the training center’s utility and if the training center gets disutility from a larger number of participants, then the
resulting number of participants will not exceed that chosen under present value maximization. If the training center gets utility from serving
some particular group, say unemployed musicians, then it will serve
more of them (or at least no fewer of them) under utility maximization
than under present value maximization, and so on.
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In this setting, performance standards have no role to play, even if
the training center has imperfect information about potential outcomes,
so long as the utility functions of the politicians and the training center
are similar enough (e.g., one is a linear transformation of the other) that
they would reach the same solution to the ex ante utility maximization
problem just described. A role for performance standards emerges when
the two utility functions imply different choices. In that event, politicians may want to provide additional incentives to training centers in a
way that makes their choices closer to those implied by the politicians’
utility function. For example, if the training centers dislike having more
participants at the margin and politicians like having more participants
at the margin, then politicians will want to introduce performance standards in a way that rewards centers for having more participants.
In one view, this situation, in which the politicians set up the local
training centers, which then deliver services within the context of broad
rules, represents a classic principal-agent problem. The politicians
would like the training centers to choose an optimum that corresponds
to their own utility, rather than that of the center staff. See the insightful survey in Dixit (2002) and the references cited therein (as well as
the other papers in the related special issue of the Journal of Human
Resources) for further elaboration of this point.
Politicians can bring center behavior in line with their own preferences in two basic ways.10 One obvious way consists of specifying the
rules governing center behavior so narrowly as to leave center staff with
little discretion to do otherwise than as specified by program rules.11
The fundamental problem with this approach in the context of ALMPs
arises from the complexity of the task at hand and the large amount of
(often tacit) local knowledge, in the sense of Hayek (1945), required for
the task. Most training centers under JTPA and now under WIA serve
individuals with quite heterogeneous desires and abilities by matching
them with a (wide) variety of services provided either directly by the
center or a service provider under contract. Attempting to prespecify the
matches between participants and services would require either numbing levels of regulatory detail or a false simplicity that would likely
seriously degrade the quality of the resulting matches. Performance
standards represent an alternative to micromanagement by the politicians via program regulations. Here politicians define the goals they
seek by defining the performance measures and the “reward functions”
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(described in Chapters 4 and 5 for the JTPA program) that link observed
performance to rewards and punishments. In so doing, they allow centers to continue using their local knowledge in choosing whom to serve
and how to serve them, while at the same time directing the application
of this knowledge toward the politicians’ own goals.
An alternative view from a principal-agent perspective assumes
that politicians and training centers share the same preferences about
whom to serve and how to serve them, but differ in their desired level of
training center effort. Put simply, politicians would like training center
staff to work very hard, while training center staff would like to consume some on-the-job leisure. This view links to the literature on piece
rates, performance-based compensation for CEOs, and other types of
incentives often found in private firms; this literature focuses almost
exclusively on methods for tying remuneration to measured output as a
means to increase unobserved effort (see Prendergast [1999] for an able
survey, Lazear [1995] for a book-length treatment, and Chapter 5 for
additional discussion in our context). We could incorporate this view
into our model by breaking inputs e into two components, one representing staff effort and the other representing other inputs. The sum of
staff effort would then enter negatively into the training center utility
function, capturing the negative direct effect of staff effort; at the same
time, staff effort would have an indirect positive effect on center utility
through its effect on the present value of net impacts.
A third view of performance standards emphasizes the information
they provide rather than their role in solving (or attempting to solve)
one or the other of the principal-agent problems just described. In this
view—discussed, for example, in Smith (2004)—performance standards
represent quick and dirty impact evaluations. They provide valuable
feedback to training center managers and staff (and to politicians) about
their progress at meeting equity and efficiency goals—feedback that,
as Lechner and Smith (2007) note, training centers often otherwise
never receive, because they rarely interact with those they serve after
they serve them. Because the feedback comes quickly, it allows rapid
responses to changes in performance due to changes in program operation, local economic conditions, or other factors. Our model does not
capture this role for performance standards in a formal way; doing so
would substantially complicate the model, as it would need to incorporate training center learning in response to the information provided by
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the performance measures. We note in Chapter 9 some implications of
thinking about performance measures in this way for the interpretation
of the evidence on the correlation between performance measures and
program impacts. Rather obviously, if performance measures exist to
proxy long-run impacts, their correlation with those impacts becomes
the paramount measure of their value.
All three views about the role of performance standards appear in
the literature; in our view, all three have empirical relevance. In this
chapter, we focus our model mainly on the first of the three roles; generalizing our analysis to include the second is straightforward.

PERFORMAnCE MEASURES In PRACTICE
In practice, most performance measures M consist of participant
outcomes in the short run. The focus on the short run stems from the desire to provide prompt feedback to program managers and politicians.
Feedback that arrives years after the corresponding actions by program
staff does little to either motivate or inform. The focus on observed
outcomes (i.e., did the participant get a job soon after finishing the program?) rather than estimated impacts (i.e., did the participant do well in
the labor market relative to what would have transpired had he or she
not participated?) has several motivations. First, evaluations (experimental or nonexperimental) that seek to estimate impacts by estimating
the counterfactual outcomes of participants take a long time, typically
on the order of years, to carry out. Even short-run impact estimates
require considerable time to collect and prepare the necessary outcome
data on participants (and, if required, a comparison group) for use in
econometric analyses. Second, performance measures based on impacts
often generate controversy, either because of uncertainty about the
econometric method utilized, in the case of nonexperimental methods,
or politically, in the case of random assignment. Finally, performance
measures based on outcome levels generally cost much less to produce
than measures based on impacts. As the literature on evaluating active
labor market programs makes clear (see, e.g., Heckman, LaLonde, and
Smith 1999), impact evaluation poses demanding technical problems
that typically require the assistance of expensive experts and make the
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process difficult to automate. In contrast, measuring outcomes presents
much simpler problems and, once established, becomes a routine data
collection and processing exercise. Costs matter, because an expensive
performance management system, even if it accomplishes something,
may not accomplish enough to justify the expense.
The most common performance measure consists of employment
rates in the period immediately following program participation. In
terms of our notation, we can represent this measure as
(3.8)

M (S0 ) =

1
1
1(Y1,i1 > 0) =
∑
∑ E1,i1 ,
N (S0 ) i∈S0
N (S0 ) i∈S0

where the first subscript on Y1,1i denotes age 1, the 0 subscript on S0
indicates the current cohort of trainees; 1(·) denotes the indicator function, which takes a value of 1 when its argument holds and a value of
0 when it does not; and E1,1 i = 1(Y1,1i > 0) is a dummy variable for employment (defined here as positive earnings) at age 1 (the first period
after participation). A slightly different formulation captures measures
such as those in JTPA and WIA that consider wages or earnings conditional on employment. For example, in our notation, a measure based
on earnings conditional on employment becomes

M (S0 ) =

1
1(Y1,i1 > 0)Y1,i1 =
∑
1
∑ 1(Y1,i > 0) i∈S0

i∈S0

1
1 1
E1,i
Y1,i .
∑
1
∑ 1(Y1,i > 0) i∈S0

i∈S0

In this performance measure, the indicator function serves to condition the average on the set of participants with positive wages or
earnings.
As described in Chapters 2 and 4, not all performance measures
focus on labor market outcomes. Some capture the receipt of various
educational credentials, such as the GED, or, in the WIA program, customer satisfaction measures based on surveys (where customers include
both participants and the firms that might hire them). Smith, Whalley,
and Wilcox (2010a,b) discuss and provide evidence on the value of such
participant self-evaluation measures. For many years, the WIA performance standards system also included a measure based on before-after
earnings changes, which took advantage of the well-known preprogram
dip in mean earnings among participants to produce the (highly mis-
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leading) appearance of large program impacts. Heckman and Smith
(1999) document the dip using the National JTPA Study data and show
its implications for, among others, the before-after estimator of program
impacts. Incorporating any or all of these alternative performance measures into our model requires no conceptual innovations.

REwARD FUnCTIOnS In ThE MODEL
The reward function R(M) links observed performance on the performance measures to rewards and (much more rarely) punishments
for training centers. In most performance systems for ALMPs around
the world, rewards come informally, through praise and recognition. In
contrast, Chapter 4 documents that rewards in the JTPA performance
standards system took the form of budgetary increments determined by
formal rules. The WIA system lies somewhere in between, with monetary bonuses awarded to states that were probably more consequential
for the recognition they accord than the funds they provide (see, for
example, Heinrich [2007]).
The simplest system assigns a discrete reward R to centers meeting
a defined standard in terms of observed performance. In terms of our
notation, this implies the reward function

 R if M (S) > τ ;
R(M (S)) = 
 0 otherwise.
Here τ denotes some fixed level of attainment on the performance
measure, such as 60 percent of former participants employed in the period after training. Training centers that exceed that level get the reward
and those that fall below it do not. As noted in Chapter 4, many more
complicated reward functions exist (or have existed) in practice, including functions that reward relative rather than absolute performance,
functions that require certain levels of performance on multiple measures, and functions that reward marginal improvements in performance
above τ . Extending our model to incorporate such reward functions is
straightforward.
For nonbudgetary rewards, it makes sense to put the reward function directly in the training center utility function, as in

(3.9)
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UT[ψ(S),N(S),Q(S),R(M)] where we leave the dependence of M on training center choices regarding whom to serve (S) and how to allocate the
inputs e among those they serve implicit. Almost by definition, we assume a positive partial derivative.
In the case of budgetary rewards, things become a bit more complicated. In that case, as in the JTPA and WIA programs, recognition
remains part of the reward for good performance, and thus it makes
sense to keep the reward function in the utility function. At the same
time, receiving a budgetary reward changes the underlying choice problem in the next period by allowing the center to serve more individuals,
to direct more inputs to those it would have served in any case, or both.
Exactly how the additional budget affects choices depends in part on
whether individuals served with the reward money count toward measured performance in the following period. If they do not, this allows
centers to focus on satisfying their preferences regarding Q(S) with the
reward money; for example, they might devote additional attention to
the “hard to serve” among their eligible population. In the JTPA and
WIA systems, individuals served with reward money do not, in fact,
count toward measured performance; nonetheless, later in this chapter
we assume for simplicity in our discussions of dynamics that they do,
so that we can simply add the reward money R to the original budget B
and proceed as before.

ThE EFFECT OF PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS On
CEnTER BEhAvIOR: CREAM SKIMMInG
This section outlines the implications of our model for center behavior in the presence of a performance standards system that uses the
mean earnings (including the zeros) of participants at age “1” (i.e., in
the period after program participation) as the performance measure and
includes a reward function that increases in measured performance. To
make things even simpler, in this section we suppose that training center utility depends only on the present value of net impacts and the
reward, corresponding to the utility function UT[ψ(S),R(M)].
Adding the basic performance management system just described
to the model changes all of the first order conditions. In each case, when
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choosing how many to serve, whom to serve, and how to allocate inputs,
the training center now considers the effect of the choice on both ψ (S)
and R(M ) . Thus, when it evaluates a potential participant, instead of
just considering their expected discounted stream of net impacts, the
center also considers their expected earnings in the period immediately
following participation. A potential participant who wants to enroll in,
say, a two-year vocational training program after getting a GED with
the help of the program becomes less attractive in the presence of the
performance standards system laid out in the preceding paragraph. On
the other hand, a potential participant who will find a job with high
earnings one or two weeks earlier with the program’s help but otherwise
derives no benefit from it becomes more attractive. This new emphasis
on short-term outcomes in choosing whom to serve and how to allocate
inputs leads to the common criticism that performance standards systems generate cream skimming (see, e.g., Barnow and Smith [2004];
Radin [2006]; Trutko et al. [2005]; GAO [2002]).
Before turning to a discussion of the effects of cream skimming on
the efficiency and equity of training center operation, we now formally
define cream skimming. The policy literature often defines cream skimming rather casually to mean serving the least “hard to serve” among
the eligible population. In terms of our model’s notation, the simple performance system described above creates an incentive to serve persons
with high values of Y1,1i , regardless of whether that high value results
from a high value of Y1,0i or a high value of D 1,i .
The existing literature is vague about whether cream skimming
should be defined in terms of Y1,i1 or Y1,i0 . Our model, and the logic of performance measurement systems more generally, suggests a definition in
terms of Y1,i1 , as it is Y1,i1 that the performance standards incentivize training centers to take account of in their decisions.12 Of course, given the
evidence in Bell and Orr (2002) that caseworkers do reasonably well at
forecasting Y0,1i and reasonably poorly at forecasting D1,i , as well as the
evidence in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) that, at least for the
JTPA program, most of the variance in Y1,1i corresponds to variance in Y1,0i
(or, put differently, the variance of D1,i is small relative to that of Y1,0i ),
the distinction may not matter much empirically.13
We now consider the implications of cream skimming for program equity and efficiency in the context of our model. To keep the
discussion simple, for the purposes of this section we make the simpli-
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fying assumption that untreated outcomes do not vary with age, so that
Y0,ai = Y0,i for all “a.” This assumption allows us to summarize equity
concerns in a single number, where we define equity as serving those
with the lowest values of Y0,i among the eligible.
Consider first an important special case. As noted in Heckman
(1992); Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); and Djebbari and
Smith (2008), conventional models of program evaluation assume that
1
1
Ya,i
and Ya,i0 differ by a constant, so that D a,i = Ya,i
− Ya,i0 = D a for all i .
Put differently, they assume that everyone has the same impact of
treatment—the so-called common effect model.14 In the common effect world, a high Y11,i goes hand in glove with a high Y10,i , and picking
persons with a high Y10,i helps toward satisfying Equation (3.8). In the
context of our model, the common effect assumption simplifies the production function in Equation (3.2) to
(3.2')

Ya1 = f (Ya0 , e) = Ya0 + D a ,

which removes the input choice decision from the problem (and with it
the variable cost portion of the cost function).
Assuming equal fixed costs for all trainees, training centers in a
common effect world serve only the individuals at the top of the distribution of untreated outcomes among the eligible. In this world, the
discounted stream of impacts does not depend on who gets served, leaving the center free to maximize their measured performance. Thus, in
the common effect world, our simple performance standards system has
no effect on economic efficiency but very unattractive equity effects.
A mild generalization of the common effect world illustrates another important point. Suppose that all individuals share the same
discounted sum of impacts

D d ,i

 A (Ya,i1 − Ya,i0 ) 

= ∑
a
 a=0 (1+ r )  ,

but that the timing of the impacts varies. To keep things very simple,
suppose that one random half of the eligibles have impacts of zero in
periods 0 and 1, the period of participation and the period just after,
while the other random half has impacts of zero in period 0 but positive
impacts in period 1 and all future periods, with the impacts just a bit
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smaller than those in the first group so that the discounted sum comes
out the same. Training centers will now prefer, at the margin and to
the extent that they can identify them, the individuals with the earlier
impacts. Put differently, given the same value of Y1,0i , an individual with
a positive impact the period following participation adds more to a center’s measured performance than an individual with no positive impacts
until the second period after participation. Thus, performance measures
based on outcomes in period 1 encourage the provision of services that
yield quick improvements in outcomes relative to later improvements
in outcomes, even conditional on the same discounted sum. At the margin, the center would even trade off some of the discounted impacts to
get a larger impact in the period of performance measurement, an incentive that those who complain about an overemphasis on low-intensity
“work first” strategies clearly have in mind.
Another simple model inspired by Heckman, Smith, and Clements
(1997) assumes independence between impacts and untreated outcomes,
while continuing to assume no variable inputs and constant fixed costs.
The production function becomes
(3.2')

1
Ya,i
= f (Ya,i0 , e) = Ya,i0 + D a,i ,

with D a,i independent of Ya0,i for a = 1,..., A . In this world, in the absence of performance standards the training centers rank individuals
by their discounted impacts and start serving individuals from the top,
continuing down the distribution until the budget runs out from paying
fixed costs. In contrast, adding in our simple performance standards
system makes the problem two-dimensional, with centers now serving those individuals with good present values of impacts and good
outcomes in the period following participation, whether due to a large
impact or to a good untreated outcome (or both) in that period. As in
the common effect model, the introduction of performance standards
leads centers to move toward serving individuals who, on average, have
better outcomes in the untreated state. Thus, once again, it has problematic equity effects. In this model, the performance standards clearly
reduce efficiency, as centers will now, at the margin, implicitly trade
off discounted impacts for good untreated outcomes in the period of
performance measurement.

A Formal Model of a Performance Incentive System 47

Finally, consider the same simple world as in the previous example,
with production function (3.2') and so on, but assume that impacts and
untreated outcomes have rank correlation γ. We have already considered the case of independence, which implies a rank correlation of zero.
With a positive rank correlation equal to one, training center behavior
does not change at all with the introduction of performance standards
because, given our simplifying assumptions, the same individuals have
both the largest impacts and the largest outcomes in the period following participation. More generally, with a positive rank correlation of
less than one, we expect relatively small reductions in both the equity
and efficiency associated with training center choices. This is because
some individuals with good discounted impacts but bad outcomes in
period 1 get dropped in favor of individuals with good untreated outcomes in period 1 but smaller discounted impacts; at the same time,
most individuals either participate or not both with and without the performance standards. In contrast, with a negative rank correlation, the
introduction of performance standards should lead to greater losses on
both dimensions, as there is more scope for training centers to trade off
impacts and outcomes. A negative correlation implies more individuals
below the cutoff (in terms of discounted impacts in a world without
performance standards) with high values of the untreated outcome, who
can therefore add substantially to measured performance in the world
with the performance standards.
If we now undo some of our simplifying assumptions by restoring
variation in untreated outcomes over time and in marginal inputs costs,
the model becomes much more complicated but the same intuition applies. In general, if we start from a situation where training centers care
only about discounted net impacts, adding performance standards to
the model reduces efficiency. The common effect case constitutes an
interesting but empirically irrelevant exception. The effects on equity
depend on the correlation between impacts and untreated outcomes
in the period of performance measurement. With no correlation or a
positive correlation, performance standards lead to cream skimming,
implying negative equity effects.
The final relaxation of our assumptions occurs when we return
to assuming that the training center utility function includes not just
discounted impacts and performance rewards but also trainee characteristics and the number of trainees. With this utility function as the starting
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point, it becomes possible to describe cases in which performance standards increase efficiency. For example, if frontline workers have the
“social worker mentality” described in Heckman, Smith, and Taber
(1996) and prefer to serve those with the lowest untreated outcomes,
and if impacts have a positive correlation with untreated outcomes as
suggested in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), then performance
standards based on short-term outcomes may increase efficiency compared to the status quo, even though they reduce efficiency relative to
the case of net impact maximization.
In the end, the effect of introducing performance standards on efficiency becomes an empirical question, as it depends on the relationship
between impacts and untreated outcomes, on the relationship between
short-run and long-run impacts, and on the extent to which training centers pursue objectives other than maximizing discounted impacts in a
world without performance standards. Chapter 6 considers how to measure cream skimming and discusses the available empirical evidence.
Chapter 9, as well as Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), considers the relationship between outcomes and impacts. Hotz, Imbens, and
Klerman (2006); Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2004); and Dyke et al.
(2006) (among others) consider the relationship between short-run and
long-run impacts.

STRATEGIC RESPOnSES TO PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS
Until now, we have not considered strategic responses of the sort
documented in Chapters 7 and 8 in our model. This section considers
“static” strategic responses related to measurement; we consider dynamic responses related to the manipulation of termination dates later
on in the chapter after introducing the dynamic version of our model.
The static responses we have in mind include the strategic enrollment
decisions in the JTPA program documented in Doolittle and Traeger
(1990) and the apparent manipulation of the telephone surveys originally used to measure employment shortly after termination in the JTPA
program, which the USDOL sought to end with stricter procedural directives.15 In regard to the former, only individuals formally enrolled in
JTPA (or, in WIA, those receiving more than core services), count for
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the performance measures. The evidence makes it clear that, in the early
years of JTPA prior to the tightening of the rules on enrollment, training
centers sometimes provided services to individuals but did not formally
enroll them until their prospects for contributing positively to the center’s measured performance looked good. In regard to the latter, until
response rate requirements appeared (and then, later, administrative
data replaced telephone surveys for this outcome), centers appeared to
selectively survey their recent terminees with the goal of maximizing
their measured performance.
A simple extension of the model to incorporate this strategic behavior begins by making a distinction between actual performance and
measured performance. Actual performance, denoted by M(S), consists
of what the performance measure would equal if measured by a neutral
outsider objectively applying program rules, while measured performance, denoted by M *(S), consists of performance as measured and
reported by the training center. Now assume that centers can incur some
cost to improve their measured performance. Formally, let
M*(S) = g[M(S),cs],
where cs denotes the cost of manipulating the measured performance
numbers in terms of both staff time and effort and the present value of
any political fallout from doing so. Further assume positive first derivatives, as well as a negative second derivative with respect to cs , so
that additional costs increase measured performance but at a decreasing
rate. This production function will likely differ among training centers
depending on the types of services they provide and the honesty of their
staff (which affects their psychic costs of strategic behavior and thus the
compensation they must receive for engaging in it). For example, under
JTPA, centers that specialized in job search assistance and subsidized
on-the-job training at private firms, both of which provide clear signals
of likely success at obtaining employment, may have had an easier time
manipulating enrollment decisions than centers that provided more
classroom training, where employment outcomes typically do not get
realized until course completion but where payments to providers may
have necessitated enrollment.
Incorporating these costs into the model by replacing actual performance in the reward function with measured performance as determined
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by this production function adds an additional first order condition to
the solution of the training center optimization problem. Training centers now select cs to balance the marginal benefits and marginal costs
of altering their measured performance relative to their actual performance. Because their actual performance enters the production function
for measured performance and the cross-partial of the production function need not equal zero, and because centers will choose to spend real
resources on manipulating their measured performance, the possibility
of strategic misrepresentation also alters centers’ actual performance.

PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS AnD BUDGETARy
DynAMICS In A TwO-PERIOD MODEL
We now consider the dynamics that arise in our model when training centers receive budgetary rewards for performance (as with the
bonus awards under WIA). In particular, assume that reward R augments the center budget for the next cohort of trainees but cannot be
used as direct bonuses to center administrators or line workers. The
possibility of receiving a budgetary reward directs attention toward the
short-run goal of maximizing performance on M(S0), and may or may
not serve to maximize the present value of net impacts ψ (S, B, J ) for
the current cohort of participants. We begin with an analysis of a model
for a training center that serves only two cohorts of trainees, with the
first served in period 0 and the second served in period 1. This simple
model provides a useful point of departure for the more complicated
model we analyze in the next section.
In this context, the incentives provided by performance standards
create a new intertemporal dynamic. Decisions by the center today affect the quality and quantity of participants in the first period as well
as the resources available to the center to serve the second period cohort. In addition to this intertemporal connection, the center’s decision
problem changes in character because center performance M(S0) is a
random variable as of date 0. Thus, when making decisions in period 1,
the center faces a fixed budget B for period 1 but a stochastic budget for
period 2, call it B , with the budgetary uncertainty resolved only after
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the center chooses S0 and e in the first period and the resulting labor
market outcomes for the first period participants are revealed.
Assuming a simple reward function that pays out B for performance
above a threshold earnings target, we can write

 B if M (S0 ) < τ ;
B = 
 B + R if M (S0 ) ≥ τ .
In this simplified two-cohort model, the center picks S0 to maximize
(3.10)

U [ψ (S0 , B, J ), N (S0 ),Q(S0 ) ]

1 1
ψ (S11 , B + R, J ), N (S11 ),Q(S11 ) 
Pr [ M (S0 ) ≥ τ | S0 ] maxU
S11
1+ ρ
1
ψ (S10 , B, J ), N (S10 ),Q(S10 )  ,
+
Pr [ M (S0 ) < τ | S0 ] maxU
S10
1+ ρ
+

where 1/(1+ ρ ) is a discount rate, S11 denotes the participants selected
in the second period if M (S0 ) ≥ τ , and S10 denotes the participants
selected in the second period if M (S0 ) < τ .
Centers can solve this maximization problem in two stages. For the
second period cohort, there are two possible states, corresponding to
whether the first cohort succeeds or fails relative to the performance
standards. In the first stage, the center solves the second period optimization problem for both possible budgets. Given these optimal values,
in the second stage it picks S0 and e0 to maximize the criterion Equation
(3.10) given the values for the second period selected in the first stage.
Heuristically, if S0 were a continuous variable, and Equation (3.10)
were differentiable in S0 , the first order condition for S0 would be

0=

∂U [ψ (S0 , B, J ), N (S0 ),Q(S0 ), R(S0 ) ] ∂ Pr [ M (S0 ) ≥ τ | S0 ]
+
∂S0
∂S0

{maxU ψ (S , B + R, J ), N (S ),Q(S ), R(M {S }) 


− maxU ψ (S , B, J ), N (S ),Q(S ), R(M {S }) }.


1
1

S11

S10

1
1

0
1

0
1

1
1

0
1

1
1

0
1
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The first term reflects the value of S0 in raising the current utility of the training center. The second term captures the dynamic effect
of budgetary rewards, which link current period performance to future
period utility. This effect equals the marginal effect of S0 on the probability of winning the award times the increase in center utility from
winning.16 Of course, the actual solution is more complicated because
the criterion is not differentiable in S0. A similar condition holds for the
choice of inputs e0 in the first period. As the two-cohort model includes,
by definition, no third cohort, the center’s second period choices have
no intertemporal aspect.
In this two-cohort model, performance standards may distort center
choices in two ways. The first consists of the static distortions already
discussed. The second results from the intertemporal linkage induced by
the budgetary rewards. For certain values of the parameters, the center
may choose to trade off first period utility for second period utility by
distorting its first period choices so as to obtain the performance reward
and thereby a larger budget in the second period. This scenario becomes
more likely as the reward increases and ρ > 0 decreases, because both
of these increase the value in the first period of having a larger budget to
spend in the second period. The substantive importance of this scenario
also depends on having a sufficiently small positive (or even negative)
correlation between the performance measure and discounted impacts.
As discussed above, if discounted impacts have a large positive correlation with the performance measure, the center does not face much of a
trade-off between the two.

PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS AnD BUDGETARy
DynAMICS In A STATIOnARy EnvIROnMEnT
This simple two-cohort model abstracts from the fact that training
centers serve multiple cohorts over many time periods. In this section,
we examine our model under the extreme (but analytically simple)
assumption that training centers operate forever in a stationary environment; that is, other than the potentially time-varying budget induced
by the performance system, the key aspects of the center’s decision
problem, such as the distribution of eligibles, the budget constraint in
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Equation (3.5), and the production function for treated outcomes in
Equation (3.2), all remain the same.
In each period, training centers can be in one of two states: 1) in
receipt of a bonus R, so that they have budget B+R to spend in the
current period, or 2) without the bonus, so that they have budget B.
The budget in each period depends on the center’s choices regarding
S and e in the preceding period. As the model assumes a stationary
environment and only two states of the world, the centers face what the
technical literature calls a Markovian decision problem. In this type of
decision problem, the center’s optimal decision depends only on which
of the two budget states it occupies in the current period; as a result, the
choices S and e require subscripts for the state of the world but not for
the time period.
Let V0 denote the center’s value function with budget B in the current period, and let V1 denote the value function for a center budget B +
R in the current period. Then,
=
V0 arg maxU [ψ ( S , B, J ), N ( S ), Q( S ) ] +
S

1

ρ

Pr(M ( S ) ≥ τ )V1 +

1
1
Pr [ M ( S ) ≥ τ ]V1 +
Pr [ M ( S ) < τ ]V0
1+ ρ
1+ ρ

1
Pr [ M ( S ) < τ ]V. 0 .
1+ ρ

Similarly, we have
V=
arg maxU [ψ ( S , B + R, J ), N ( S ), Q( S ) ] +
1
S

+ R, J ), N ( S ), Q( S ) ] +

1
1
Pr [ M ( S ) ≥ τ ]V1 +
Pr [ M ( S ) < τ ]V0
1+ ρ
1+ ρ

1
1
Pr [ M ( S ) ≥ τ ]V1 +
Pr [ M ( S ) < τ ]V0 .
1+ ρ
1+ ρ

It follows from the usual assumptions about the utility function that
V1 > V0 ; in other words, centers prefer to have more resources available.
The optimal choice of S depends on the rewards, the preferences, and
the constraints facing centers.
We now present some intuitive analysis of some of the effects of the
incentives induced by the performance standards in our simple dynamic
model. First, let P 01 indicate the probability of not receiving a reward in
one period and receiving one in the next period and let P 11 indicate the
probability of receiving a reward in two consecutive periods. As having
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more resources makes it easier to attain all center objectives, including
meeting the performance standards, it follows that P11 > P 01 . Performance standards with budgetary rewards impart a value to incumbency.
Second, the analysis of the two-period model carries over in part in
this more general setting. With sufficiently large R, sufficiently small
ρ, and sufficiently misdirected performance incentives (incentives not
aligned with maximizing the present value of net impacts), centers may
sacrifice utility in the current period in order to obtain the budgetary
reward and thereby increase their utility in the next period.
Third, consider the special case of centers that, in the absence of the
performance standards, care only about maximizing the present value
of net impacts (and thus not about N(S) or Q(S)). For certain values of
the parameters, such centers may divert resources away from that goal
in low budget (nonreward) periods. They will do so in order to get the
budgetary reward in the following period, which can then be spent on
generating a larger total discounted stream of net impacts than would
period-by-period net impact maximization.
Fourth, continuing with the same special case, with a sufficiently
low probability of attaining the reward threshold and a sufficiently
high reward R, the introduction of performance standards can lower the
aggregate net impacts produced by all centers. Unsuccessful centers divert their activities away from productive uses and toward meeting the
performance targets but reap no budgetary rewards. Successful centers
produce more net impacts in the next period because they have more resources, but these additional impacts may not suffice to make up for the
reductions in impacts in the current period from the centers that failed
to reach the performance targets despite diverting resources away from
present value maximization. If the increases in the present value of net
impacts from the successful centers do not exceed the decreases from
the unsuccessful centers, then aggregate output falls.

PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS AnD BUDGETARy
DynAMICS: ThE REAL wORLD
As described in Chapters 2 and 4 and in more detail for WIA in
Heinrich (2007), both JTPA and WIA built budgetary rewards into
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their performance systems. However, in both programs, the budgetary awards did not simply get added to the budget for the following
period, as we have assumed for simplicity in our model. Instead, in
JTPA, individuals served using the budgetary reward money did not
count against the performance measures in the following period. This
allowed centers to focus these funds on, in most cases, the hard to serve.
In the context of our model, they spent them to maximize their utility in terms of ψ (S, B, J ) , Q(S) , and N (S) without worrying about
R[M(S)]. Similarly, under WIA, most states spend their bonus funds
on program improvements, either in the form of new initiatives or enhancements to current program infrastructure and services (e.g., trying
to develop learning programs that engage dropouts, at-risk youth, and
disadvantaged adults, improving outreach activities, and so on). Taking into account the realities of the programs does not change the basic
dynamics outlined in the preceding two sections. For certain parameter
values, centers might still find it optimal to take a hit in terms of current
period utility in order to obtain the reward money, provided the additional utility obtained in the next period more than makes up for the loss
when discounted back to the current period.
Moreover, with economies of scale in center operations, the real
world budgetary rewards in JTPA and WIA may still generate the sort
of incumbency effects described in the preceding section. Centers in
JTPA and WIA could spend their reward money in part on administrative costs. If, for example, they would buy productivity-increasing
office equipment or hire better managers with this money, this should
spill over to the participants served under the regular budget B. In the
model, we could capture this by making c(e) declining in N(S) to reflect economies of scale that arise from using physical or human capital
more intensively.

STRATEGIC BEhAvIOR In A DynAMIC EnvIROnMEnT
Another dynamic incentive induced by performance standards
arises when centers have some flexibility over the period in which their
participants count for the purposes of the performance measures. As
documented for JTPA in Chapter 7, centers have some flexibility in the
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timing of termination decisions for their participants. Thus, around the
end of one period (a program year in JTPA or WIA) they have some
choice regarding whether to count particular participants in the current
period or in the next period. When centers face nonlinear reward functions, like the simple one considered above in which the center receives
R for attaining some threshold level of performance τ but has no incentive to do better at the margin either above or below τ, centers above the
cutoff in the current period will want to move “good” participants to the
following period. In contrast, a center with performance well below τ in
the current period will want to move “bad” participants who might otherwise finish participating in the next period back to the current period,
where they can do no harm to a “lost cause.”
Our formal model does not capture this particular strategic response
to performance standards, though we could modify it to do so. The simplest change would add the capacity for centers to count some current
period participant realizations against performance in the following period. Doing so would have some per-participant cost that increased with
the number of current period participants counted in the next period.
The increasing per-participant cost captures the effect of rules, such as
those in JTPA and WIA, that govern how long centers can keep participants “on the books” without spending money on them, as well as the
fact that some program services (such as occupational training courses)
have fixed durations, thus limiting flexibility. A set of more complicated
changes to the model would also allow centers to bring forward good
outcomes from the following period.

SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS
This chapter has laid out a (relatively) simple model of training center behavior in the context of a generic performance standards system
similar to those used in active labor market programs around the world.
Such performance standards systems have a variety of justifications,
including aligning center behavior with the preferences of politicians
who fund but do not operate them, solving a principal-agent problem
by increasing the effort levels of center staff, and providing “quick and
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dirty” pseudo-evaluations of the extent to which the program improves
the labor market outcomes of participants.
This model clarifies the ways in which performance standards
systems affect center behavior, and the conditions under which those
changes will increase the earnings or employment gains from participation, as well as the conditions under which they have positive or
negative equity effects by changing the set of persons served among the
eligible. We clarify the discussion of cream skimming in the literature
in the context of our model. We show that the effects of introducing
a performance standards system depend in part on center preferences
and in part on empirical parameters such as the correlation between
the short-term participant outcomes typically utilized as performance
measures and the long-term behavioral impacts that represent the real
goal of most programs.
We extend our simple model to include strategic behavior by training centers seeking to “game” the performance measures, whether by
playing tricks with measurement in a static context or by manipulating
the period in which participants count against the performance measures in a dynamic context. We examine two dynamic versions of our
model in which centers receive budgetary rewards in each period based
on their measured performance in the prior period. In this dynamic context, further distortions of center choices can result, as they may have
an incentive to trade off utility (and perhaps discounted net impacts) in
one period to achieve high performance and thus a larger budget in the
following period.
Overall, this model provides a framework for thinking about the
effects of performance standards on organizational behavior in the context of ALMPs and in broader contexts such as schools. In so doing, it
motivates and provides a theoretical context for the empirical investigations presented in the later chapters of this book. Finally, in our view,
the analysis in this chapter, along with the empirical evidence presented
elsewhere in the book, suggests that policymakers who have mandated
such systems, as well as the administrators who have determined their
details and undertaken their practical implementation, have often failed
to appreciate the difficulty of designing a performance system that
makes things better (rather than making them worse), as well as the
dependence of the effects of performance standards systems on empirical parameters that remain generally unknown and little investigated.
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notes
1. See Hanushek (2002) for a discussion of accountability systems in education based on performance standards at the teacher and school level.
See, for example, Barnow (1992) and Barnow and Smith (2004) for additional discussions of performance standards in publicly provided training
programs.
2. Wilson (1989) and Dixit (2002) discuss conflicts regarding the objectives
of programs as outcomes of a political process.
3. On the issue of the timing of participation, see, for example, Sianesi
(2004), Heckman and Navarro (2007), and Fredrikkson and Johansson
(2008) and the papers cited therein.
4. It can also be negative in the long run, as indeed it was for male youth
in JTPA. Bloom et al. (1993), Bloom et al. (1997), and Orr et al. (1996)
provide more detail regarding the experimental impact estimates from the
National JTPA Study.
5. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) present evidence on the importance
of general equilibrium effects in evaluating large scale educational programs and Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) provide evidence of such effects
in an earnings supplement program.
6. Note that r may represent a social discount factor.
7. We assume interior solutions. Sufficient conditions for an interior solu0
tion are concavity of Equation (3.2) in e for all Ya ,i , convexity of ci(ei) for
each i, and Inada conditions on both cost and technology. For some S, the
constraint in Equation (3.4) may be slack (that is, λ = 1 can be obtained).
8. There may be more than one S that qualifies. If so, we assume the training
center picks one of them at random.
9. There is an additional stage to the allocation process that we do not consider, namely, the allocation of the overall program budget among centers.
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, the budget should be allocated to equate returns at the margin for all centers.
10. We ignore other methods for aligning training center behavior with politicians’ preferences, such as developing a professional culture among
caseworkers. See, for example, Wilson (1989) for further discussion.
11. See the related discussion in Sosin (1986) regarding the interaction between rules and caseworker discretion in the old Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
12. In thinking about cream skimming from a policy perspective, two other
facts should be kept in mind. First, as shown in Chapter 6, even if cream
skimming occurs, the operation of program eligibility rules means that
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13.

14.
15.
16.

even the cream consists of relatively disadvantaged individuals. Thus, at
least in programs like JTPA or WIA, cream skimming does not generally
mean that program resources were spent on, for example, middle-class
people. Second, in the United States, many federal, state, local, and voluntary sector employment and training programs coexist at any given
point in time. For example, National Commission for Employment Policy
(1995) documents that dozens of other programs coexisted with JTPA.
When thinking about cream skimming in a particular program, such as
WIA, it should be kept in mind that other programs may provide services
better suited to the hardest to serve among that program’s eligible population. Determining whether cream skimming, should it occur, is good or
bad, requires more thought than the literature typically devotes to it.
The finding in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) will hold in general
for programs with small mean impacts relative to the mean untreated outcome, so long as the impacts are not strongly negatively correlated with
the untreated outcome.
In models with regressors, this assumption is Δa,i (X) = Ya,i1 − Ya,i0 = Δa for
all i, yielding equal impacts for all persons with the same X.
See JTPA Directive No. D98-15, February 22, 1999.
In this heuristic problem, we assume that the second order conditions are
satisfied.
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4
The JTPA Incentive System
Implementing Performance
Measurement and Funding
Pascal Courty
Gerald Marschke

This chapter outlines the specifics of JTPA’s performance incentives, which provide necessary background information for subsequent
chapters in this monograph. It also speaks generally to the challenges
that must be met in formulating performance measures and incentives
anywhere in government.1 In particular, we argue that the decisions
about what should be measured, and how, when, and by whom it should
be measured, make a critical difference for the success of incentivebacked performance measurement.
The JTPA organization was conceived in the spirit of New Federalism. Proponents of New Federalism have argued that more decentralized
decision making leads to “laboratories of the states” that foster innovation and creativity and hence, in the end, superior policies. In JTPA,
states indeed used their discretion to produce a wide variety of performance measurement and incentive structures. The federal government
retained control over some important aspects of the incentive system.
The discretion left to the states, however, was important for determining the character of performance measurement and the incentives.
By providing an analytical description of performance measurement in JTPA, this chapter complements the institutional literature on
the JTPA bureaucracy (Barnow 1992; Svorny 1996). Although this
literature provides a good understanding of how JTPA’s performance
incentives worked at the federal level, it has little to say about its implementation at the state level. By offering a more complete description of
JTPA performance incentives, this chapter lays the foundation for under-
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standing how the JTPA incentive system determined bureau-cratic behavior
and program outcomes. Previous studies of the impact of JTPA’s performance incentive scheme on bureaucratic behavior (Anderson, Burkhauser,
and Raymond 1993; Courty and Marschke 2004; Heckman, Smith, and
Taber 1996; and Marschke 2002) have used only the federal guidelines,
which provide an incomplete and possibly misleading representation of
the true incentive systems.2 Along with others (see, e.g., Wholey 1999,
p. 305), we believe that such case studies of operational performance
measurement systems are important inputs into developing theories to
understand and recommendations to improve performance measurement in the public sector.
We limit our description to the state incentive and performance
measurement policies for the years 1987–1989 for a sample of 16 states
(identified in Table 4.1).3 In describing JTPA’s performance-based incentive system, we address three questions. First, what was the nature
of the training center’s incentive? Or, how much was at stake? Second, which dimension of performance did JTPA reward? That is, what
mattered? According to the act, Congress intended the performance
incentives to measure the training centers’ success in developing participants’ labor-market specific human capital (U.S. Congress 1982,
Section 106[a]). Because direct measures of human-capital value-added
are unavailable, the program’s federal overseers have resorted to proxies of value-added. At the heart of the JTPA incentive system is a set of
performance measures based on the labor market outcomes of enrollees
at or shortly after training. We describe these performance measures.
Third, what is the relationship between performance and awards? In
JTPA, states determined awards in three steps. First, they standardized
the performance outcomes to make them comparable across training
centers. States rewarded training centers not for the absolute level of
performance but for their performance in excess of a numerical threshold, or performance standard. The performance standard depended on
factors that were specific to each training center and outside the centers’
control. The performance standards were intended to establish reasonable counterfactual levels of performance that one would expect given
the environment in which the training center operated. The second step
was to establish the training center’s eligibility for an award. Training centers were usually eligible only if they exceeded the standards
associated with all or a defined subset of the performance measures.
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Finally, the states formulated award functions that translated training
centers’ excess performances into budgetary awards. The sensitivity of
the award to excess performance determined the strength of the incentive and varied across states and over time.
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section investigates
the bureaucrats’ motivations for seeking awards. The second section
explains the JTPA performance measures and also how performance
outcomes across the population of training centers were adjusted to
level the playing field. The third section describes the incentive award,
and the last section concludes and summarizes our main findings.

AwARDS AnD BUREAUCRATIC PREFEREnCES
The JTPA incentive system takes the form of increases in training
centers’ training budgets. We start by describing the sizes of these increases. By focusing solely on the absolute award amounts, however,
one risks overlooking potentially important influences of performance
awards on bureaucratic behavior and program outcomes. These nonfinancial reasons are reviewed next.
Award Size
The act required that states allocate about 7 percent of their total
JTPA training budget to their incentive programs.4 States then decided
how to allocate this sum among the three categories of expenditures: 1)
awards for successful training centers, 2) administration of the incentive programs, and 3) “technical assistance” for unsuccessful training
centers. JTPA mandated that the state set aside funds for technical assistance, but left the amount set aside up to the state. Technical assistance
provided resources to improve managerial performance to training centers that failed to meet performance standards.
While the act intended that the training centers use the awards primarily for training, awards could also be used for staff bonuses and
payroll increases. A training center was required to spend at least 70
percent of the award on training activities, leaving 30 percent, at most,
for staff compensation. By comparison, training centers were permitted
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Table 4.1 State Funding of the JTPA Incentive Program States of the national JTPA Study, 1987–1989
Program year 1987
Program year 1988
Program year 1989
Percentage of
Percentage of
Percentage of
award funds
award funds
award funds
Award fund allocated to federal Award fund allocated to federal Award fund allocated to federal
as percentage
performance
as percentage
performance
as percentage
performance
State
of 6 % funds
standards
of 6 % funds
standards
of 6 % funds
standards
CA
85
100
85
88
85
88
CO
95
100
85
100
85
100
FL
—
—
—
—
—
—
GA
75
100
75
90
75
90
IA
75
99
75
99
75
99
IL
75
100
75
100
75
100
IN
93
40
92
60
78
60
MN
85
50
85
50
85
50
MOa
100
100
100
100
100
100
MS
100
70
98
70
98
70
MTa
66
100
66
100
66
100
NE
85
60
85
60
85
60
NJ
80
33
80
33
80
33
OH
80
100
80
60
70
60
100
RI
75
100
75
100
75
TX
76
90
77
90
81
80

NOTE: JTPA allowed each state to use up to 6 percent of its JTPA appropriation for direct cash payments to job training centers for performance on federal and state performance measures. The first column for each year lists the fraction of the 6 percent that was set aside
for the award fund. This fraction represents the maximum amount that would be rewarded to training centers for performance relative
to federal and state standards. The second column for each year represents the fraction of the award fund that is set aside for federal
performance standards alone. — = data not available.
a
The 1987 values for Missouri and Montana in the first column are taken from the NCEP-SRI survey, which interviewed training center
personnel in 1986 concerning the program year 1986. They are not calculated from training center policy documents.
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to spend no more than 15 percent out of budgetary funds on payroll.
The higher cap for payroll expenses alone may have motivated training
centers to pursue awards.
Table 4.1 shows the share of the incentive fund set aside for the
award for a sample of 16 states in the years 1987–1989. We collected
data on these 16 states because they contained the 16 training agencies that participated in the late 1980s USDOL-commissioned National
JTPA Study (NJS). The NJS was an important experimental study involving approximately 20,000 enrollees that was designed to measure
the impact of job training in JTPA on participants’ earnings and employment prospects. The analyses contained in Chapters 5, 6, and 9
are at least in part based on the NJS data. The second, fourth, and sixth
columns show the award size as a percentage of the 7 percent incentive
fund for 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. Although states varied in
the portion set aside for awards, as Table 4.1 shows, most states made
available a majority of the incentive fund to training centers as potential
awards. Montana set aside the smallest share—66 percent of the incentive fund—while Missouri and Mississippi (in 1987) set aside the entire
fund to be paid out as an incentive award. While the portion set aside
varied significantly across states, it was stable over the 1987–1989 period. For example, between 1987 and 1989, Illinois devoted 75 percent
of its 7 percent fund to the award fund. It reserved the other 25 percent
for technical assistance. Only in Indiana did a significant change take
place. Between 1987 and 1989, Indiana lowered the portion set aside
for the award from 93 percent of the incentive allocation to 78 percent.
The other states devoted a constant (or nearly constant) share of the
incentive funds to awards.
In some states, not all of the funds that the state made available
for awards were paid out. Not all funds were awarded because many
training centers did not perform well enough to meet the states’ award
eligibility requirements. Nevertheless, as Table 4.2 shows, the amounts
paid out were substantial. Table 4.2 shows the actual award amounts
disbursed as a fraction of the training center’s budget for a sample of
448 training centers in program year 1987. The average disbursement
was equivalent to 7 percent of the training center’s budget.5 The highest disbursements were equivalent to 60 percent of the training center’s
budget. Rewards this large, however, were not possible in all states.
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Table 4.2 Size of Incentive Award
Mean
(Std. dev.)
First quartile
Median
Third quartile
Maximum
Number of obs.

Allocation ($)
2,326,191.42
(3,043,936.68)
1,003,308.50
1,627,151.50
2,398,462.00
29,408,455.00
448

Incentive award ($)
119,663.79
(145,751.12)
33,000.00
93,550.00
160,534.00
1,407,853.00
385

Fraction of training
center’s budget
0.07
(0.07)
0.03
0.06
0.09
0.57
385

NOTE: Data are from the National Commission for Employment Policy and SRI, Inc.
(see their description in Dickinson et al. [1988]).

We expect that if incentives matter, the intensity of the behavioral
responses to the incentives should depend on the size of the award.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the award amounts available varied significantly by state. Everything else equal, we might expect that JTPA
incentives produced greater responses among training centers in Missouri than Montana where the award disbursement was the greatest
(i.e., 100 percent of the award fund). In addition, the kind of behavioral
response we observe would likely have depended upon how states divided award money between state and federal measures of performance.
The division matters because state and federal performance measures
stressed different aspects of training center output.
why Should Training Centers Care about Awards?
As a rough approximation, the awards might have increased salaries by as much as 15 percent.6 This figure corresponds to the purely
financial part of the incentive. This by itself represents a substantial
increase even compared with private sector bonuses. There is, however,
little evidence that training center administrators paid out such a large
share of the award as salary bonuses.7 Why, then, should bureaucrats
care about the awards?
There are at least three reasons why a training center may wish
to increase its budget. First, Niskanen (1971) and others argue that
everything the bureaucratic manager desires (salary, staff, power, professional reputation, and perquisites) derives from the bureau’s budget.
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Because of their training and the orthodoxy of the social work profession, welfare bureaucrats—like the ones in JTPA—may behave as
selfless advocates for their clients (Lipsky 1980). Nevertheless, even as
client advocates, JTPA bureaucrats would desire extra award funds to
expand their clients’ training resources.
Second, performance levels and the awards they represent might
have been used by local elected officials for political gain. The act gave
local elected officials—often these are city mayors—some authority
over the operation of training centers. The administrative headquarters
of training centers were frequently situated in these elected officials’
offices. These elected officials often touted performance awards as measures of their administration’s success in the local fight against poverty.
Third, bureaucrats might have sought performance awards for
the professional recognition they convey. Bureaucrats faced no other
objectives—and the public and bureaucratic superiors have no other
evaluation criteria—as precisely defined, quantifiable, and available as
these performance measures. Tirole (1994, p. 7) argues that government bureaucrats might be “concerned by the effect of their current
performance not so much on their monetary reward, but rather on their
reputation or image in view of future promotions, job prospects in the
private and public sectors.”8 Moreover, by performing well compared
to the standards, bureaucrats could protect themselves against attack
from outside critics and political enemies.
As a final point, note that because awards were based on group
performance, individual bureaucrats had an incentive to free-ride on the
effort of colleagues. Free-riding may have muted the influence of incentives at the level of caseworkers. Ultimately, the issue of the influence
of budget-based awards and the significance of the free-riding problem
must be resolved empirically.

PERFORMAnCE MEASURES
The act directed the USDOL to formulate measures of performance
that captured the gains produced in the employment and earnings of
participants and the reductions in their reliance on welfare programs
(Chapter 2). Reliable measures of earnings and employment impacts of

The JTPA Incentive System 73

job training, however, were prohibitively costly to obtain, and instead,
the USDOL issued measures that assessed the effectiveness of job training through the labor market outcomes of enrollees at training end.
JTPA required states to use the USDOL’s performance measures in
constructing their incentive system. Nevertheless, the USDOL permitted states to impose additional performance measures, and many states
did. Whereas the federally designed performance measures were concerned with labor market outcomes, state measures (described below)
tended to focus on inputs. While many states developed their own measures, they typically devoted a disproportionately small share of the
award to them, leaving the bulk of the award for the federally designed
measures.
The following section discusses the federal and state-designed measures and how states divided their awards between them. In addition,
this section discusses the possible consequences of the construction
of these measures for JTPA training practices. Over time, state and
federal authorities replaced or redefined those performance measures
whose effects were possibly counterproductive. We also discuss these
modifications.
Federal Performance Measures
Table 4.3 defines the federal performance measures in place during
the period 1987–1989. For the adult portion of the program, the system’s performance measures were employment rate at termination, the
average wage at termination, the cost per employment, the employment
rate at 90 days after termination—i.e., at follow-up, the average weeks
worked at follow-up, and the average weekly earnings at follow-up. For
the youth portion of the program, the system’s performance measures
were the employment rate at termination, the cost per employment, the
positive termination rate, and the employability enhancement rate. The
youth employment rate at termination and youth cost per employment
were defined as for adults. Youth positive termination rate and youth
employability enhancement rate evaluated the acquisition of certain
kinds of general or labor market skills, such as the completion of a major level of education, or completion of a GED certification (see Table
4.3, especially the last part of the note).
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Table 4.3 national JTPA Performance Measures in Effect in years 1987–1989
Performance measure
Definition
Adult performance measures
Employment rate at termination Fraction of terminees employed at termination
Welfare employment rate at
Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at
termination
termination
Average wage at termination
Average wage at termination for terminees who were employed at termination
Cost per employment
Training center’s year’s expenditures on adults divided by the number of adults
employed at termination
Employment rate at follow-up
Fraction of terminees who were employed at 13 weeks after termination
Welfare employment rate at
Fraction of terminees receiving welfare at date of application who were employed at
follow-up
13 weeks after termination
Average weekly earnings at
Average weekly wage of terminees who were employed 13 weeks after termination
follow-up
Average number of weeks worked by terminees in 13 weeks following termination
Average weeks worked by
follow-up
Youth performance measures
Fraction of youth terminees employed at termination
Youth employment rate at
termination
Fraction of youth terminees who obtained employment competencies (see note below)
Youth employability
enhancement rate
Youth positive termination rate Fraction of youth terminees who were “positively terminated” (see note below)
Training center’s year’s expenditures on youths divided by the number of youths
Youth cost per employment
positively terminated

NOTE: The date of termination is the date the enrollee officially exits training. A terminee is an enrollee after he has officially exited
training. All measures are calculated over the year’s terminee population. Therefore, the average follow-up weekly earnings for 1987
was calculated using earnings at follow-up for the terminees who terminated in 1987, even if their follow-up period extended into 1988.
Likewise, persons who terminated in 1986 were not included in the 1987 measure, even if their follow-up period extended into 1987.
A positive termination is entering unsubsidized employment, attaining youth employment “competencies” (through coursework, training and/or tests in work maturity, basic education, or job-specific skills), entering non-JTPA training, returning to school full time, or
completing a major level of education.
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All federal performance measures for adult participants had three
characteristics in common. All performance measures were 1) year-end
summaries of yearly cumulated performance, 2) based on aspects of the
enrollee’s labor market status on the date the enrollee officially terminated the program or at three months after termination, and 3) averages
of outcomes over the population of the year’s terminees (not participants). Thus, training centers did not face a piece rate in the sense that
training centers received compensation per unit of output: e.g., per enrollee employed, or per dollar increase in an enrollee’s earnings ability.
Instead, training centers received awards for achieving high average labor market outcomes. For example, the employment rate at termination
for the fiscal year 1987 was defined as the fraction of persons terminated between July 1, 1987, and June 30, 1988, who were employed on
their termination date.9 Awards were thus independent of the number of
persons who obtained high outcomes.
The use of performance measures varied across states. In 1987, the
USDOL required states to base incentives on seven termination-based
measures: the adult employment rate at termination, adult welfare employment rate at termination, adult cost per employment, average wage
at termination, youth employment rate at termination, youth positive
termination rate, and youth cost per employment. In 1988–1989, the
USDOL extended the list of measures to the 12 described in Table 4.3
and required states to choose any 8 or more of these 12 measures.
The years 1988 and 1989 marked the beginning of the phaseout of
termination-based performance measures and the cost measure.10 After
1992, the USDOL prohibited the states from using any cost measures
of performance. Moreover, after 1992, all performance measures based
on measures of output became follow-up measures.11
Performance measures based on labor market outcomes may have
influenced training center behavior in several ways. First, because they
measure aspects of an enrollee’s employment state and not the impact
of job training, they may have led training centers to select enrollees
most able to achieve high levels of employment at high wages, instead
of the enrollees most likely to benefit from the program. This behavior
has been called cream skimming (see Chapters 6 and 9).
Second, the performance measures may have encouraged training centers to offer “quick fixes,” that is, employment-oriented job
search or on-the-job training services. These services, rather than more
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intensive kinds that result in greater skill development, would more
frequently lead to employment on the measurement date, whether or
not the employment match was suitable and likely to last beyond the
end of training. The reason why quick fixes may have been preferred
is because the employment and wage measures focused on labor market success at a point in time rather than over a period of time. Cream
skimming is an example of dysfunctional behavior that results when
the performance measures are not well-aligned with the goals of the
organization. If quick fixes generate smaller welfare gains per dollar
spent than more intensive services they also constitute dysfunctional
behavior (see Bloom et al. [1997] for evidence on the relative effectiveness of different training types in JTPA). See Blau (1955) for an early
discussion of unintended responses to performance measures.
Third, because these measures were based on averages instead of
aggregate outcomes, training centers had no incentive to spend their
entire budget. Actually, the optimal training strategy from a pure performance point of view was to enroll only the most promising applicant.
More generally, enrolling a smaller than efficient population would
typically be an optimal strategy in areas where able applicants were
scarce. In these areas, rather than enroll less able enrollees who lower
per capita scores, training centers would prefer to leave some of their
budget unspent.
Fourth, the role of the cost measure was ambiguous. The cost measure was defined as the total expenditure divided by the number of
persons employed at training end. Holding spending constant, the cost
measure becomes an incentive to produce as many employed terminees
as possible. Bureaucrats could produce greater numbers of employed
terminees either by increasing their employment rates at termination or
by enrolling more applicants (holding the employment rate constant).
Viewed in this way the cost measure would have countered the incentive to serve small populations. The elimination of the cost measures in
the last years of JTPA would have added an additional incentive to reduce the number of enrollees served. Training centers would enroll less
than the efficient number of enrollees because small enrollee populations increased the per capita spending, and greater per capita spending
increased the per capita performance outcomes (Barnow [1992] makes
this point).
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Federal Performance Standards
The impact of the performance measures on bureaucratic behavior
depended critically on the threshold the bureaucrat had to meet. For example, a training center did not receive an award for the wage measure
if its year-end average wage outcome (the average wage at termination) failed to meet the average wage standard. Thus, the wage measure
would produce no effect on behavior if the wage standard was set too
high so that no amount of effort would push the wage outcome over the
standard. Another reason why the performance standards were crucial
was because the performance awards did not depend on absolute performance but on excess performance, that is, on the difference between
the performance outcome and the performance standard.
This subsection describes the heights of the standards and how they
were tailored to the different environments faced by the training centers.
The USDOL adjusted the performance standards to the local conditions
faced by training centers in an attempt to level the playing field.
For each performance measure, the numerical standard started with
the national “departure point.” The USDOL set the departure point for
all but the cost and wage measures at the 25th percentile of the distribution of performance in the system in the preceding two years. That is,
75 percent of the training centers would have exceeded the performance
standard on average. For the cost measure, good performances were
low performances. Successful training centers had to produce an outcome below the standard. The USDOL set the departure point for the
cost measure at the 90th percentile. For the wage measure, the department set the departure point at the 50th percentile.12
Training centers faced different costs of meeting these departure
points. Costs varied because labor markets, training costs, and the
characteristics of the eligible populations varied. Imposing uniform
standards would have favored low-cost training centers by increasing
their resources relative to high-cost training centers. Only in the case
that low-cost training centers tended also to be more efficient would
such incentives enhance the efficiency of the allocation of training
resources. Believing that this probably was not the case, the USDOL
established an adjustment model that took into account features of the
training center’s environment that may be correlated with costs. For example, by taking into account local unemployment measures and other

The JTPA Incentive System 79

measures of the labor market, the adjustment methodology lowered the
employment rate standard for training centers in depressed job markets,
compared to training centers in robust job markets.
Although the USDOL allowed states some flexibility in developing
standards, most states used the department’s adjustment methodology.13
All states participating in the NJS used the USDOL’s adjustment model
during the NJS years. We describe this method here.
USDOL adjustment model
Consider an arbitrary performance measure and let Sl be the outcome produced by training center l. The USDOL adjustment scheme
posited that the following function generates performance outcome Sl .
(4.1)

Sl = a + β1 (x1l − x1 ) + β 2 (x2l − x2 ) + ... + β M (xMl − xM ) + e l ,

where x1l , x2l ,..., x Ml are training center l’s realizations for the M factors
chosen, x1 , x2 ,..., x M , are the average realizations of these factors over
all JTPA training centers, and εl is a site-specific error term. Biannually
the USDOL estimated the coefficients β with the most recent two years
of training center–level data using ordinary least squares. βm expresses
the impact of an increase in the factor xMl , on the outcome Sl , holding
other factors constant. The USDOL chose a different set of factors for
each performance measure. It chose those economic factors and demographic variables based upon their availability and whether the factors
were statistically correlated with the performance outcomes. In addition, political considerations may have played a role.14
Table 4.4 presents an example of a JTPA worksheet for adjusting
the adult employment rate at termination in 1987. The first six adjustment factors in the table are enrollment population characteristics (the
percentage of the participant population that is female, black, Hispanic,
Asian, handicapped, and welfare recipients). The last two adjustment
factors are measures of the local economy (unemployment rate and
population density). Column B presents factor values for a hypothetical training center. Columns C and E present the actual national factor
averages and the weights from the USDOL adjustment model for 1987.
These weights are the estimated effects of each characteristic on the
performance outcome adult employment rate at termination (estimated

A. Local factors
% Female
% Black
% Hispanic
% Asian
% Handicapped
% Welfare recipient
Unemployment rate
Population density

B. Training center
C. National
D. Difference
factor values
averages
(B − C)
E. Weights
49.9
52.8
−2.9
−0.020
41.2
23.8
17.4
−0.081
30.1
7.9
22.2
−0.009
2.1
2.4
−0.3
−0.022
9.5
9.1
0.4
−0.093
35.0
29.8
5.2
−0.276
8.8
8.0
0.8
−0.623
0.21
0.6
−0.39
0.771
G. Total effect of local factors on performance expectations
H. National departure point
I. Model-adjusted performance level (G + H)

F. Effect of
local factors
0.058
−1.41
−0.20
0.01
−0.04
−1.44
−0.50
−0.3
−5.77
62.4
56.6

NOTE: Local factors listed in column A are determined by the USDOL. Percentages are of year’s participant population. Values for columns C, E, and H are given by the USDOL. Values for column B are for a hypothetical training center.
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Table 4.4 U.S. Department of Labor’s Performance Standard Adjustment Model Performance Standard: Adult
Employment Rate at Termination

The JTPA Incentive System 81

β’s from Equation 4.1). The training center’s realization of each of the
factors is compared to the national average and the difference is multiplied by a weight. For example, suppose the hypothetical training center
served 1,000 persons during 1987, of which 499 were female. Thus, its
percentage female factor was 49.9 percent. To obtain the adjustment
to the standard for the female participation factor, one multiplies the
difference between the training center’s factor value and the national
average (49.9 − 52.8 = −2.9) by the adjustment weight (−0.020). The
adjustment weight reflects how the enrollment of women historically
affected the employment rate outcome.
For the other factors, weighted differences were calculated similarly. The total effect of local factors on performance expectations
(column F)—the sum of the weighted differences—was added to the
national departure point. The departure point (the 25th percentile value)
for the measure was 62.4. The final performance standard (56.6) is the
sum of the departure point (62.4) and adjustment factor (−5.8). The
state used the final standard to establish whether the training center had
met its adult employment rate target.
The USDOL intended that the bar be set to a height appropriate to
the training center’s circumstances. Thus it included measures of the
local unemployment rate and of local population density to capture aspects of the local labor market in which the training center operated.
For example, as one can see from Table 4.4, the weight on the local
unemployment rate measure was negative: a one-point increase in the
local unemployment rate lowered the standard by about two-thirds of
a point. Because training centers were small relative to the local labor
market, the unemployment rate is an example of an influence on the
performance outcome which was likely to be beyond the training center’s control.
As Table 4.4 also makes clear, an important class of characteristics
for which the USDOL adjusted standards was the composition of the
enrollment pool. While the enrollment pool reflected in part the composition of the local eligible population (an influence beyond the training
center’s control), it was at least partly a choice variable. Adjusting the
performance standard in this way may have encouraged the training
center to enroll not only persons who would boost performance outcomes, but also persons who would lower standards.
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Table 4.4 also reveals that the USDOL adjustment model did not
take into account training services as a relevant control variable, although these data were available to the department. Thus, the nature of
the adjustment procedure meant that the incentive system held training
centers accountable for the kinds of training provided but not the kinds
of enrollees enrolled; both choices have consequences for the effectiveness and efficiency of training. Neither did the adjustment model
directly control for the training services available in the training centers’
local area. This is more surprising; by not controlling for the availability and costs of training facing training centers, the incentive system
implicitly favored those training centers located in markets where there
was a competitive and efficient training industry.15
State Performance Measures and Standards
States were permitted to develop their own performance measures.
While state measures played a smaller role than federal measures in
the determination of the awards, the number of NJS states using their
own measures increased from 10 to 13 between 1987 and 1989. The
increase in importance of state-formulated measures was apparently a
nationwide trend.
In Table 4.1, the second column under each year shows the percentage of the total award set aside allocated to federal measures, as
opposed to state measures. Although state-defined measures were common among the NJS states, they comprised a relatively small fraction of
the award. Excluding New Jersey, the average split between federal—
or performance-based—measures and state measures was 82/18. The
split ranged from a low of 50/50 to a full allocation of the money to the
federal award.
We broke down the state measures into four categories. The most
important category of state measures comprised input or enrollment
measures. In the mid-1980s, states became increasingly concerned that
federal performance incentives were driving training center bureaucrats
to enroll from the eligible population only those enrollees who were
likely to get jobs at the end of training—i.e., who were “job ready.”
Many states implemented a set of enrollment-based performance measures designed to encourage training centers to enroll the more difficult
cases. In 1988, for example, 9 out of 16 states set up standards that com-
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pensated training centers for the number of or the rate at which persons
in target groups were enrolled.16 These target groups varied by state
but were typically the least successful in the labor market among the
eligible and included high school dropouts, minority youths, Women/
Infant Nutrition program participants, and older workers. For example,
in addition to compensating performance based on federal performance
measures, Minnesota rewarded training centers for the fraction of enrollees who were receiving public aid. In these cases, compensation
was contingent upon meeting a numerical standard, frequently based
on the fraction of eligible persons in the local population who belonged
to the target group. Studies of the effect of incentives on the enrollment
decision can be further refined by allowing for these enrollment quotas
to influence the enrollment decision.
The other categories of state measures were more idiosyncratic.
Some states compensated training centers for the fraction of their budgetary allotment spent. For example, in 1987 and 1988, Mississippi paid
a portion of its award money to training centers that spent at least 85
percent or more of their budgets. Training centers might have left portions of their budgets unspent because, as we noted above, the kinds of
applicants who would produce high-performance outcomes may have
been scarce. Rather than enrolling less able enrollees who lower per
capita scores, training centers might have enrolled fewer enrollees than
the maximum their budgets would have allowed.
Three of the 16 states sought to encourage JTPA training centers
to coordinate their activities with other state agencies that helped the
poor.17 In promoting these goals, states typically evaluated performance
subjectively, without well-defined performance standards. Finally,
although state performance measures usually were not based on participant labor market outcomes, some states used their own measures
to encourage training centers to seek longer-term employment matches
before the USDOL began offering the follow-up measures in 1988. In
1987, New Jersey used a separate measure for employment retention,
similar to the federal employment rate at follow-up measure.
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ThE JTPA AwARD
This section describes how states used performance outcomes and
standards to reward training centers. In particular, we discuss the states’
eligibility rules that determine which training centers received awards
and the award functions themselves. The award functions translate the
performance of eligible training centers to award amounts.
The states were entirely free to design the eligibility rules and the
performance awards as they saw fit, which led to great variation in both
across states. In fact, no two award functions (or eligibility rules, for
that matter) were identical. Because of space constraints, we do not
report the exact computation rules for the awards. Instead, we define
some broad dimensions that are important from a behavioral point of
view, to categorize the different types of award functions, illustrating
where appropriate with specific details from the state incentive systems.
qualifying for Awards
Here we discuss the qualifying criteria for the 16 NJS states in years
1987–1989. Some states (such as Indiana) required training centers
to meet all standards as a prerequisite for earning any award money.
Other states required training centers to exceed a subset of standards
to qualify. For example, in 1987 Minnesota required training centers to
exceed five of seven performance standards to qualify for awards. Other
states had no qualification criteria. These states (such as Iowa) simply
rewarded training centers for each performance standard exceeded.
Some qualification criteria were quite complicated. For example,
in 1987, Illinois divided the seven federal measures in place at the time
into three groups. To qualify for an incentive grant, a training center
had to meet both standards in the first group, one of two standards in
the second group, and one of three standards in the third group.18 In addition, the training center had to meet a slightly higher version of the
standards for at least one measure.
The number and kind of standards a training center had to meet
to win an award may have been an important determinant of the influence of incentives upon behavior. States that required the training
center to meet all standards discouraged training centers from special-
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izing in the production of certain performance outcomes at the expense
of others. Moreover, the greater the number of performance standards
that training centers were required to meet, the lower their likelihood of
obtaining an award. By lowering the chances to qualify for an award,
such qualification criteria may have discouraged training centers from
attempting to win awards.
Award Function
The award functions varied along several important dimensions.
The three most important dimensions, discussed below, address three
broad questions: Which performance measures mattered? How competitive was the incentive system? Did excess performance cease to
matter after some point?
Performance measure weighting. By exercising their discretion
over which measures they included in their awards (see Table 4.2) and
in their construction of the eligibility criteria, states could emphasize
some performance measures and de-emphasize others. In addition,
states used explicit weighting schemes in the award function for the
same purpose. Although many states weighted each measure used
equally, some states weighted performance measures differently to emphasize some measures over others.
Consider, for example, New Jersey in 1987 and 1988. While a training center there had to meet its cost standards to qualify for an award,
its cost outcomes did not figure into the award’s calculation. Moreover, the award calculation up-weighted the follow-up-based measures
compared to the termination-based measures. In de-emphasizing the
cost- and termination-based measures, New Jersey intended to encourage training centers to provide more intensive training and enroll more
difficult-to-train enrollees (see Note 12).
Competition among training centers. In many states (such as
Texas), a training center’s award depended only on its own performance. In Illinois’s scheme, the size of a successful training center’s
award depended on the number of training centers that qualified: the
lower the number of training centers that qualified, the greater the allocation to the successful ones.
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Other examples of interdependence more closely resemble the relative performance evaluation schemes found in the incentive literature
in economics. New Jersey is an example of a state that pitted training
centers against one another in a form of head-to-head competition. In
New Jersey’s tournament system, a training center received an award
based not on an absolute level of performance but on its position in a
ranking of its fellow training centers.
Evaluating a training center on its relative performance may have
stimulated competition between training centers by accentuating social
comparisons. Another reason for relative performance evaluation is
that it holds training centers harmless for influences that are beyond the
training center’s control and that affect all training centers uniformly.
Thus, relative performance evaluation should be most effective in states
where training centers are homogeneous (e.g., operate in similar environments) and if the performance standards do a poor job of controlling
for factors that are outside the training centers’ control.19
Marginal incentive. The marginal incentive measures the change
in incentive award for a small change in performance. Marginal incentives are constant when the award function is linear, as in a piece rate
compensation system. However, they may depend on the level of performance. When the marginal incentives vary with the level of performance, incentives are said to be nonlinear. In JTPA, the main source
of nonlinearity was the performance standard: in many states, training centers were paid only contingent upon achieving standards. Many
states (such as Georgia) paid out the entire award merely for meeting
the standards. Such states provided no pecuniary incentive to exceed
the standards. Other states, however, compensated training centers for
performance in excess of the standard, at least over some range of performance. For example, in Illinois in 1987, a training center’s award
increased with its performance, until its performance exceeded the standard by 40 percent. For performance in excess of 40 percent of the
standard, the training center received no additional compensation. The
marginal incentives for performances above 40 percent of the standard
were zero.
As with many incentive systems based upon attaining standards, training centers may have been able to manipulate the award
intertemporally by selectively choosing when to report good and bad
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performances. In this way, training centers would have been able to
increase their performance outcomes without actually increasing the effectiveness of their training. Deadline effects have been described in
the behavior of military recruiters whose bonuses depend on recruitment quotas (Asch 1990), salespersons whose commissions depend on
achieving sales targets (Oyer 1995), and CEOs whose bonuses depend
on performance targets linked to measures of corporate earnings (Healy
1985). See Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997) for evidence of deadline
effects in JTPA, and Courty and Marschke (2004) for an attempted estimation of the efficiency costs of these effects.

COnCLUSIOn
This chapter details a description of the incentives in place under
JTPA. The incentive awards amount to budgetary increases that training
center bureaucrats valued for professional, personal, and political reasons. The potential size of the bonus award varied by state and program
year. In program year 1986, for example, the total bonus was about 7
percent of the training budget. These awards, however, could have been
a substantial added source of training funds. Depending on the state and
the year, this amounted to as much as 60 percent of a training center’s
yearly allocation of funds.
The heart of the JTPA incentive system was the set of performance measures and their standards. Job training programs illustrate
the difficulty of devising performance measures that are aligned with
programmatic goals. In the early years of JTPA, performance measures
were based on employment outcomes measured at training end, thus
possibly encouraging training centers to pursue high employment rates
instead of increased earnings-capacities. Moreover, because they were
based on average outcomes, performance measures may have reduced
the number of disadvantaged people served, raised the expenditure per
enrollee, and produced budget surpluses. In later years, some states
adopted expenditure-based performance measures, possibly to counteract the incentives created by federal measures to leave some of their
budgets unspent.
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Training centers received awards when the outcomes of performance measures exceeded numerical standards. The USDOL attempted
to adjust performance standards to reflect the environment in which
the training center operated so that training centers in healthy and in
depressed economies had to exert complementary levels of effort to
achieve their standards. The USDOL’s adjustment scheme offers a realworld example of strategies for adjusting performance measures that
have been proposed in the literature (Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz
1999). Performance standards were also adjusted for the characteristics of persons enrolled, so as to discourage cream skimming, but not
adjusted for the kinds of training offered. Excluding training from the
adjustment method may have promoted employment-oriented services
—such as job clubs and on-the-job training—and these services may
not have produced either stable employment relationships or significant
improvements in the long-term employability of enrollees. This study
has revealed numerous ways in which performance measures might
have been misaligned with the agency’s goals. With the exception of
some cream skimming studies and a study of deadline effects, these
distortionary effects have not been investigated. We believe that further
research on the behavioral responses to JTPA’s incentives would lead
to much useful information for developing and refining performance
measures for many kinds of public sector organizations.
The federal government left the formulation of many of the details
of the award to the states. Consequently, the form of the award varied.
States established eligibility criteria that modified the JTPA incentive
system by reducing the incentive to specialize in the production of one
or two performance measures, lowering the training center’s likelihood
of obtaining an award, holding effort constant, and emphasizing some
performance measures over others.
The strength of the award varied greatly across states, suggesting
that the magnitude of responses to performance incentives depended
on the state. States also differed in the degree of competition among
training centers and in the interdependence of awards. Head-to-head
competition among training centers in some states may have heightened
the impact of the incentive system on behavior. States also differed in
the extent to which they compensated exceptional performance. In
some states, training centers received no more award money for meeting standards than exceeding them. In other states, training centers
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received additional money for higher performance. States also designed
and implemented their own performance measures that promoted different goals than the goals implicit in the federal measures. Thus, the
objectives transmitted to the training center depended on the state in
which it operated.

notes
This chapter introduces features of the JTPA incentive system that will be used
extensively in the remainder of this monograph. Some of these features have been discussed and analyzed in detail elsewhere (Courty and Marschke 1997, 2002, 2003, and
2004), and parts of this chapter borrow from these sources.
1. Discussions of general criteria for choosing performance measures and constructing performance measurement systems, for example, are found in Hatry (1980),
Hurst (1980), Usilaner and Soniat (1980), Wholey (1999), and GAO (1996).
2. Cragg (1997) and Marschke (2002) are exceptions.
3. We chose to limit the number of states and years for which we collected incentive policies because of the difficulty and expense of obtaining these records. We
collected data on these 16 states because they contained the training agencies that
participated in the late 1980s USDOL-commissioned National JTPA Study, described in Chapter 2.
4. The JTPA funds were allocated in three subfunds: 1) 78 percent were set aside for
training services, 2) 6 percent were set aside for the incentive system, and 3) the
remaining 16 percent were set aside for other special services. The award fund as a
fraction of total training budget was 7.1 percent (6/[78+6]) if one assumes that all
award funds were eventually distributed as training budget. The actual figure may
have been a little lower because some of the incentive set aside fund was spent on
the administration of the incentive funds.
5. These figures are based on the data set of SRI, International and Berkeley Planning Associates. See Dickinson et al. (1988) for a description of these data.
6. Salary payroll represented at most 15 percent of training budget that was itself
only 78 percent of total JTPA training funds (see Note 7). The award fund was 6
percent of JTPA funds and at most 30 percent could be distributed as salary. The
award salary bonus as a fraction of total salary was at most (0.06 × 0.3)/(0.15 ×
0.78) = 0.15.
7. In a survey of 30 training centers conducted by Dickinson et al. (1988), only
three administrators indicated that this was their practice. In a 1994 telephone
survey administered to 11 of the 16 training centers of the National JTPA Study,
all training center administrators that we spoke to denied that they ever distributed
a portion of the award for salary bonuses.
8. Thompson (2000) describes the merit pay system at the Social Security Administration, ushered in with the enactment of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
Under this system one half of managers’ annual pay increases were determined by
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9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

their performance relative to a set of output indicators. While originally set up as
a basis for rewarding pay increases, these indicators became the basis for promotion decisions as well. According to one former manager, they became “the basis
for your career . . . if you do well on those four measures. You can write your own
ticket” (p. 270).
Note that persons who entered the program already employed, and then terminated
employed, holding the same job they began training with, say, were numbered
among the successfully trained—i.e., were employed at termination—for award
accounting purposes.
In the first years of JTPA (through 1987), the USDOL required states to use a
cost measure. Nevertheless, some policymakers and analysts, alarmed at the short
length of training (the average length of training is about five months in JTPA),
instigated investigations by the GAO and other interested parties into the link
between cost measures and short, low-intensity services. As a consequence of this
inquiry, the USDOL encouraged states to phase out the cost measure, “to encourage [training centers] to provide more comprehensive programming and increased
services for those individuals who are most in need’’ (Division of Employment
and Training, New Jersey Department of Labor 1990). Moreover, in response to
a number of Labor Department investigations, which concluded that training centers were emphasizing “quick fixes” with job-placement-oriented services that had
no long-term impact on enrollees’ skills, the department formulated a number of
follow-up measures: the measures based on outcomes three months after termination, presented in Table 4.3. The USDOL introduced follow-up measures to
“[promote] effective service to participants and [assist] them to achieve long-term
economic independence’’ (Division of Employment and Training, New Jersey Department of Labor 1990).
That is, the employment rate at termination and average wage at termination gave
way to the employment rate, the average weeks worked, and average weekly earnings at follow-up (13 weeks after termination).
Actually, the USDOL’s JTPA Technical Assistance Guide, PY1988, reports that
the cost standard’s departure point was set “above the 25th percentile. It more
closely resembles an estimate of average performance.” We interpret this statement to mean the department set the wage standard at the 50th percentile.
State governors had the option to 1) set the performance standard at the national
departure point; 2) adjust the national departure point for specific economic, geographic, and demographic factors within the state or local service delivery areas
using the regression model established by the USDOL; or 3) propose their own
adjustment method to the USDOL. Between the end of the National JTPA Study
and the end of JTPA, more states abandoned the USDOL adjustment method for
their own (option 3).
Barnow (1992) writes that “when estimated coefficients have an unexpected sign,
the variables are dropped from the models and regressions are re-estimated” (p.
292). For example, in some regressions, the USDOL dropped an indicator variable
for Hispanic enrollees because it apparently showed a positive effect on performance outcomes.

The JTPA Incentive System 91
15. For more on the specification of USDOL’s regression model, see Barnow (1992)
and Trott and Baj (1987). One significant shortcoming they describe is that estimating the Equation with training center–level data, as opposed to enrollee-level
data, biased the estimates of the model’s coefficients. Using enrollee-level data,
Trott and Baj demonstrated that the practice of pooling the data by training center
significantly changes some of the estimates of βm. For a general discussion of the
theory of adjusting performance measures, what factors should and should not
be used to adjust performance measures, see Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz
(1999).
16. These states were California, Iowa, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Jersey, and Ohio.
17. These states were Georgia, Iowa, and Ohio.
18. The first group consisted of the adult employment rate at termination and the adult
cost per employment. The second group consisted of the youth positive termination rate and the youth employment rate at termination. The third group consisted
of the average wage at termination, the welfare employment rate at termination,
and the youth cost per positive termination.
19. The USDOL’s performance standard adjustment methodology—to the extent that
it accounted for external factors that affect performance—produced the same
effect.
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5
Setting the Standards
Performance Targets and Benchmarks
Pascal Courty
Carolyn J. Heinrich
Gerald Marschke

A key element in the design of performance measurement and accountability systems is the establishment of appropriate benchmark
levels (or standards) of performance to guide the evaluation of program
outcomes. Performance benchmarks shape system incentives and influence the responses of public managers and staff operating programs. In
systems with rewards and sanctions linked to results, performing above
or below the standards can have important short-term consequences
(e.g., budgetary rewards or revisions, positive or negative recognition),
as well as long-term ones (e.g., promotion, structural reorganization).
In this chapter, we review the literature in information economics,
contract theory (see, for example, Dixit [2002] and Prendergast [1999]),
and public administration to draw out theoretical implications for the
construction of performance standards in public organizations.1 We
then assess alternative methods that are commonly used to construct
performance standards and consider the relevance of these lessons for
the design of performance measurement systems in public programs.
An important premise of our work is that the method used to construct
performance standards can change the way employees behave and influence the internal efficiency of organizations. Focusing in particular
on performance benchmarking in U.S. workforce training programs
(i.e., JTPA and WIA programs), we assess whether the design of performance standards in these programs is efficient and consistent with basic
principles derived from theory.
The exercise of performance assessment clearly serves important functions in public organizations other than promoting efficiency.
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Marshall et al. (2000) describes three primary functions: 1) accountability for public expenditures, 2) the production of comparative
information to inform customer choices in public services, and 3)
improvement of professional practice and program management. For
example, public managers may use performance information to identify
best practices and to communicate to outside constituencies legitimate
information about organizational achievements. We acknowledge the
possibility that the introduction of performance measurement may
transform organizations through channels other than those we discuss
in our literature review. We likewise recognize that political and ethical
concerns also influence the construction of performance standards and
the use of performance data. We discuss these issues to a greater extent
in our case study analysis of performance benchmarking in public training programs.

ThEORy-BASED FRAMEwORK FOR
PERFORMAnCE BEnChMARKInG
We frame our discussion in terms of the principal-agent model, a
theoretical framework commonly applied in the economics and public
administration literatures. There are critics of this model who argue that
it overemphasizes the self-seeking behavior of agents and neglects social interactions and motivators. In his classic study of organizations,
Thompson (1967), for example, describes the importance of cliques,
social controls based on informal norms and status that influence the
performance of organizations. Similarly, stewardship theory emphasizes collective goals and public managers “whose motives are aligned
with the objectives of their principals,” or who highly value cooperative behavior even when their interests and those of the principal
diverge (Davis, Donaldson, and Schoorman 1997, p. 21). Although we
acknowledge the roles of social and cultural norms and the influence
of political and personal power relationships as described in these alternative theoretical frameworks, we rely primarily on principal-agent
theory in modeling behavior and relationships in this study.
In our application of principal-agent theory to the study of performance standards systems, we call the party who designs the
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measurement system the principal and the party whose performance is
measured the agent. We denote the measured performance P, and the
benchmark level of performance, or the performance standard, P0. The
difference between the performance outcome (P) and the performance
standard (P0) is denoted ∆P, that is, ∆P = P − P0.
We are interested in the methods that are used to construct the
performance benchmark P0 and in the kind of information that these
methods incorporate in the benchmark. Although we recognize that
there may not exist a single method of construction that could be effectively applied in all situations, we still believe that some methods are
largely more effective than others. We say that a standard is poorly constructed or “ineffective” if it is missing key pieces of information and/
or if it is likely to send the wrong signals and to stimulate behavioral
responses with negative implications. In addition, we recognize that,
in practice, organizations will often use multidimensional measurement systems with multiple measures and performance benchmarks.
Although we explicitly discuss these issues, for the sake of conciseness,
we focus in our literature review on the simplest case with a single
performance measure, as this is sufficient to highlight the main lessons
from the literature without loss of generality.
We assume that the agent has some control over the performance
outcome, and following the economics literature, effort constitutes the
agent’s choices and exertions that influence the performance outcome.
We denote the effort choice e and assume that higher effort levels increase the performance outcome, that is, P(e) increases with e. We
model effort as a one-dimensional choice by the agent. It is useful,
however, to think of e as a vector of activities; the agent chooses not
only how hard to work, but also how to allocate her time and effort
across different activities. For example, in job training centers, caseworkers allocate their efforts toward recruiting participants, assessing
their training “needs,” networking with other social service organizations and managing contracts with external vendors, and bookkeeping,
to name a few of their activities. The lessons we draw from our model
based on a simple formulation—assuming that e is a scalar—are robust
to this more realistic assumption.
In the simplest formulation, performance is equal to effort P = e,
and value added is equal to DP = e − P0. We think of value added here
as the agent’s contribution to the principal’s welfare, net of costs. In
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the case of a job training program, assuming its objective is to raise the
earnings and employability of the poor, value added is the value of the
labor market skills enrollees acquire due to the exertions of training
center workers, net of training costs.
As discussed above, setting the absolute level of the performance
standard is a critical task in performance measurement systems. In
the federal programs we study—JTPA and WIA—and others since
the U.S. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993,
government officials are required to undertake this task annually. We
assume (consistent with practice in these programs) that the performance standard determines the level of acceptable performance below
which sanctions are imposed and above which rewards are given. By
increasing the standard, the principal boosts incentives to improve
performance, because the agent has to supply more effort to meet the
standard and avoid sanctions.
Large or incessant increases in the standard, however, also diminish the credibility of the measurement system, with the consequence
that the agent may simply give up or search for alternative, possibly
unproductive ways to increase measured performance. In our model,
we assume that the agent receives a level of compensation that is independent of performance, and we define the level of effort that one
would expect for that base compensation as e0. In an efficiently functioning system, prevailing competitive forces determine this level of
effort. In other words, it is the amount of effort a representative agent
would expect to exert for the base level of compensation. In this case,
the performance standard is set at the level of performance that occurs
when the agent provides the competitive level of effort, P0 = P(e0).
The rationale behind setting the performance standard at this level
is that if the performance standard were set above P(e0), then the principal would be unable to attract and retain the agent. Agents would
not apply or compete for the job or contract. On the other hand, if the
performance standard were set below P(e0), the principal would be
overcompensating the agent.
To illustrate this definition of the performance standard, consider
a simple manufacturing production example. We use this example
because manual work constitutes the occupational class where performance benchmarking was first used in a systematic way (and is still
common practice). Taylor (1911) was perhaps its most famous early
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proponent. His ideas arose from his experience as a machinist in a steel
plant. Miller (1992, p. 102) also used a piece-rate production setting
to analyze “managerial dilemmas” and to consider how an incentive
system could “harness individual self-interest in pursuit of organizational goals,” “transforming an organizational social dilemma into an
organizational ‘invisible hand.’” This choice of example is without loss
of generality, as we will argue that the problems that arise with the
construction of performance standards in public organizations do not
fundamentally differ from those arising in production manufacturing.
Suppose a manual worker in a factory is paid a wage (w) per hour.
The wage is paid independently of the level of worker performance.
In addition to the fixed wage, the principal may wish to reward the
worker for superior performance and impose sanctions for inferior
performance. The number of pieces the worker produces per hour is
by itself insufficient to assess whether to reward or sanction the agent.
One way to address this question is to conduct time-and-motion studies to establish a benchmark level of performance, or an hourly rate,
P0 = e0(w), which a representative worker earning w would achieve, and
then use this benchmark to evaluate actual performance. In other words,
the principal actually assesses the level of performance that occurs under competitive effort and uses this information to set the performance
standard. The difference between the worker’s performance and the
performance standard is used as a measure of value added. Under that
interpretation, value added corresponds to what the agent adds, because
of superior effort, to what we would expect to prevail in the market.
This method of establishing the performance standard requires estimating the production technology available to the agent, that is, the
relation between effort and outcomes. Once this relationship is understood, it is possible to infer the agent’s excess effort relative to the
competitive level of effort. Counterfactual experiments such as timeand-motion studies, however, are practical only in a few occupations
that typically involve manual work. Many public and private sector
work situations involve nonmanual work, complex group interactions,
and nonstandardized outputs, making experimental studies to construct
counterfactual performance benchmarks very costly.
These complications mean that the methods typically used to
construct performance standards are imperfect. Real world methods
necessarily balance the cost of establishing fair and appropriate stan-
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dards and the expected return to the organization from assessing value
added more precisely; and of course, in the “real world,” non-economic
factors—e.g., political goals, legislative requirements, etc.—may also
influence standard setting processes. These challenges and trade-offs
will become evident in the case study analysis of the JTPA and WIA
performance standards that follow. First, however, we review a set of
generic problems that any method of setting performance targets must
address.
Leveling the Playing Field
Thus far, we have considered the case of a principal who manages
a single agent working in a single environment. It often happens, however, that the agent works in multiple environments or that the principal
manages multiple agents who face different work conditions. To illustrate, we return to the time-and-motion study example presented above
and assume that there are multiple workers assigned to different machines. We also assume that the machines vary in their productivity in
the sense that the amount of effort required to produce a unit of output
varies by machine. (One might model this idea formally by defining
the performance outcome from machine k when effort is e as P(e) =
ke, where k > 0 and k is different from machine to machine.) Assume
that each machine’s productivity is known to both the principal and the
agent.
If the agent is allowed to refuse to work on a machine, the principal
must factor the difference in marginal products of effort across agents
into the determination of the performance standard. In fact, if the principal sets the same performance standard for all machines, say, P0 = e0,
then the agent will only agree to work with machines that exhibit high
marginal productivities. An important point is that time-and-motion
studies would have to be conducted in each work environment to control for the special circumstances of the environment that are commonly
observed by the principal and the agent.
Consider, for example, the job-training caseworker with the responsibility to assess clients and place them into jobs at a rate required by
the performance standard. The caseworker will prefer to work with the
most motivated and capable clients and direct them into the most effective employment preparation activities. Consequently, in the absence of
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adjustments to the standard, the caseworker would respond by discriminating against low-ability enrollees and directing only the higher-ability
trainees into services with the highest measured performance outcomes
(e.g., job-placement activities).
Insurance and Uncontrollable Risk
The time-and-motion study example assumed no uncertainty about
the worker’s performance outcome. Consider a more realistic example
where the worker produces a number of pieces that depend on his or
her effort and also on some external shock or influence, for example,
a power outage that slows production (or in the job-training example,
an economic recession that dampens job placement success). The performance outcome is now equal to P + ∆ and the worker’s value added
is ∆P = (P + ε) − P0 , where e is a mean zero random variable that is
realized only after the agent has chosen his or her level of effort. Setting
the standard at a level that does not take into account these circumstances or context implies that a worker who supplies the effort level
that is required to achieve the performance standard will sometimes
overperform and other times underperform relative to the standard. In
this situation, value added is equal to ∆P = ∆ when e = e0 . Outside
shocks do not influence the worker’s choice of effort because additional
effort still increases expected performance. They do, however, change
the realized level of performance and value added, and therefore, the
worker’s compensation.
Although a risk-neutral worker will not suffer any disutility from
this variation in compensation, a risk-averse worker will, and this establishes a first rationale to construct as fair a performance standard as
possible. The merit of performance standards will depend in part on
their ability to control for outside risk (i.e., circumstances beyond the
control of public managers or staff). The logic of agency theory is that
standards that properly account for external influences reduce compensation risk, thereby increasing the agents’ welfare. Lowering the risk
faced by the agent is also desirable for the principal, as it means that he
does not have to offer the agent a higher wage to compensate for risk
bearing.
The key challenge for performance standards system designers is
to identify the sources of controllable versus uncontrollable factors that
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influence the performance outcome. In other words, it is important to
hold the worker responsible for effort, e, but not for external influences,
e. At the same time, the principal does not want to discount factors
that are within the agent’s control. For example, the principal does not
want to lower the performance standard in the event that the worker’s
machine breaks down if the agent might have anticipated and prevented
the breakdown. In the context of the job-training example, the principal does want to hold the caseworker responsible for (and reward)
efforts made to appropriately assess clients and facilitate better workeremployer matches. But it would be unfair and inefficient to penalize
the caseworker (or job-training center) for a lower rate of workeremployer matches if it is due to a declining number of labor market
(job) opportunities.
As suggested above, though, risk aversion is not the only reason the
agent may experience disutility from performance standards that fail
to control for outside risks. Another closely related concern is fairness.
The issue of income variability drives the concern under risk aversion,
while other considerations, such as interpersonal comparisons, may
foster concerns about fairness. For example, the agent may experience
more disutility from an idiosyncratic shock that lowers only her performance and not the performance of her coworkers, compared to a
group shock that lowers all workers’ performance. The former shock
generates different treatments amongst individuals who have essentially behaved identically. As under risk aversion, if workers value
fairness, the principal benefits from discounting factors that are outside
the worker’s control.
hidden Information, Adverse Selection, and Distortions
We show in the previous section that in setting performance standards, the principal may want to take into account information about
shocks that influence the performance outcome and that are outside the
agent’s control. These shocks are observed only after the agent has chosen a level of effort, implying that they do not influence this choice. We
now consider a different kind of information that plays an important
role in the construction of performance standards. This information is
observed only by the agent, and not by the principal, and it is observed
before the agent chooses his/her level of effort. For example, assume
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that when the agent is assigned to a new machine, she alone knows the
productivity of that machine and can use this information to make her
effort choice. We say that the information is privately known by the
agent, and consistent with the literature, we characterize such situations
as hidden information (Holmstrom 1982; Miller 1992).
Hidden information further complicates the problem of setting
standards. To illustrate, we return to the job training program example
and again assume that the training efforts of caseworkers in this program are evaluated in part according to the rate at which their clients
secure jobs. Caseworkers observe relevant information about applicants
on the likely success of training investments, (e.g., personal motivation
and employment barriers). Based on this information, the caseworkers
can predict how likely the applicant is to obtain employment by the end
of training. Assume furthermore that those applicants who are more
likely to perform well on the performance measure are not necessarily
those who benefit most from training. Indeed, some applicants to the
job-training program may be highly likely to obtain employment on
their own. As a result the caseworkers may overinvest in easy-to-serve
applicants and underinvest in hard-to-serve ones, and it may be impossible for the principal to correct these investment distortions.
For example, a given effort level e could produce performance outcome P = e + h, where h < 0 if a hard-to-serve participant is enrolled,
and h > 0 if an easy-to-serve participant is enrolled. We denote hidden
information by h to distinguish this kind of information from information that is publicly known, such as the information about varying
productivities of machines. If the caseworker observes the applicants’
type, he has an incentive to enroll only easy-to-serve applicants because
they produce better outcomes.
In fact, the only way the principal could try to correct these distortions would be by controlling for the type of applicants who have been
served, adjusting upward the performance of those agents who have
enrolled a larger fraction of hard-to-serve applicants. By assumption,
however, only the agent knows this information. If the principal were to
ask the agent what type of participants he has enrolled, the agent would
have an incentive to report enrolling only hard-to-serve enrollees, and
the principal would have no way to verify that the agent is telling the
truth.
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Practically speaking, the principal could correct these distortions
by developing a specific measure to target the hard-to-serve groups,
for example, using observable variables such as welfare recipient or
limited English proficiency as proxies for “hard-to-serve.” This would
assume that welfare recipients or nonnative English speakers are harder
to serve because they require higher investments for equal outcomes.
The principal could set a lower performance standard for these individuals, for example, P0’ = e0 − h, where P0’ < P0 by construction. Of
course, we know that not all welfare recipients (or nonnative English
speakers) are identical; some are easier to serve than others, and the
agent observes this information. Again, the agent will be inclined to
select a nonrepresentative sample of these groups. This implies that the
principal has corrected some distortions because the agent’s attention
is now focused on a needier target population, but the agent will still
select those applicants who are the easiest to serve within these subpopulations of applicants.
Note that a slightly different problem from hidden information,
known as adverse selection in the literature, occurs when there are multiple agents who are privately informed. In our example, it could be
the case that different agents face different costs, observed privately, of
meeting the standard. In the job training case, this happens when there
are multiple caseworkers who face different eligible populations, and
when the caseworkers privately observe this information. The distinction between adverse selection and hidden information has to do with
the point in time when the agent becomes privately informed. Under
hidden information, the agent becomes privately informed after agreeing to the contract, while under adverse selection, the agent is informed
before agreeing to the contract. As a consequence, adverse selection
introduces the possibility that the agent’s private information will influence the agent’s decision to accept the contract or not.
To illustrate, assume that the principal offers all agents the option
to run special programs that are only for hard-to-serve populations. The
principal lowers the standards for these special programs, and using our
terminology, this would constitute a new optional contract. The agent
agrees or declines to participate. The agents will choose to run such
programs on the basis of their private information about the population
they face. Presumably, the agents who face the best chances to meet the
lower performance standards will decide to run such programs. How-
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ever, these agents may not be those who generate the highest returns
from the principal’s perspective. The agent’s selection rule poses a
problem when it does not correspond to the rule that the principal would
use, had the principal had the same information as the agent.
Multiple Principals
Another distinctive feature of performance standards systems in the
public sector is the greater likelihood that agents will work for more
than one principal. In the context of public organizations, one should
think of principals as a widely defined category that includes all constituencies or interest groups that may influence the actions of the agent,
either directly through explicit rewards or indirectly through more subtle channels. For example, in the context of our application to the JTPA
and WIA programs, Congress, the USDOL, and state governments
would be the main principals, since these are the actors who directly define the goals and activities of the organization, both through the design
of the incentive system, performance standards, and also through other
organizational features. But local politicians, private industry council
representatives, and other interest groups should also be viewed as secondary principals, since these parties likewise have roles in influencing
training program priorities and agency actions.
The key implication of the presence of multiple principals is increased complexity in the incentive system, particularly if the interests
of the different principals are not aligned, e.g., emphasizing different
priorities or outcomes. The agent has to choose how to allocate his/her
effort level e across the various goals or objectives of the principals,
which might be represented in a performance standards system by multiple standards, P1 , P2 , P3 , etc.
Dixit (2002) proposes an analysis of multiple principals competing noncooperatively for the agent’s effort. As expected, the agent will
allocate more effort toward the objectives of principals who compensate at a higher rate (or provide greater rewards for achievement in
some form or another). In other words, if w1 > w2 , then e1 > e2 and P1
= e1(w1) > P2 = e2(w2); performance is higher on the outcome set by the
principal who calls for P1 and provides greater rewards for its achievement. Dixit demonstrates that the marginal level of effort applied by the
agent (e1 , e2 , e3 , etc.) toward the achievement of the various outcomes
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will be decreasing in the number of principals. The reason is simply
that each principal will reward the agent for success on the particular
dimension(s) of effort that concern him or her, but he will also insure
the agent against failure on dimensions of effort that concern the other
principals. If principals choose the level of incentive noncooperatively,
the desire to insure the agent will conflict with the desire to provide
incentives.
In investigating how the principals compete for the agent’s effort,
Dixit also shows that the declines in agents’ marginal level of effort
(as the number of principals increases) will be exacerbated if the efforts across principals’ objectives are substitutes. In other words, the
principals undermine one another, and the impact of the incentives is
diminished. In equilibrium, all principals call for effort, but since efforts are substitutable, the incentive effects on total effort are reduced.
Dixit’s analysis calls for two recommendations for organizational
design. First, one should allocate and organize tasks across agents based
on whether they are complements or substitutes. Complementary activities can be grouped together, but the grouping of substitute activities
should be avoided. In the context of the JTPA program, if there are
some principals who are more concerned about equity of allocation
(local government) and others more concerned about efficiency (the
federal government), then it may be optimal to divide up the functions
of enrollment and training and to assign each of these activities to two
separate agencies.
In addition, the model has implications for how the principals
should be allowed to compete. In particular, the principal i should not
be permitted to excuse or cover for the agent’s poor performance toward
meeting principal j’s objective. This “compartmentalization principle”
has implications in a public organization. Consider, for example, the
conflict between enrollment and training in the JTPA program described
above, and assume that the proposed solution of breaking up these tasks
is not feasible for administrative or practical reasons. In this situation,
the principals who are concerned primarily with reaching hard-to-serve
populations will try to set the performance standard in such a way that
training agencies are not penalized for achieving low performance outcomes. Similarly, principals who care mainly about efficiency will try
to minimize the emphasis placed on enrollment choices. A possible result would be that agencies would face low performance standards and
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no constraints on enrollment. To avoid this outcome, one would want
to minimize principals’ interference with one another in the setting of
performance standards.
Although there is considerable discussion of “multidimensionality” or multiple principals in the literature, there is little mention of
situations in which there may be a hierarchy among the principals.
The political science literature discusses “political multidimensionality” and the difficulty of identifying an “ultimate principal,” e.g., the
competing interests of House and Senate chambers, committees, and
other political actors that have implications for the stability of agents’
behavior (Maltzman and Smith 1994). However, it is also possible that
in a political hierarchy such as that established in the JTPA system,
with service providers taking signals from local job-training authorities
and state and federal policy directives at the same time, agents might
allocate their efforts toward alternative objectives of these principals
according to the principals’ position in this hierarchy.
Dynamic Issues
Measurement systems are often changed from time to time. There
are many reasons why the principal may update performance standards.
First, the principal may want to set low standards when a new performance measure is introduced to give the agent time to adjust to the
change. Second, the principal may correct performance measurement
systems as she acquires new information about the effectiveness of different measurement schemes or about the influence of external factors
on performance. Third, the principal may revise the standard to account
for changes in the environment or in the production technology.
The agent will take into account the possibility of future changes,
and most importantly, the fact that current performance outcomes may
be used in setting future standards. In both the JTPA and WIA programs, this has been a central component of the performance standard
setting process. The WIA legislation explicitly identifies “continuous
performance improvement,” in which performance targets increase
each year, as a central tenet of the performance standards system. Such
a rule also implicitly exists in any organization that uses past agent performance to estimate the production function and set standards for the
present. Assume the agent systematically outperforms the standard, and
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the principal consequently increases it. It could be that the agent was
outperforming the standard because the agent was exerting exceptional
effort. The agent will then anticipate that current performance influences future standards. The natural response to such a rule is to stop
supplying high effort because it increases the standard (and the level of
effort required to obtain the same reward in the future). Thus, a simple
static view of incentive systems may fail to capture such behavioral
responses that arise only when one considers the dynamic nature of
performance measurement.
In the economics and management literature, this phenomenon
is known as the ratchet effect (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987; Miller
1992). The agent’s belief about the principal’s policies regarding future
standards will significantly influence his behavior and the success of
the incentive system. To eliminate the ratchet effect, the agent must
trust that the principal will not change the standard. Trust is more likely
to develop under repeated interactions when the principal can create a
reputation for not reneging on the contract. Miller (1992, p. 157) likewise recognizes the importance of trust in these situations, noting that
“‘trustworthiness’ on the part of managers seems to be a necessary element of an effective incentive system.” Another way the principal can
eliminate the ratchet effect is by committing to never change a standard,
or more realistically, by committing to strict rules for changing the standard. Such commitment is likely to eliminate fear of the ratchet effect
and reinforce incentives for effort.

OvERvIEw OF PERFORMAnCE STAnDARD–
SETTInG APPROAChES
We now present a brief overview of alternative methods for constructing performance standards (informed by the theoretical discussion
above) and consider the environments where these methods are likely
to work well.
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Estimating the Production Function
Most basically, the principal (or public agency) can attempt to estimate the production function (i.e., the level of productivity expected
from a given level of effort) to set the standard. It is sometimes possible
to establish a standard through experimentation or through statistical
methods. Such an approach will only be valid, however, for production processes that are stable over time and across environments. This
is relatively rare, for example, in public social service provision. The
use of data on past performance outcomes to construct estimates of the
production function is a more common application of this method. A
potential problem with this method, as discussed earlier, is the introduction of a ratchet effect if higher performance outcomes increase future
standards. This method is also unlikely to work well in nonstationary
environments where the production technology is subject to transient
shocks.
Relative Performance Evaluation
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is possible when the principal manages multiple agents. RPE can take many forms. In one form, the
principal ranks the agent’s performance as in a tournament (e.g., akin to
the Job Corps Center annual performance rankings). Alternatively, the
principal could compare the agent’s performance to the average performance among all agents who perform the same work. RPE works
well for “insurance purposes” because it controls for shocks that are
common to all agents. In this way, the model provides a rationale for
benchmarking by comparing performance across similar workers/agencies, as called for by some public administration scholars (Hatry 1999).
Of course, this method has its limitations, too, in that it may exacerbate
competition and may also result in wasteful behaviors (e.g., sabotage,
monitoring others, etc.).
negotiating the Standard
With this method, the principal and agent negotiate (agree on)
the performance standard. If objective information on the production
function is absent and relative performance evaluation is not a viable al-
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ternative, this may be the only solution available. This approach requires
an environment of mutual trust between the agent and principal(s), i.e.,
one in which the agent does not withhold important information about
her effort and capabilities, and where the principal can be trusted to use
performance information fairly, e.g., not to increase the standard in the
event of performance outcomes above the standard. The resulting performance standard (and the corresponding distribution of risk between
the principal and agent) may be more a function of the relative bargaining ability of the parties, however, rather than reflecting principles of
effective performance standard setting processes.

PERFORMAnCE-STAnDARD SETTInG In FEDERAL
JOB-TRAInInG PROGRAMS
In the U.S. government’s largest job-training program, individual
providers of government training have been evaluated by their performance relative to specific, numerical standards. Congress has also
legislated important changes in the formulation of these numerical
standards, as described in Chapter 4. A major redesign of the program
five years ago introduced an entirely different approach to setting
performance standards, and we will devote considerable attention
to the implications of these changes for the system’s incentives and
functioning.
Under JTPA, Congress, the USDOL, and state authorities shared
in designing and implementing the program’s incentive policies. The
Labor Department established expected performance levels using a
regression-based model with national departure points. States could
use the optional department adjustment model or develop their own adjustment procedures, although the state-developed procedures and any
adjustments made by the governor had to conform to the USDOL’s parameters (see Chapter 4 and Social Policy Research Associates [1999]).
A majority of states adopted these models and used the USDOLprovided performance standards worksheets to determine performance
targets (some with modifications).
The WIA program that replaced JTPA in 2000 introduced a new
approach to setting performance standards that involves the negotia-
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tion of performance targets. States negotiate with the USDOL and local
workforce investment areas to establish performance standards, using estimates based on historical data (or past performance) that are
intended to take into account differences in economic conditions, participant characteristics, and services delivered. The pretext for making
this change to a system of negotiated standards was to promote “shared
accountability,” described as one of the “guiding principles” of WIA
(USDOL 2001, p. 8).
In our case analysis of the JTPA and WIA performance measurement systems, the USDOL, Congress, and the states constitute multiple
principals in the organizational structure, while local implementing
authorities (in government entities or training centers) function as the
agents, undertaking the business of enrolling, training, and finding employment for the program clients. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 (p. 22) shows
the performance measures currently in effect in the WIA program and
also indicates which of these are new to WIA (i.e., that were not used in
the JTPA program).
Determining the Base Level of Performance
The first challenge in setting performance standards is to establish
the “counterfactual” level of performance, i.e., the level of performance
that would occur under a competitive level of effort. Consider for example the entered employment rate measure. What employment rate
outcome would an agent who supplies a competitive level of effort
achieve?
In general, the USDOL has attempted to address this question
through the use of data on past performance. For example, prior to the
start of JTPA, the Labor Department collected performance data on outcomes during the final years of the training program that preceded JTPA
and used these data to determine the performance standards in the first
year of JTPA. Now assume that past performance in a representative
training environment gives a distribution of performance, and that differences in performance outcomes are due only to differences in effort.
Then if the department believes that only 50 percent of the training
centers have supplied at least the competitive level of effort, the performance standard should be set at the 50th percentile of the distribution
of past performance.
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In the JTPA measurement system, the performance standard was set
at the outcome produced by the training center at the 25th percentile of
performance among all training centers nationwide. Thus, the USDOL
evaluated a training center’s effort, e, against an effort level e’, that corresponded to the effort level of the training center at the 25th percentile
of systemwide performance. An interpretation of this choice is that 25
percent of the training centers in the previous program were not supplying
a competitive level of effort.
Under WIA, the more systematic approach for setting standards
described above was abandoned. With discretion for setting performance standards transferred to the negotiation process between states
and localities, the use of past performance information varied widely.
The USDOL did provide some guidance for negotiated targets under WIA using data on the performance of seven early implementing
states. However, among the majority of states that used baseline performance measures in determining appropriate levels for the standards,
the sources of these data differed considerably. The various types of
data used included the projected national averages for the negotiated
standards provided by the Labor Department; federal baseline numbers
(available in the federal performance tracking system, i.e., Standardized Program Information Reporting [SPIR] data); unemployment
insurance (UI) data; and states’ own performance baselines from previous program years. Georgia, for example, used program year (PY)
1998 state performance records combined with the projected national
averages in negotiations with regional office representatives and locallevel officials to determine the performance targets for the first three
years of WIA. Some states, such as New Hampshire and Ohio, used
UI data from earlier periods (PY 1994–1997) combined with USDOL
performance data available in the SPIR to set performance levels. These
considerable differences across states in the performance standard setting process have important implications for the ability of the principal
to create a level playing field for all agents.
Is the Playing Field Level?
Although our discussion thus far has centered on a representative
training center, there are important differences across centers in the
populations from which they draw their enrollees and in their labor mar-
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kets. For example, training centers located in relatively depressed labor
markets should reasonably expect lower performance outcomes than
those located in relatively tight labor markets. The USDOL recognized
this problem and provided states with a method to adjust standards that
took into account features of the training center’s population and environment that may have been correlated with the performance outcome.
Under JTPA, this method established the 25th percentile only as a
starting or departure point. For each training center, the departure point
was adjusted using a regression model, taking into account the extent
that the training center’s characteristics differed from the average training center’s characteristics. Thus, continuing the above example, the
adjustment approach would lower the entered employment rate standard for training centers in depressed job markets relative to those in
robust ones.
In the WIA program, the formal performance standards adjustment
models were discarded by nearly all of the states (the exceptions being
Texas, Maryland, and the District of Columbia). At the same time, the
USDOL instructed states to take into account differences in economic
conditions, participant characteristics, and services provided. For a
majority, these adjustments to standards were made informally during
the review of past performance data and in negotiations. For example,
Wisconsin reported using PY 1997 data and the projected averages in
negotiations with local officials to set the standards. A comparison of
these data shows that when Wisconsin’s PY 1997 baseline was above
the projected national averages, the projected averages were established
as the targets. When Wisconsin’s baseline numbers were below the projected national averages, the baseline values were typically set as the
targets. Other states (e.g., Washington, Nebraska, South Carolina, and
others) followed a similar process.
Adjusting for Uncontrollable Risks
In addition to accounting for factors (demographic, economic, or
others) known at the time that performance standards are established, it
is important to allow for adjustments to standards that will offset future
or unknown risks of poor performance due to conditions or circumstances beyond the control of agents. In other words, the adjustment
methodology should also correct for the risk generated by a random
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shock (ε) in the model. While exceptional performance is still an unbiased estimator of excess effort even in the presence of a random shock,
such a shock introduces noise in the measure of value added, and therefore in the training center’s award. Because of risk-averse training staff
and uncertain budgets, it is in the principal’s interest to formulate performance standards that control both for persistent differences across
training centers and transitory or idiosyncratic shocks.
As described above, many states used past performance data to set
performance standards for the first year of the WIA program. In addition, most states also built in anticipated performance improvements
for the two subsequent years. However, economic conditions changed
significantly between the pre-WIA period and first three years of the
program’s implementation. Between 1998 and 1999, unemployment
rates were declining on average, with 75 percent of all states experiencing a decline. Then between 2000 and 2001, this trend reversed. More
than 75 percent of the states experienced an increase in unemployment
rates, and the increases were even greater between 2001 and 2002, following the September 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attacks.2 As
unemployment rates were increasing in the first three years of WIA
(from 3.94 percent to 5.35 percent, on average) and creating adverse
labor market conditions for trainees, the standards for performance
achievement in the program were also increasing (from 66.44 percent
to 70.94 percent, on average).
Year-to-year variations in job availability typically cannot be anticipated by training centers, much less an economic shock of the magnitude
precipitated by the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, by adjusting a training center’s standards for the local unemployment rate each
year, the variance in performance due to unpredictable changes in the
environment is reduced. And although these types of adjustments were
made in the JTPA system, they were not standard practice under WIA.
A 2002 GAO report confirmed that WIA program administrators were
seriously concerned about their ability to meet performance targets. All
state program administrators reported that some of the performance
targets were set too high for them and that the performance standards
negotiation processes did not allow for adequate adjustments to varying
economic conditions and participant demographics. In fact, the proportion of states meeting or exceeding their performance standards dropped
between PY 2001 and PY 2002 for nearly all measures, some dramati-
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Table 5.1 Percent of States Meeting or Exceeding Their negotiated
Performance Standards in Pys 2000–2002
Performance measure/standard
PY 2000 PY 2001 PY 2002
Adult entered employment rate
56.7
66.5
61.5
Adult employment retention rate
54.0
60.7
57.7
Adult earnings change
49.3
64.6
48.1
Adult credential rate
36.7
45.6
46.2
Dislocated worker entered employment rate
52.7
65.5
55.8
Dislocated worker employment retention rate 42.0
58.7
51.9
Dislocated worker earning replacement rate
54.7
74.8
61.5
Dislocated worker credential rate
36.7
58.7
55.8
Older youth entered employment rate
58.7
63.6
42.3
Older youth employment retention rate
52.0
61.2
48.1
Older youth earnings change
52.7
64.6
59.6
Older youth credential rate
29.3
31.6
23.1
Younger youth retention rate
38.0
59.2
57.7
Younger youth skill attainment rate
72.0
69.4
53.9
Younger youth diploma rate
25.3
45.6
50.0
Employer satisfaction
45.3
75.7
69.2
Participant satisfaction
51.3
78.6
76.9
SOURCE: Heinrich (2004).

cally, such as the 21 percent decrease in the proportion of states meeting
their older youth entered employment rates (see Table 5.1).
Cream Skimming and quick Fixes
The pressures generated by a high-stakes performance measurement system can lead to undesirable behavioral responses on the part of
agents. The performance standards under both JTPA and WIA were not
only “noisy,” but they were also vulnerable to manipulation by agents.
One way to increase P − P0 (and the corresponding performance award)
was to increase effort. Another way to increase P − P0 that required no
additional effort, however, was to select among the eligible applicants
only the high-h types. That is, training centers might enroll persons who
would produce high employment rates and earnings, even in the absence
of training. This behavior has been called cream skimming (in addition
to Chapter 6, see, e.g., Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond [1993];
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Cragg [1997]; Heckman and Smith [2003]; and Heckman, Smith, and
Taber [1996]).
To prevent cream skimming, the USDOL adjusted the JTPA
standards for the effects of the characteristics of enrollees on P. As illustrated in Chapter 4, the adjustment method compensated training
centers for enrolling persons such as the handicapped who tended to
lower posttraining employment rates and earnings outcomes. Training
centers that enrolled lower than average numbers of welfare recipients
and handicapped were required to achieve higher standards. That is, the
USDOL adjusted performance standards for the effect of the training
center’s enrollment policies on P.
These adjustments under JTPA, which apparently did not fully account for all low-h characteristics, may have reduced cream-skimming
behavior, but they did not eliminate it (Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith
[2002]). In addition, the adjustment method did not account for training centers’ choices about the training services made available. Thus,
the performance measures generated incentives to emphasize short-run,
“quick fix”–type job placement activities in lieu of longer-term activities with more training content (Courty and Marschke 2003). Courty
and Marschke (1997, 2004a) also showed how program managers
strategically managed their “trainee inventories” and timed participant
program exits to maximize end of the year performance levels. For a
more detailed overview of the findings described in this subsection, see
Chapters 6 and 7.
Implications of Multiple Principals
The federal government’s efforts to encourage service delivery to the
hard-to-serve and the provision of more intensive training activities were
also frustrated by the presence of multiple principals with differing priorities. Although state authorities followed suit in placing more emphasis on
these same goals, some local job-training authorities continued to demand
low-cost placements from their service providers (Heinrich 1999). Heinrich
found that service providers were aware of the new federal and state
policy directives but focused primarily on job placement rates and costs
per placement in their efforts, largely because these were the outcomes
directly rewarded with contract renewals and other forms of recognition
at the local level.
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The change under WIA to a system in which regional USDOL
representatives, state authorities, and local representatives engage in
negotiations to determine performance standards might have presented
an opportunity for greater coordination in aligning these principals’
interests and reducing problems associated with divided agent efforts.
In practice, however, the lack of formal adjustment mechanisms for
standards under the new system only exacerbated these problems. After
interviewing WIA program administrators in 50 states and visiting five
sites, the GAO (2002) concluded that “the need to meet performance
levels may be the driving factor in deciding who receives WIA-funded
services at the local level” (p. 14). The GAO report and a subsequent
study (Heinrich 2004) describe how some local areas have limited access to services for individuals who they perceive are less likely to get
and retain a job. For example, some have responded to these pressures
by augmenting the screening process for determining registrations or
by limiting registrations of harder-to-serve job seekers, including dislocated workers whose preprogram earnings were more difficult to replace.
A Texas official indicated that even with Texas’s relatively sophisticated statistical model for setting and adjusting performance standards,
adequate adjustments had not been made for economic conditions.
In her empirical analysis of WIA program performance across the
states, Heinrich (2004) estimates OLS regressions using as dependent
variables states’ actual performance levels, and in separate regressions,
the differentials between their actual performance and the negotiated
standards. The objective of these analyses is to assess the relationship of
local participant characteristics and economic conditions to measured
performance and to determine if “adjustments” made in the negotiation
process (i.e., to establish fair standards) were effective in accounting for
these factors. For example, states with a comparatively high number of
high school dropouts participating in their programs could have negotiated a lower employment retention rate or earnings change standard
in anticipation that their less educated populations would have fewer
or less attractive employment opportunities. If the states’ initial processes for adjusting performance standards through such negotiations
had worked as intended, one would expect to see fewer or weaker relationships between the performance differentials and these baseline
characteristics (compared to their relationships with actual performance
levels). In other words, only state and local program efforts—not char-
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acteristics of their populations or economic conditions that were beyond
program managers’ control—should explain why they met, exceeded,
or fell below their negotiated performance standards.
Heinrich estimates separate regressions for each of the 17 performance standards for these two dependent variables. In both sets of
models, characteristics such as race, education, and work history were
statistically significant predictors of performance relative to some standards, suggesting that adjustments for participant characteristics were
inadequate. In fact, the most consistent, negative predictors of performance levels and differentials were unemployment rates. These findings
confirm that states were not prepared to adjust for what turned out to
be significant risks of failure to meet performance standards due to the
economic downturn and aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks.
Dynamics
Under JTPA, the practice of pegging the performance standard to
the performance of the training center at the 25th percentile in the prior
period likely contributed to unsustainable changes in the level of effort
exerted by training centers over time. If training centers responded to
incentives and strived to exceed the performance standard, the distribution of training centers’ performances would shift to the right, implying
that the new 25th percentile (which would become the basis of the standard in the next year) would exceed the old 25th percentile. As long as
training centers can keep up with effort, the standard grows ever higher,
and the amount of effort necessary to meet the standard also increases,
leading to higher outcomes and future increases in the standard. More
realistically, at least if performance improvement or inflation goes on
for long enough, such a system implies that some training centers will
eventually fall behind and fail to meet the standard. If such a system
would be used for long enough, performance inflation should eventually stop and about 25 percent of training centers would perform below
the standard: an unsatisfactory outcome.
Table 5.2 reports the departure points for a number of the original
JTPA performance measures (i.e., the adult employment rate at termination, the adult welfare employment rate at termination, and the
youth employment rate at termination). These departure points were
consistently set at the 25th percentile of a previous year’s distribution of
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Table 5.2 Departure Points for First-Generation JTPA Standards
Adult welfare
Youth employment
Adult employment employment rate at
rate at
Program year rate at termination (%) termination (%)
termination (%)
1984
47.0
—
21.4
1985
57.1
—
36.4
1986, 1987
62.4
51.3
43.3
1988, 1989
68.0
56.0
45.0
NOTE: — = data not available.
SOURCE: Courty and Marschke (2004b).

outcomes. As predicted, Table 5.2 shows a general increase in departure
points over this period of the early JTPA years. The departure points in
1986–1987 were much higher than those in 1984–1985, which is not
unexpected given that they were based on performance under JTPA’s
predecessor program and the initial nine months of JTPA (during which
training centers were not subject to incentive policies).
Under WIA, the USDOL strongly encouraged states and localities
to set standards that would motivate improved performance from year
to year. In fact, in the effort to promote “continuous performance improvement,” the states set standards that not only required that they
improve over time, but also that the magnitude of the improvements increase from year to year. This approach gave states an implicit incentive
to negotiate lower standards in the early years, and some of the states,
in fact, attempted to do this. North Carolina, for example, was asked by
the USDOL to increase the level of its negotiated standards before the
start of the WIA program, as they were judged to be too low relative
to other states and North Carolina’s past performance (Heinrich 2004).
For the most part, though, states and localities complied with WIA requirements by building yearly increases into the standards.
As the analysis by Heinrich shows, however, this approach failed
due to the lack of adjustments for changing economic conditions in
the early years of WIA. Two years into the program’s operation, 38
states were identified as having failed to achieve at least 80 percent
of their performance goals for two consecutive years and were at risk
for sanctions. More generally, these findings suggest that the types of
formal performance standards adjustments made in the JTPA system
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to control for factors outside program managers’ control are critical to
the success of a system intended to promote continuous performance
improvements. The presence of conditions that drive ratchet effects in
WIA also suggests that the design of performance incentives may not
always follow a strictly economic logic.

COnCLUSIOnS
In this chapter, we have drawn from the information economics,
contract theory, and public administration literatures to discern basic
lessons for the construction of performance standards. We demonstrate
the relevance of these lessons in the context of two public programs,
the U.S. JTPA and WIA federal job training programs. We find evidence that performance measurement system designers have attempted
to “level the playing field” over time to provide equivalent performance
incentives across states and localities. Performance standard adjustment
methods were established to account for “shocks” that are outside an
agent’s control and to reduce the risk faced by the agent. Policymakers
have also tried to reduce the potential negative distortions due to hidden
information.
At the same time, it is not surprising that in a public sector program
with multiple principals and political relationships influencing administration, the evidence suggests that these problems were not fully
resolved. We identified some negative dynamic properties of the performance measurement system that threaten its sustainability. In both JTPA
and WIA, the dynamics of performance benchmarking and the challenges of effectively adjusting performance expectations for external
influences beyond program managers’ control likely contributed to inefficiencies and generated incentives to influence performance in ways
other than increasing effort. Selecting trainees according to observed
characteristics associated with their labor market success, limiting the
availability of more intensive training services, and demonstrating lower
performance early on to allow for performance improvements over
time are some examples of strategic behaviors that were unintended
by system designers and potentially harmful to the system and program outcomes. In the WIA system, where rewards (up to $3 million in
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grants) and sanctions (up to a 5 percent reduction in grants) had potentially important implications for program functioning, the performance
standards should have provided appropriate incentives and feedback to
operators about the effectiveness of their activities in improving service
quality and participant outcomes.
Politicians, along with economists and private sector representatives, have been calling for a more businesslike administration of
government for more than a century, most recently in the “reinventing
government” and New Public Management reform initiatives. The use
of performance measurement systems and bonuses in public sector programs has been a key component of these recent initiatives, although
both policymakers and scholars have begun to uncover evidence of their
“dark side,” including some of the negative or unintended consequences
described in this study (Radin 2000). Our research confirms both the
potential of these systems to be effectively managed to promote performance improvements, and the limitations of these systems’ design,
which are guided not only by economic theory, but also by political
demands and the complexities of representative governance. Although
our research doesn’t point to cogent solutions for all of the problems
that public sector performance measurement system designers face, we
do suggest some specific actions public managers can take to improve
these systems, such as the proper incorporation of different types of
information into the standard, coordination among multiple principals
with conflicting interests, and more careful attention to the dynamic implications of performance measurement. More generally, we also hope
that the framework for analysis of these issues that we present might
better guide policymakers’ or other scholars’ understanding and consideration of how these systems and public program performance might
be improved.

notes
1. Both Dixit and Burgess and Ratto (2003) evaluate this literature in the context of
incentive provision inside government organizations.
2. In New York City alone, it is estimated that about 430,000 job-months and $2.8
billion in wages were lost in the three months following the September 11 attacks
(Makinen 2002).
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6
Do the Determinants of Program
Participation Data Provide
Evidence of Cream Skimming?
James J. Heckman
Jeffrey Smith

This chapter considers the extent to which detailed data on the
process of participation in a social program can provide researchers
and policymakers with meaningful evidence on the nature and extent
of cream skimming caused by a performance-management system. We
illustrate our discussion with an empirical analysis of data collected as
part of the National JTPA Study (NJS). These data allow us to empirically decompose the process of participation in the JTPA program into
a series of stages: eligibility for the program, awareness of the program,
application to the program, acceptance into the program, and enrollment
into the program. This chapter reframes and reinterprets the analysis in
Heckman and Smith (2004) for this volume.1
Conceptually, this chapter contributes to the literature by clarifying
how and when data on multiple stages of the program participation process provide credible evidence on the effect of performance standards
on program participation. Decomposing the process into stages allows
researchers to compare the determinants of participation across stages.
Dividing the stages into those on which program staff (and thus performance standards) have an important influence and those on which they
do not provides suggestive evidence on the importance of performance
standards for program participation.
Empirically, we make two major contributions. First, we document
the importance of factors other than cream skimming induced by performance standards in accounting for differences in JTPA participation
among subgroups. In particular, the eligibility rules for JTPA play a
major role in driving subgroup differences. Conditional on eligibility,
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further subgroup differences emerge at the stage of program awareness, something over which program staff have at most limited control.
These findings suggest caution regarding the conclusions from existing
analyses that presume strong effects of cream skimming based solely
on comparisons of the characteristics of program eligibles and program
participants.
Second, our analysis of the determinants of program enrollment
conditional on application and acceptance into the program (the stage
where we expect program staff to have the most control over the process) yields some suggestive evidence consistent with cream skimming.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First we put
this chapter into the context of the broader literature. We then present
a framework for analyzing data on multiple stages of the program participation process and discuss what such data can reveal regarding the
empirical importance of cream skimming induced by performance
standards in determining who gets served. The next section documents
aspects of the JTPA program relevant for our analysis but not covered
in Chapter 2. We then describe the data we use and the four training
centers from the National JTPA Study at which much of the data were
collected, followed by a detailed examination of four stages in the JTPA
participation process: eligibility, program awareness, application and
acceptance into the program, and formal enrollment. We decompose the
program participation process in order to focus on how overall differences in participation probabilities across subgroups break down into
effects at each stage of the participation process. The last section reviews our conclusions and places them in the context of the volume as
a whole.

COnTExT
Our analysis fits into two broader literatures, one on the determinants of participation in social programs and the other on the effects of
performance management systems in social programs in general and in
active labor market programs in particular. Currie (1996) surveys the
literature on the determinants of participation in social programs; see
also the long list of references in Heckman and Smith (2004).2
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The majority of this literature focuses on participation in U.S. entitlement programs such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF),
Food Stamps, and Unemployment Insurance. Persons eligible for such
programs are legally entitled to their benefits. In addition to the decisions of potential participants, bureaucratic discretion plays a role
even in entitlement programs as program staff can affect eligibility
decisions—see, e.g., Parsons (1991) for the case of disability insurance—and can affect the information available to potential participants
as well as the hassle costs of participation in other program contexts.
Empirical analyses of participation in entitlement programs typically
focus on the demand side and analyze the effects of variation in the
costs and benefits of participation among eligibles.
A smaller literature considers U.S. nonentitlement programs, such
as many employment and training programs, where participation conditional on eligibility depends explicitly on both decisions by potential
participants and decisions by program gatekeepers; we call such programs mutually voluntary programs. The JTPA program that we study
represents such a program, as do National Science Foundation grants
and admission to (selective) state colleges and universities (and many
other programs). As noted in Chapter 2, under WIA (JTPA’s successor), so-called core services, such as job search assistance, represent
an entitlement while more expensive services, such as classroom training, require participant interest, program staff approval, and meeting
eligibility requirements. Analyses of the determinants of participation
in mutually voluntary programs have many purposes, including informing, developing, and implementing econometric evaluation estimators;
documenting or explaining differences in participation rates across
groups; and examining the role of performance standards (and, in our
case, the cream skimming they encourage) on participation patterns.
Recent analyses in the context of active labor market programs include
Mitnik (2009), Skedinger and Widerstedt (2007), and Weber (2008);
see also the earlier references in Heckman and Smith (2004).3
A vast general literature on the effects of performance management
systems in government has arisen in the past two decades. Osborne
and Gaebler (1992) and Osborne and Plastrik (1997) provide important
popular treatments, while Heinrich and Lynn (2000), Forsythe (2001),
and Radin (2006), among others, offer more scholarly overviews. In
the narrower context of active labor market programs, the chapters in
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this volume touch on many of the major strands of the literature, including analyses of participation and service assignment patterns (as in
this chapter), analyses of the effects of cross-sectional and time-series
variation in the nature or presence of performance incentives on outcomes (as in Chapter 7), studies of performance-based contracting (as
in Chapter 8), and the correlation of performance measures with experimental or econometric estimates of the causal effects of programs (as
in Chapter 9). Chapters 7, 8, and 9 review the corresponding literatures
in depth.
Our analysis in this chapter takes its inspiration from both of these
literatures. The literature on participation in employment and training
programs influences our choice of variables, including our examination
of recent labor force status patterns. It also influences our interpretation
of the results. The broader literature on program participation motivates
our emphasis on variation across individuals in the expected costs and
benefits of participation and our concern with program awareness. As
discussed in more detail in the next section, the literature on the effects
of performance management systems influences our thoughts on the
evidentiary value of our analysis.

A FRAMEwORK FOR AnALyzInG PARTICIPATIOn
In SOCIAL PROGRAMS
This section outlines a descriptive framework for analyzing the
determinants of participation in a social program using data on the characteristics of random samples of individuals observed at each stage of
the process and considers its analytic value. The framework follows
individuals through multiple stages of a linear participation process, in
which participation requires passing through a sequence of stages in a
specific order. The particular stages in our framework spring from the
data available to us and the (not unrelated) institutional details of the
JTPA program examined in our empirical application. Generalizing our
framework to allow for a nonlinear participation process (say, by explicitly accounting for the small fraction of JTPA participants sentenced
to participate in the program by a judge or for individuals who reach
JTPA via a referral from a service provider) or for a larger number or
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smaller number of stages is straightforward. Moreover, our framework,
and our discussion of the evidence it provides, both generalize well beyond JTPA and well beyond the context of active labor market policies.
In order for a person to participate in JTPA, he or she must be eligible for it, must be aware of it, must apply for it, must be accepted
into it, and must be formally enrolled in it. Figure 6.1 depicts the process of selection into the program. Different factors govern each stage
of the process. Legislators define the eligibility criteria that program
staff members apply to each applicant. Program awareness depends on
outreach efforts by program operators, on other aspects of the informational environment surrounding potential participants, such as friends
who have participated or interaction with staff from other programs,
and on potential participants’ prior beliefs about the costs and benefits
of learning about employment and training programs.
Potential participants make application decisions based on the expected benefits and perceived costs of participation. Acceptance into
a program depends on bureaucratic preferences over applicant types,
which in many programs are determined in part by formal performance
standards systems. Acceptance also depends on the willingness of the
applicant to pursue the application process to its conclusion and on further changes in opportunity costs, such as sudden illnesses or the arrival
of job offers, during the application process.
Formal enrollment depends on both bureaucratic and personal preferences. For example, as noted in Chapter 4, the JTPA performance
Figure 6.1 The JTPA Selection Process
Eligibility for JTPA

↓

Awareness of JTPA

↓

Application to JTPA

↓

Acceptance into JTPA

↓

Enrollment into JTPA
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standards system counted only the employment and wages of enrollees
in a specified period following termination from the program. As a result, local JTPA offices had an incentive to gain additional information
about the potential employability of persons accepted into the program
and to use it to guide their enrollment decisions. At the same time, the
passage of time between acceptance and enrollment (as when waiting
for a particular course to begin or looking for an employer willing to
offer an OJT position) leads to changes in opportunity costs that may
cause accepted applicants to decline enrollment when offered.
To more formally describe the participation process, consider the
following conditional probabilities for a person with characteristics x:
1) the probability of eligibility, 2) the probability of program awareness
given eligibility, 3) the probability of application given eligibility and
awareness, 4) the probability of acceptance given application, and 5) the
probability of formal enrollment conditional on acceptance into a program. In formal terms, we have
(6.1)

Pr(el = 1| x) ,

(6.2)

Pr(aw = 1| el = 1, x) ,

(6.3)

Pr(ap = 1| aw = 1, el = 1, x)

(6.4)

Pr(ac = 1| ap = 1, aw = 1, el = 1, x) ,

(6.5)

Pr(en = 1| ac = 1, ap = 1, aw = 1, el = 1, x) ,

where el = 1 if a person is eligible for a program and zero otherwise,
aw = 1 if a person is aware of a program and zero otherwise, ap = 1 if a
person applies to a program and zero otherwise, ac = 1 if a person applies to and is accepted into a program and zero otherwise, and en = 1 if
a person is formally enrolled in a program and zero otherwise.
As persons only participate in the program if they are eligible el = 1,
are aware aw = 1, apply ap = 1, are accepted ac = 1, and formally enroll
en = 1, we can decompose the probability of participation given X = x,
Pr( par = 1| x) , into the five components on the right-hand side of Equation (6.2):
(6.6)

Pr( par = 1| x) =

Pr(en = 1| ac = 1, ap = 1, aw = 1, el = 1, x) Pr(ac = 1| ap = 1, aw = 1, el = 1, x)
Pr(ap = 1| aw = 1, el = 1, x) Pr(aw = 1| el = 1, x) Pr(el = 1| x) ,
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where par = 1 if a person participates in a program and zero otherwise. By estimating each of the five component probabilities, we can
determine the effect of each variable in x on the overall probability of
participation and where and how it influences program participation.
A variable that has no effect on the overall probability of participation
may have strong, but offsetting, effects on the component probabilities.
In the sections that follow, we apply this framework to analyze participation in the JTPA program. Data limitations force us to combine
application and acceptance into a single step, which we call “application/acceptance.” We equate acceptance into the program with reaching
the stage of random assignment during the experimental evaluation of
JTPA. Only eligible applicants who completed the aptitude and achievement tests required at most JTPA training sites and who received a
written JTPA service plan were subject to random assignment. These
conditions required a substantial commitment by JTPA training centers to continued interaction with the applicant, but fall short of formal
enrollment into JTPA. The section titled “The Determinants of Enrollment in JTPA” presents two sets of decompositions based on Equation
(6.6). The first set includes four stages: eligibility, awareness, application/acceptance, and enrollment. In the second set, we decompose
Pr(ac = 1| el = 1, x) , the probability of application and acceptance conditional on eligibility, into separate stages of awareness given eligibility
and acceptance given awareness. Focusing solely on these two stages
allows us to examine the effects of explanatory variables not included
in the full decomposition due to data limitations or because they are
perfect predictors of eligibility.
What can we learn from the analyses undertaken in the remainder
of the chapter regarding the empirical importance of cream skimming
induced by the JTPA performance standards system for the overall patterns of participation in JTPA among various groups? To begin with, we
can use institutional knowledge to divide the stages of the participation
process into those affected and not affected by program staff. Subgroup
differences in the determinants of passing through stages not affected
by program staff, such as eligibility and (in the main) awareness clearly
cannot result from cream skimming. The full decompositions presented
in the section “The Determinants of Application/Acceptance into
JTPA” reveal the relative importance of these stages for overall group
differences.
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For stages of the participation process potentially affected by both
the decisions of potential participants and the decisions of caseworkers,
our framework yields at best suggestive evidence. Consider a particular
characteristic Z that positively affects employment and earnings outcomes in the absence of participation and that both the caseworker and
the researcher observe. Now consider a stage of the participation process over which caseworkers have some control. A positive effect of Z
on the probability of passing through this stage is consistent with cream
skimming by caseworkers and so provides some suggestive evidence
in that regard. At the same time, high-Z individuals might participate
at higher rates even without cream skimming, perhaps because of a
correlation between observed Z and unobserved motivation or because
high-Z individuals expect to benefit more from program participation.
By contrast, a negative effect of Z indicates that cream skimming is not
the dominant influence on whether or not high-Z individuals transit this
stage of the participation process. It does not, however, demonstrate the
absence of cream skimming, because a negative estimated effect might
simply result from other factors working in the opposite direction overpowering caseworker efforts.
Our empirical analysis is deliberately descriptive. We seek to establish empirical regularities about the participation process in the
JTPA program as it existed at the time our data were generated. These
regularities suggest interesting behavioral relationships governing the
process of program participation. They are not causal (or “structural”
in the sense that economists use that term). For example, we would
expect substantive changes in the eligibility rules to change not only
the determinants of eligibility, but the conditional determinants at the
other stages as well. We do not require causal effects to make the inferences we do. The analyses in this chapter complement, rather than
substitute for, related analyses in the literature that aim to estimate the
causal effects of performance standards on program behavior by making use of plausibly exogenous variation in the presence or details of
such standards. Examples of such analyses include Chapters 7 and 8 in
this volume, as well as Cragg (1997), Courty and Marschke (2008), and
Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forthcoming).
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ThE JTPA PROGRAM
JTPA was the primary U.S. federal employment and training program for the disadvantaged until replaced by the programs financed
under WIA in 1998. JTPA provided classroom training in occupational
skills, remedial education, job search assistance, work experience, and
subsidized on-the-job training (essentially a temporary wage subsidy) at
private firms for approximately one million persons each year. Chapter
2 gives an overall picture of the program, compares it to its predecessors and to WIA and, along with Chapter 4, details its performance
management system. This discussion focuses on the details of JTPA
eligibility determination, which have special relevance to the analysis
in this chapter.
There were two primary avenues to eligibility for JTPA. The first
and most important avenue was economic disadvantage, which occurred if one of two criteria were met: 1) low family income in the six
months prior to application to the program, or 2) being in a family receiving cash public assistance such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), general assistance, or Food Stamps.4 The short window for income eligibility allowed highly skilled and normally highly
paid workers to become eligible for JTPA after being out of work only
a few months. According to the USDOL (1993), in program year 1991
around 93 percent of JTPA participants qualified because they were economically disadvantaged. A second avenue to eligibility was an “audit
window’’ that allowed up to 10 percent of participants at each JTPA
training center to be noneconomically disadvantaged persons with
other barriers to employment such as limited ability in English.5 Due
to the subjective nature of these barriers, and the resulting difficulty in
determining who is affected by them, at some stages in the participation process (described in more detail below) we consider only persons
eligible by virtue of being economically disadvantaged. Devine and
Heckman (1996) discuss the eligibility rules for JTPA and their implications for the composition of the eligible population.6
There are some differences between the eligibility criteria and services offered in JTPA compared to its predecessors, the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA) and the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA), and its successor, the WIA program.
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Barnow (1993) suggests that these differences are modest in regard to
CETA and MDTA. USDOL (1998), O’Shea and King (2001), and Social
Policy Research Associates (2004; see especially Exhibit 1) document
the details of the WIA program. Universal eligibility for low-intensity
core services under WIA represents the largest difference between WIA
and JTPA. By law, local programs must give priority to transfer program participants and other low income individuals when allocating
intensive and training services. For these more expensive services, but
not for the core job finding services, the WIA participation process remains broadly similar to that under JTPA.

DATA
The primary source of our data is the NJS, an experimental evaluation of the JTPA program conducted from 1987 to 1989.7 We use data
on JTPA, even though the program no longer exists, because similar
data do not exist for the WIA program. As argued in Chapter 3, the programs have enough in common in terms of the populations they serve,
the services they provide, and the institutions that provide them that, at
a general level, the inferences we make regarding the relative importance of cream skimming and other factors in determining participation
patterns likely carry over to WIA.
In the NJS, persons accepted into JTPA at a nonrandom sample of
16 JTPA training centers were randomly assigned into either a control
group excluded from JTPA (for 18 months) or a treatment group given
access to JTPA services. In order to learn more about the JTPA-eligible
population, and to facilitate the development of better nonexperimental
evaluation methods, data were collected on JTPA-eligible nonparticipants (ENPs) at 4 of the 16 centers. We describe these 4 centers in
detail in the next section. The ENP sample includes only individuals eligible via the economic disadvantage criterion as determined by a short
household screening instrument.
Detailed information on demographic characteristics, labor market
histories, transfer program participation, and family composition and
income was collected on the ENPs and on experimental control group
members at the same four sites. We use this information for our analy-
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ses of awareness of JTPA and of application/acceptance into JTPA. For
the experimental treatment group, we have only the limited information
on characteristics collected shortly before random assignment. We use
these data to study enrollment into JTPA at the four sites.
The NJS did not collect data on persons ineligible for JTPA. In order to analyze the determinants of eligibility we use a national sample
drawn from the 1986 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Devine and Heckman (1996) use the SIPP for their
detailed study of JTPA eligibility; our dataset is a close cousin of theirs.
The SIPP data are well suited to this purpose because they contain sufficient information to precisely determine JTPA eligibility via economic
disadvantage. We treat the SIPP panel as a series of repeated crosssections, and create a dataset consisting of person-months.8
The data we use have, not surprisingly, both advantages and disadvantages. In terms of advantages, both the SIPP and ENP data measure
eligibility via economic disadvantage relatively precisely. All of the
surveys from the NJS obtained relatively high response rates; the SIPP
does less well on this dimension. Measurement of both acceptance
and enrollment in JTPA relies on administrative data, and so avoids
the problems of systematic measurement error in survey measures of
program participation documented by Smith and Whalley (2009) for
JTPA and by Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009) for a wide variety of
other programs. The key disadvantages associated with our data include
the lack of separate information on program application and our reliance on only four nonrandomly selected sites for the ENP and JTPA
participant data. The latter becomes problematic when combined with
national-level data from the SIPP and when attempting to generalize to
the overall JTPA eligible and participant populations.

ThE FOUR SITES FROM ThE nATIOnAL JTPA STUDy
Detailed data on ENPs were collected from the geographic areas
served by four training centers: Corpus Christi, Texas; Fort Wayne, Indiana; Jersey City, New Jersey; and Providence, Rhode Island. Table
6.1 provides descriptive information about these centers in order to pro-
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vide some context for our analysis. The table notes provide details on
the sources and definitions of the variables.
The first three columns of Table 6.1 present the race/ethnicity of the
eligible adult population at each site, constructed using the data on the
ENPs and the experimental control group. The sites vary widely on this
dimension, with a strong Hispanic majority in Corpus Christi, a strong
African American majority in Jersey City, almost exclusively whites in
Fort Wayne, and a broad mix in Providence. The fourth column presents
mean years of schooling among adult eligibles at each site. Here we find
less variation, though Providence stands out as an outlier on the low
side, with a mean below 11 years.
The fifth and sixth columns provide economic context in the form
of the unemployment and the poverty rates, respectively. Corpus Christi
and Jersey City have relatively weak economic situations at this time,
while Providence and (especially) Fort Wayne were experiencing relatively low unemployment and poverty rates.
The final three columns summarize the service recommendations
that the JTPA participants in the experimental samples at these training
centers received prior to random assignment. In the jargon of the National JTPA Study, the “CT-OS treatment stream” denotes individuals
recommended for classroom training in occupation skills (and possibly
other services, but not on-the-job training), the “OJT treatment stream”
denotes individuals recommended for on-the-job training (and possibly
other services, but not classroom training in occupational skills), and
the “other treatment stream” is a residual category. Most of those recommended for CT-OS either receive it or do not enroll at all (and thus
receive at most very minimal services), but many of those recommended
for OJT end up enrolling but receiving only job search assistance because no employer can be found who will offer them an on-the-job
training slot. The sites differ in their service mix for a number of reasons, including the availability of local training providers of sufficient
size and quality, the state of the local economy, and whether the center
leadership has a “work first” or “learn first” orientation. Among the
four sites in our study, Jersey City emphasizes classroom training, Fort
Wayne and Corpus Christi emphasize on-the-job training, and Providence emphasizes other services.

Table 6.1 Characteristics of the Four Sites from the national JTPA Study
Eligibles
Name
Corpus Christi
Fort Wayne
Jersey City
Providence

Fraction
white
0.25
0.74
0.05
0.32

Fraction
black
0.08
0.23
0.68
0.28

Fraction
Hispanic
0.66
0.02
0.24
0.31

Average
years of
schooling
11.33
11.28
11.51
10.72

Unemployment rate
10.2
4.7
7.3
3.8

Poverty
rate
13.4
5.9
18.9
12.1

Fraction
CT-OS
treatment
stream
34.3
6.4
46.0
32.3

Fraction
OJT
treatment
stream
51.5
66.2
35.7
13.0

Fraction
other
treatment
stream
14.1
27.3
18.3
54.7

SOURCE: Characteristics of the adult eligible population at each site come from the authors’ calculations using the National JTPA Study
data on the ENPs and the experimental control group. Following Heckman and Smith (1999), we assign the ENPs a weight of 0.97 and
the controls a weight of 0.03 in calculating these averages. The numbers for race/ethnicity do not add up to 1.00 because other race/
ethnicity individuals are omitted. The unemployment rates (unweighted annual averages for 1987–1989) are from Exhibit 3.3 of Orr et
al. (1996). Poverty rates (for 1979) are from Exhibit 3.2 of Orr et al. (1996). The treatment stream recommendation fractions come from
Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993, Table 7.1). As noted in the text, these refer to the services for which individuals in the National
JTPA Study were recommended prior to random assignment. The CT-OS treatment stream corresponds to individuals recommended for
classroom training in occupational skills and possibly other services not including on-the-job training. The OJT treatment stream refers
to individuals recommended for subsidized on-the-job training at private firms plus possibly other services not including CT-OS. The
other treatment stream is a residual category.
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Overall, these four sites vary on geographic (two in the Northeast, one in the Southwest, and one in the Midwest), demographic,
economic, and programmatic dimensions. Although neither the 4 sites
nor the 16 sites represent random samples of all JTPA training centers,
the sites examined in this chapter nonetheless do a good job of capturing the diversity present in the population of sites. In addition, the site
characteristics presented here provide a context for, and aid in the interpretation of, the results that follow.9

ThE DETERMInAnTS OF ELIGIBILITy
FOR ThE JTPA PROGRAM
This section examines the determinants of eligibility for JTPA. Table 6.2 defines the explanatory variables used in this chapter. Tables 6.3
and 6.4 present the results of logit analyses of the determinants of eligibility. Table 6.3 presents results for adult (aged 22 and above) men and
women, and Table 6.4 presents the results for male and female out-ofschool youth (aged 16–21). We focus on these four demographic groups
throughout our empirical analysis for three reasons. First, they are the
groups employed in the experimental impact reports, in our other work
utilizing these data, and in some of the other chapters in this volume.
Second, because of differences around family responsibilities and education, we would expect men and women, and youth and adults, to
behave differently. Third, we have no NJS data on in-school youth, as
this group was excluded from the experimental analysis.
The first column for each demographic group in Tables 6.3 and 6.4
displays estimated coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses) from logit models of the probability of eligibility derived
from the SIPP data. The second column displays estimates of the mean
derivative of the probability of eligibility with respect to each characteristic (in square brackets) along with p-values from tests of the null
hypotheses that each population coefficient equals zero.10
A number of interesting findings emerge from this analysis.
First, even after controlling for family income and productivity characteristics, race and ethnicity are very important determinants of the
probability of eligibility. For example, for adult females, the difference
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Table 6.2 Definitions of variables
Site indicators
Fort Wayne, Jersey City, and Providence indicate the site of residence. Corpus
Christi is the omitted site.
Race and ethnicity
Black, Hispanic, and other race/ethnicity indicate race or ethnicity. Whites are
the omitted group.
Age
Age categories indicate age at the time of eligibility determination or of the
participation decision. The omitted category is 16–18 years for youth and
22–29 years for adults.
Highest grade completed
Schooling categories indicate the highest grade of formal schooling completed. The omitted category is exactly 12 years.
Low English ability
This variable indicates low ability in English. For the ENPs, this means that
the person completed the baseline interview in a language other than English.
For the controls, it means that the person indicated a language other than
English in response to a survey question on language preference.
Marital histories
These categories indicate the respondent’s marital status history. The omitted category is single, never married. In Tables 6.16 and 6.17, the divorced,
widowed, and separated category is broken up into two categories, one for
persons who were last married from 1–24 months ago and one for persons
who were last married more than 24 months ago.
Presence of young children
Children younger than six years old indicates an own child less than six years
old in the household.
Current AFDC receipt
This variable indicates that the respondent was receiving benefits under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, either as a case head or as
part of someone else’s case.
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Table 6.2 (continued)
Current Food Stamp receipt
This variable indicates that the respondent was in a household receiving Food
Stamps.
Current labor force status
These variables indicate whether the respondent was employed, unemployed
(not working but looking for work), or out of the labor force (not employed
and not looking for work). The omitted category is currently employed.
Labor force status transitions
These categories in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 and Tables 6.16–6.19 indicate the two
most recent labor force statuses in the seven months up to and including the
month of the participation decision. The second status in each pattern indicates the labor force status at the time of the participation decision. The first
status indicates the status of the most recent prior spell during the preceding
six months. Thus, the pattern “employed → unemployed” indicates someone
who was unemployed at the time of the participation decision but whose most
recent prior labor force status within the preceding six months was employed.
Persons in the same labor force status for all seven months have repeated
patterns of the form “OLF → OLF.” The omitted pattern is “employed →
employed,” indicating persistent employment. In some cases, the “employed
→ OLF” and “unemployed → OLF” categories are collapsed due to small
sample sizes.
Time since most recent employment
These categories indicate the number of months since the person was last
employed. The omitted category is currently employed.
Family income in the last year
These categories indicate total family earnings in the past year. The omitted
category is less than $3,000. For some tables, the original six categories are
combined into four due to small sample sizes.
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Table 6.3 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Eligibility: Adults
Adult males
Adult females
Black
1.315
[0.060]
2.172
[0.129]
(0.034)
0.000
(0.032)
0.000
Hispanic
1.070
[0.048]
2.270
[0.136]
(0.036)
0.000
(0.030)
0.000
Other race/ethnicity
1.352
[0.062]
1.551
[0.090]
(0.087)
0.000
(0.051)
0.000
Aged 30–39
−0.860 [−0.038]
0.018
[0.001]
(0.030)
0.000
(0.026)
0.489
Aged 40–49
−0.939 [−0.042]
0.144
[0.007]
(0.040)
0.000
(0.030)
0.000
Aged 50–54
−1.586 [−0.064]
0.047
[0.002]
(0.049)
0.000
(0.035)
0.176
Highest grade < 10
0.737
[0.033]
0.974
[0.060]
(0.034)
0.000
(0.029)
0.000
Highest grade 10–11
0.292
[0.012]
0.514
[0.031]
(0.033)
0.000
(0.028)
0.000
Highest grade 13–15
−0.231 [−0.009] −0.408 [−0.022]
(0.031)
0.000
(0.025)
0.000
Highest grade > 15
−0.064 [−0.003] −1.652 [−0.075]
(0.036)
0.074
(0.032)
0.000
Currently married
0.157
[0.006]
1.366 [−0.074]
(0.035)
0.000
(0.029)
0.000
Div.-wid.-sep.
0.177
[0.007]
0.043
[0.003]
(0.042)
0.000
(0.031)
0.162
Child age < 6 years
−0.205 [−0.008]
0.646
[0.035]
(0.036)
0.000
(0.027)
0.000
Family income $3,000–$6,000
0.113
[0.019] −0.367 [−0.039]
(0.050)
0.024
(0.044)
0.000
Family income $6,000–$9,000
−1.814 [−0.206] −1.737 [−0.154]
(0.048)
0.000
(0.043)
0.000
Family income $9,000–$12,000 −3.103 [−0.268] −2.671 [−0.214]
(0.056)
0.000
(0.043)
0.000
Family income $12,000–$15,000 −3.857 [−0.295] −3.318 [−0.249]
(0.056)
0.000
(0.044)
0.000
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Table 6.3 (continued)
Family income > $15,000
Constant
Number of observations

Adult males
−4.966 [−0.331]
(0.048)
0.000
−0.474
[0.000]
(0.033)
0.000
80,598

Adult females
−4.461 [−0.301]
(0.037)
0.000
4.714
[0.000]
(0.043)
0.000
89,196

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets,
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. Person-month data from the 1986 SIPP
full panel. Omitted categories in the logit are white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals
12, never married, no young children, and family income less then $3,000. Using the
sample proportion eligible as the cutoff value, the within-sample prediction rates for
adult males are 72.48 percent for eligibles and 91.10 percent for noneligibles. The
corresponding rates for adult females are 79.82 percent for eligibles and 88.32 percent
for noneligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).

in the average probability of eligibility for blacks and Hispanics relative
to whites exceeds 0.12 holding the resource variables constant.
Being married has a large negative estimated effect on the eligibility probabilities for all groups except adult males. The eligibility status
of adult males is driven primarily by their own income, while for adult
females and for youth, eligibility status depends in large part on the
earnings of other family members. For all demographic groups except
adult males, the presence of an own child under the age of six living in
the home substantially increases the probability of eligibility for JTPA.
Children raise the income cutoff for eligibility by increasing household
size but do not add to the family income. In addition, years of schooling
have an important impact on eligibility for all groups.
Not surprisingly, the probability of eligibility decreases monotonically with family income for all four demographic groups. The
magnitude of the estimated average derivatives is very large for family
income categories corresponding to incomes above $6,000. For adult
males, raising family income from less than $3,000 to between $9,000
and $12,000 produces a decrease in the average probability of JTPA
eligibility of 0.268. For male and female youth, the estimated average
derivatives are larger still, reflecting the differential importance of family resources in determining eligibility for these groups.
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Table 6.4 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Eligibility: youth
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 19–21
Highest grade < 10
Highest grade 10–11
Highest grade > 12
Currently married
Div.-wid.-sep.
Child age < 6 years
Family income $3,000–
$6,000
Family income $6,000–
$9,000
Family income $9,000–
$12,000
Family income $12,000–
$15,000
Family income > $15,000
Constant
Number of observations

Male youth

Female youth

1.111
[0.056]
(0.164)
0.000
2.255
[0.121]
(0.103)
0.000
1.514
[0.078]
(0.195)
0.000
−0.434
[−0.021]
(0.082)
0.000
1.959
[0.100]
(0.105)
0.000
1.469
[0.074]
(0.109)
0.000
−0.150
[−0.007]
(0.107)
0.160
−1.657
[−0.068]
(0.168)
0.000
−3.041
[−0.106]
(0.380)
0.000
1.161
[0.061]
(0.168)
0.000
−2.582
[−0.387]
(0.153)
0.000
−4.370
[−0.547]
(0.165)
0.000
−4.595
[−0.561]
(0.157)
0.000
−5.935
[−0.631]
(0.204)
0.000
−6.628
[−0.660]
(0.153)
0.000
6.246
[0.000]
(0.170)
0.000
10,280

2.446
[0.155]
(0.092)
0.000
1.114
[0.068]
(0.076)
0.000
2.065
[0.129]
(0.408)
0.000
0.124
[0.007]
(0.070)
0.079
0.915
[0.057]
(0.107)
0.000
0.134
[0.008]
(0.086)
0.118
−0.617
[−0.036]
(0.072)
0.000
0.609
[0.036]
(0.082)
0.000
1.511
[0.094]
(0.242)
0.000
1.468
[0.090]
(0.081)
0.000
−1.306
[−0.201]
(0.102)
0.000
−3.008
[−0.436]
(0.126)
0.000
−4.237
[−0.552]
(0.144)
0.000
−5.057
[−0.610]
(0.142)
0.000
−6.585
[−0.695]
(0.103)
0.000
6.164
[0.000]
(0.117)
0.000
11,165

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and
p-values are below the mean derivatives. Person-month data from 1986 SIPP full panel.
Omitted categories in the logit are white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never
married, no young children, and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample proportion eligible as the cutoff value, the within-sample prediction rates for male youth
are 71.95 percent for eligibles and 90.67 percent for noneligibles. The corresponding
rates for female youth are 72.72 percent for eligibles and 91.32 percent for noneligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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As we detail in the table notes, the small set of characteristics included in the specifications reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 do well at
predicting within-sample eligibility status. For all four groups, over 70
percent of the eligibles and almost 90 percent of the noneligibles are
correctly predicted when we use the overall eligibility rate within each
group to define the cutoff for predicting eligibility. Taken together, our
results demonstrate that the eligibility rules for JTPA produced substantial group differences in access to subsidized government training.
These differences have no link to the presence of a performance management system within JTPA.

ThE DETERMInAnTS OF AwAREnESS
OF ThE JTPA PROGRAM
This section investigates the determinants of awareness of the JTPA
program using data on the controls and ENPs at the four JTPA sites
described earlier. The concept of program awareness is an elusive but
important one. Differential access to information about the program can
affect awareness and thereby influence participation. Language barriers
are an obvious case in point. However, awareness also depends on the
incentives a person has to participate in the program. In some cases
the desire to participate may influence awareness rather than awareness
independently influencing participation.
As we lack evidence on individuals’ information-gathering activities, we cannot determine the extent to which information costs, and
therefore program awareness, play a causal role in determining program participation choices. However, the evidence presented in this
section indicates that awareness of JTPA among those eligible for it
is by no means universal, and that program awareness appears to be
related to the likelihood of participation in the program, to education,
and to language skills. We also present evidence that a sizeable fraction
of persons who are eligible for the program do not believe that they are
eligible for it. Taken together, this evidence suggests that barriers to information represent an important determinant of program participation.
Each member of the ENP sample was asked whether or not he or
she had heard of the JTPA program. In keeping with the decentral-
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ized nature of the program, local training sites often selected operating
names other than JTPA. To overcome this problem, ENPs were asked
about their awareness of JTPA using the program’s primary name in
their locality. This measure does not capture general awareness of the
existence of programs like JTPA among individuals not aware of JTPA
by its local name. Persons who indicated that they were aware of the
program were then asked whether or not they believed themselves to
be presently eligible for it. Control group members are assumed to be
aware of JTPA and of their own eligibility for it.
Table 6.5 presents rates of awareness and self-reported eligibility
for ENPs in each major demographic group. The first column presents
the fraction of the ENPs who have heard of JTPA. These fractions are
surprisingly low. For all four groups, the awareness rate is below 50
percent. The rate is higher for youth than for adults, which may indirectly reflect requirements that sites expend 40 percent of their training
resources on youth, who constitute much less than 40 percent of the eligible population. The second column gives the fraction of those persons
aware of the program who think that they are eligible for it. Note that all
Table 6.5 Awareness of and Self-Reported Eligibility for the JTPA
Program: JTPA-Eligible nonparticipants
Self-reported
Self-reported
eligibility for JTPA eligibility for JTPA
Self-reported
conditional on
unconditional on
awareness of JTPA
awareness
awareness
Adult males
0.3539
0.3598
0.1274
(0.0167)
(0.0311)
(0.0116)
Adult females
0.4165
0.4594
0.1913
(0.0124)
(0.0214)
(0.0099)
Male youth
0.4722
0.5672
0.2678
(0.0373)
(0.0610)
(0.0330)
Female youth
0.4667
0.5410
0.2525
(0.0289)
(0.0453)
(0.0251)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. National JTPA Study data. Respondents are
coded as aware of JTPA if they report having heard of JTPA by its most common local
name. Respondents are coded as self-reported eligibles if they are aware of JTPA and
report that they believe themselves to be presently eligible for it.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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of the ENPs are determined to be eligible at the time of their screening
interviews and that nearly all are still eligible at the time the awareness
question was asked in the baseline interview. Conditional on awareness,
only 36 percent of adult males, 46 percent of adult females, and around
55 percent of youth realize that they qualify for JTPA services. Taking
the product of these two probabilities yields the unconditional probability of awareness and self-reported eligibility appearing in the third
column. Barely 12 percent of adult male eligibles can identify both the
program and their own eligibility for it. Even among youth, only about
25 percent of eligibles are both aware of the program and of their own
eligibility for it. These figures suggest that there are substantial costs
associated with finding out about social programs such as JTPA and
about the rules governing access to their services, and that information
costs play an important role in producing demographic differentials in
program participation.
The results from a logit analysis of the determinants of awareness
of the JTPA program appear in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. These tables have
the same basic structure as Tables 6.3 and 6.4. These estimates result
from the pooled sample of ENPs and experimental controls at the four
sites in the NJS that collected ENP data. Following Heckman and Smith
(1999), we weight the data such that the ENPs and controls represent
0.97 and 0.03 of the overall eligible population, respectively.
For all four demographic groups, black eligibles are relatively more
likely than white eligibles to know about JTPA. Adult Hispanic eligibles are relatively less likely than whites to know about JTPA, with
the difference being statistically significant in both cases. The negative
and statistically significant coefficient estimates for Hispanic adult eligibles arise even after controlling for facility with the English language
and for level of education.11 Language skills and educational deficits
play a role in explaining this phenomenon but more than just language
deficits are involved. Tienda and Jensen (1988) find that Hispanics participate less in government programs compared to non-Hispanics with
the same basic economic characteristics; this suggests that they may
obtain less information about programs such as JTPA from their social
environment.
Consistent with the standard human capital model (see, e.g., Becker
[1964]), older adults have statistically significantly lower probabilities
of awareness of the program than persons age 22 to 29. This may reflect
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the reduced demand for skill enhancement programs with age documented in, e.g., Leigh (1995). The pattern with respect to education is
hump-shaped. Persons with the lowest levels of schooling have lower
conditional probabilities of awareness than those who have completed
high school. This evidence supports the notion of substantial information processing costs among those with very low levels of schooling. A
lower likelihood of participating in JTPA, and hence a lower value to
information about the program, accounts for the evidence that the most
educated persons are less aware of the program. More specifically, individuals with high levels of education have low incentives to know about
poverty reduction programs, as they are not typically eligible for them.
Among adults, divorced, widowed, or separated eligibles have
a higher probability of awareness than do those who are single. The
difference is both statistically and substantively significant for adult
males. For three of the four groups, living in a family that receives
Food Stamps has a positive effect on the probability of being aware of
JTPA, while living in a family that receives AFDC has a positive effect
only for adult males and for female youth. The estimated effect of living in a family receiving Food Stamps is large, with mean derivatives
of 0.164 and 0.133, and it is statistically significant for both adult males
and females. As nearly all of the adult female AFDC recipients also
receive Food Stamps, the negative (essentially zero) coefficient on the
AFDC variable indicates the additional effect of receiving both AFDC
and Food Stamps, rather than just Food Stamps. Interpreted in this way,
the absence of any AFDC effect becomes less surprising. The strong
effects observed for Food Stamp receipt are consistent with the practice
in that program of providing recipients with information about training
opportunities.
Unemployed (i.e., out of work but actively looking for work)
eligibles have a higher probability of program awareness for all four
demographic groups. This difference between the unemployed and the
employed is statistically significant for both male and female adults.
In contrast, eligible individuals who are out of the labor force (i.e., not
working and not actively looking for work) have lower probabilities of
awareness than employed eligibles for all four demographic groups.
These results are consistent with the relative value of information about
JTPA for the two groups.

148 Heckman and Smith
Table 6.6 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Awareness
among JTPA-Eligible nonparticipants: Adults
Adult males
Adult females
Fort Wayne
0.261
[0.055]
−0.187
[−0.039]
(0.233)
0.264
(0.203)
0.356
Jersey City
0.071
[0.015]
−0.174
[−0.036]
(0.210)
0.736
(0.191)
0.364
Providence
−0.268
[−0.054]
−0.683
[−0.142]
(0.231)
0.245
(0.197)
0.001
Black
0.414
[0.094]
0.288
[0.063]
(0.272)
0.128
(0.194)
0.138
Hispanic
−0.486
[−0.102]
−0.360
[−0.077]
(0.210)
0.021
(0.185)
0.051
Other race/ethnicity
−0.290
[−0.063]
−0.348
[−0.074]
(0.279)
0.298
(0.255)
0.174
Low English ability
−0.763
[−0.147]
−1.334
[−0.254]
(0.180)
0.000
(0.144)
0.000
Aged 30–39
−0.345
[−0.073]
−0.114
[−0.024]
(0.165)
0.037
(0.137)
0.405
Aged 40–49
−0.372
[−0.078]
−0.235
[−0.050]
(0.201)
0.064
(0.174)
0.177
Aged 50–54
0.010
[0.002]
−0.126
[−0.027]
(0.349)
0.977
(0.253)
0.619
Highest grade < 10
−0.476
[−0.100]
−0.836
[−0.180]
(0.179)
0.008
(0.135)
0.000
Highest grade 10–11
−0.144
[−0.031]
−0.126
[−0.028]
(0.210)
0.494
(0.173)
0.468
Highest grade 13–15
0.102
[0.022]
−0.263
[−0.058]
(0.239)
0.671
(0.201)
0.190
Highest grade > 15
−0.387
[−0.082]
−0.646
[−0.141]
(0.279)
0.166
(0.292)
0.027
[−0.051]
Currently married
0.019
[0.004]
−0.239
(0.181)
0.918
(0.162)
0.142
Div.-wid.-sep.
0.718
[0.156]
0.112
[0.024]
(0.273)
0.009
(0.164)
0.494
Child age < 6 years
−0.079
[−0.016]
−0.062
[−0.013]
(0.161)
0.623
(0.130)
0.635

Program Participation Data and Cream Skimming 149
Table 6.6 (continued)
Current AFDC receipt
Current Food Stamp receipt
Currently unemployed
Currently out of the labor
force
Family income $3,000–
$9,000
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
Family income > $15,000
Constant
Number of observations

Adult males
0.088
[0.019]
(0.499)
0.859
0.756
[0.164]
(0.251)
0.003
0.805
[0.176]
(0.289)
0.005
−0.182
[−0.037]
(0.258)
0.481
−0.152
[−0.030]
(0.347)
0.662
−0.070
[−0.014]
(0.343)
0.838
0.377
[0.080]
(0.340)
0.267
−0.359
[0.000]
(0.393)
0.361
1,551

Adult females
−0.086
[−0.018]
(0.218)
0.694
0.625
[0.133]
(0.187)
0.001
0.628
[0.136]
(0.250)
0.012
−0.221
[−0.047]
(0.140)
0.115
0.604
[0.129]
(0.239)
0.012
0.389
[0.083]
(0.239)
0.104
0.156
[0.033]
(0.215)
0.469
0.238
[0.000]
(0.287)
0.407
2,436

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never
married, no young children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving
Food Stamps, currently employed, and family income less than $3,000. Using the
sample proportion aware of JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for
adult males are 63.29 percent for aware eligibles and 62.95 percent for unaware eligibles. The corresponding rates for adult females are 69.44 percent for aware eligibles
and 61.82 percent for unaware eligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.7 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of JTPA Awareness
among JTPA-Eligible nonparticipants: youth
Male youth
Female youth
Fort Wayne
0.054
[0.011]
0.150
[0.033]
(0.661)
0.935
(0.490)
0.759
Jersey City
−0.147
[−0.031]
−0.509
[−0.111]
(0.727)
0.839
(0.461)
0.270
Providence
−0.412
[−0.087]
−0.686
[−0.153]
(0.666)
0.536
(0.438)
0.117
Black
1.183
[0.242]
0.902
[0.204]
(0.739)
0.109
(0.464)
0.052
Hispanic
0.189
[0.040]
0.298
[0.068]
(0.652)
0.772
(0.416)
0.475
Other race/ethnicity
1.348
[0.277]
−0.813
[−0.167]
(1.370)
0.325
(0.610)
0.183
Low English ability
−2.972
[−0.439]
−2.373
[−0.393]
(0.751)
0.000
(0.664)
0.000
Aged 19–21
−0.891
[−0.187]
−0.212
[−0.048]
(0.528)
0.091
(0.300)
0.478
Highest grade < 10
−0.025
[−0.005]
−0.672
[−0.153]
(0.630)
0.968
(0.368)
0.068
Highest grade 10–11
0.280
[0.059]
−0.077
[−0.018]
(0.592)
0.636
(0.405)
0.849
Highest grade > 12
−0.254
[−0.053]
0.063
[0.014]
(0.729)
0.728
(0.496)
0.898
Currently married
1.323
[0.266]
0.136
[0.031]
(0.819)
0.106
(0.370)
0.713
Div.-wid.-sep.
−0.584
[−0.119]
−0.951
[−0.203]
(0.830)
0.482
(0.444)
0.032
Child age < 6 years
−0.242
[−0.050]
−0.164
[−0.037]
(0.758)
0.750
(0.323)
0.613
[0.073]
Current AFDC receipt
−0.838
[−0.170]
0.329
(1.087)
0.441
(0.420)
0.433
Current Food Stamp
0.494
[0.103]
−0.026
[−0.006]
receipt
(0.813)
0.543
(0.410)
0.950
Currently unemployed
0.522
[0.110]
0.362
[0.081]
(0.575)
0.363
(0.471)
0.442

Program Participation Data and Cream Skimming 151
Table 6.7 (continued)
Currently out of the labor
force
Family income $3,000–
$9,000
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
Family income > $15,000
Constant
Number of observations

Male youth
−0.990
[−0.203]
(0.594)
0.095
−0.907
[−0.188]
(0.915)
0.321
−0.395
[−0.082]
(0.938)
0.673
−0.703
[−0.146]
(1.031)
0.495
0.613
[0.000]
(1.019)
0.547
530

Female youth
0.000
[0.000]
(0.342)
1.000
0.040
[0.009]
(0.441)
0.928
−0.321
[−0.072]
(0.555)
0.563
−0.410
[−0.092]
(0.534)
0.442
0.272
[0.000]
(0.633)
0.668
700

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never
married, no young children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving
Food Stamps, currently employed, and family income less than $3,000. Using the
sample proportion aware of JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for
male youth are 72.31 percent for aware eligibles and 64.86 percent for unaware eligibles. The corresponding rates for female youth are 67.43 percent for aware eligibles
and 53.64 percent for unaware eligibles.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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While the concept of program awareness is a conceptually problematic one, the evidence presented here indicates that learning about
the JTPA program and its eligibility requirements is not costless, and
that the likelihood of becoming aware of the program varies in predictable ways. In particular, we find that differences in information costs,
information processing and language skills, and the expected value of
information about the JTPA program (which is itself a function of the
probability of participation in the program and its expected benefit) can
account for the patterns we observe in the data. Both the institutional
structure of JTPA and our empirical findings suggest little if any link
between awareness and JTPA’s performance standards system. While
local JTPA offices could in principle influence awareness by targeting
specific groups or locations in their (quite limited) marketing efforts
or by choosing contractors with links to specific subgroups among the
eligible population, the indirect nature of these strategies suggests that
even a program that wanted to cream-skim would likely devote its efforts primarily to other margins. Moreover, findings such as the positive
effect of Food Stamp receipt on awareness argue against a major role
for attempts to cream-skim at this stage in the participation process. Our
analysis also suggests, however, that one way to boost program participation is to increase awareness among those eligible.

ThE DETERMInAnTS OF APPLICATIOn/
ACCEPTAnCE InTO JTPA
This section presents a logit analysis of the determinants of application/acceptance (defined as reaching random assignment) conditional
on program awareness using data on controls and ENPs from the NJS.
We combine the application and acceptance stages here because we
lack the data to examine them separately. Combining these two stages
in the program participation process means that the patterns we observe reflect the influence of individual decisions to apply and to persist
through the (sometimes lengthy) application process, as well as JTPA
staff decisions regarding referrals to other programs, the number of required visits to the JTPA office and other hassle costs, what services to
offer, and so on.
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Tables 6.8 and 6.9 report estimates of logit models of application/
acceptance into the JTPA program as a function of observed characteristics for the four demographic groups. Coefficient estimates and
estimated standard errors take account of the choice-based nature of
the sample. The training site indicators included in the model have no
behavioral interpretation, as the relative numbers of ENPs and controls
at each site is an artifact of the study design. The notes to Tables 6.8 and
6.9 summarize the within-sample predictive success of the models.12
The most dramatic result in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 is the powerful effect of recent labor force status dynamics on application/acceptance
into JTPA.13 For both adult males and adult females, all of the labor
force status pattern indicators have coefficients statistically different
from zero, though many of the coefficients cannot be statistically distinguished from one another. In general, unemployed persons are the
most likely to apply and be accepted into the JTPA program. For adult
men, individuals who recently became unemployed, either by leaving
employment or by reentering the labor force, have higher application/
acceptance probabilities than the long term (over six months) unemployed. This difference does not appear for adult women.
Older adults have a lower conditional probability of application/
acceptance, consistent with conventional arguments that the return to
training declines with age. The effect of years of completed schooling
on acceptance into the program shows a hill-shaped pattern for adults,
with individuals with fewer than 10 or more than 15 years of schooling
having differentially low estimated application/acceptance probabilities. This pattern reveals that it is more than just low rates of awareness
that cause those with less than a high school education to have low rates
of participation in JTPA conditional on eligibility. For youth, the probability of application/acceptance increases monotonically with years of
schooling.
Relative to single, never married persons, currently married persons have a statistically significantly lower probability of application/
acceptance for three of the four demographic groups. Among adult
men, but not the other three demographic groups, divorced, widowed,
and separated persons also have lower probabilities of application/acceptance into JTPA.
The effect of living in a family receiving AFDC is negative for all
four groups, and statistically significant for three. In contrast, family
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Table 6.8 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Acceptance into JTPAAware EnP and Control Samples: Adults
Fort Wayne
Jersey City
Providence
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 30–39
Aged 40–49
Aged 50–54
Highest grade < 10
Highest grade 10–11
Highest grade 13–15
Highest grade > 15
Currently married
Div.-wid.-sep.
Child age < 6 years
Current AFDC receipt
Current Food Stamp receipt

Adult males
2.334
[0.117]
(0.450)
0.000
1.120
[0.040]
(0.482)
0.020
1.547
[0.054]
(0.507)
0.002
0.159
[0.008]
(0.304)
0.600
−0.170
[−0.007]
(0.442)
0.701
1.228
[0.079]
(0.455)
0.007
−0.564
[−0.028]
(0.263)
0.032
−0.836
[−0.038]
(0.396)
0.035
−0.766
[−0.036]
(0.518)
0.139
−0.950
[−0.040]
(0.341)
0.005
−0.103
[−0.006]
(0.331)
0.755
0.327
[0.020]
(0.332)
0.325
−1.420
[−0.053]
(0.550)
0.010
−0.875
[−0.043]
(0.314)
0.005
−0.571
[−0.031]
(0.316)
0.071
−0.166
[−0.007]
(0.349)
0.634
−1.545
[−0.047]
(0.691)
0.025
0.189
[0.009]
(0.323)
0.558

Adult females
1.878
[0.118]
(0.256)
0.000
1.228
[0.060]
(0.238)
0.000
1.720
[0.084]
(0.280)
0.000
−0.060
[−0.003]
(0.199)
0.763
0.964
[0.067]
(0.240)
0.000
−0.169
[−0.008]
(0.494)
0.732
−0.291
[−0.016]
(0.160)
0.069
−0.226
[−0.013]
(0.224)
0.313
−0.276
[−0.016]
(0.334)
0.408
−0.194
[−0.010]
(0.172)
0.258
−0.112
[−0.006]
(0.184)
0.543
0.413
[0.027]
(0.208)
0.047
−0.500
[−0.024]
(0.767)
0.515
−0.909
[−0.042]
(0.214)
0.000
0.142
[0.010]
(0.167)
0.398
−0.185
[−0.010]
(0.159)
0.245
−0.975
[−0.050]
(0.232)
0.000
0.205
[0.012]
(0.191)
0.282
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Table 6.8 (continued)
Unemployed → employed
OLF → employed
Employed → unemployed
Unemployed → unemployed
OLF → unemployed
Employed or unemployed →
OLF
Employed → OLF

Adult males
1.752
[0.068]
(0.390)
0.000
2.372
[0.120]
(0.447)
0.000
3.861
[0.328]
(0.430)
0.000
2.615
[0.146]
(0.536)
0.000
4.048
[0.360]
(0.566)
0.000
5.421
[0.610]
(0.937)
0.000

Unemployed → OLF
OLF → OLF
Family income $3,000–
$9,000
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
Family income > $15,000
Constant
Number of observations

1.550
[0.055]
(0.556)
0.005
−1.196
[−0.075]
(0.531)
0.024
−0.448
[−0.034]
(0.480)
0.351
−1.895
[−0.098]
(0.507)
0.000
−3.385
[0.000]
(0.564)
0.000
1,024

Adult females
1.722
[0.080]
(0.325)
0.000
1.122
[0.039]
(0.370)
0.002
2.782
[0.210]
(0.277)
0.000
2.862
[0.223]
(0.320)
0.000
2.326
[0.144]
(0.324)
0.000

1.400
[0.055]
(0.314)
0.000
2.242
[0.134]
(0.452)
0.000
1.093
[0.037]
(0.260)
0.000
0.269
[0.016]
(0.232)
0.246
−0.023
[−0.001]
(0.339)
0.946
0.034
[0.002]
(0.313)
0.914
−4.857
[0.000]
(0.385)
0.000
1,520

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimates reflect
weighting to account for choice-based sampling. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, “Employed →
employed,” and family income less than $3,000. The categories “Employed → OLF” and
“Unemployed → OLF” are combined due to small sample sizes. Using the population proportion of persons accepted into JTPA (assumed to be 3 percent overall) to determine the
cutoff, the within sample prediction rates for adult males are 81.06 for controls (applied
and accepted into JTPA) and 81.38 for ENPs (did not apply or not accepted into JTPA).
The corresponding rates for adult females are 65.94 for controls and 71.43 for ENPs.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.9 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Acceptance into JTPAAware EnP and Control Samples: youth
Male youth
Female youth
Fort Wayne
2.268
[0.127]
0.750
[0.040]
(0.647)
0.000
(0.506)
0.139
Jersey City
1.445
[0.060]
0.462
[0.022]
(0.649)
0.026
(0.545)
0.396
Providence
3.627
[0.246]
1.218
[0.067]
(0.632)
0.000
(0.471)
0.010
Black
−0.793
[−0.030]
0.227
[0.011]
(0.515)
0.124
(0.434)
0.601
Hispanic
0.717
[0.046]
0.097
[0.005]
(0.628)
0.254
(0.439)
0.825
Other race/ethnicity
−4.207
[−0.080]
0.971
[0.064]
(1.252)
0.001
(0.798)
0.223
Aged 19–21
0.285
[0.013]
−0.451
[−0.024]
(0.460)
0.536
(0.328)
0.169
Highest grade < 10
−0.104
[−0.005]
−0.028
[−0.001]
(0.508)
0.838
(0.421)
0.947
Highest grade 10–11
−0.187
[−0.009]
−0.392
[−0.018]
(0.475)
0.693
(0.440)
0.373
Highest grade > 12
0.472
[0.028]
0.236
[0.014]
(0.845)
0.576
(0.441)
0.592
Currently married
−1.225
[−0.042]
−0.527
[−0.022]
(0.637)
0.055
(0.436)
0.227
Div.-wid.-sep.
0.155
[0.009]
0.316
[0.018]
(1.226)
0.899
(0.662)
0.633
Current AFDC receipt
−1.455
[−0.043]
−0.934
[−0.007]
(0.980)
0.137
(0.399)
0.019
Current Food Stamp
0.555
[−0.043]
1.311
[−0.042]
receipt
(0.580)
0.339
(0.370)
0.000
Child age < 6 years
−1.294
[0.030]
−0.139
[0.083]
(0.676)
0.056
(0.339)
0.681
Unemployed →
2.110
[0.120]
1.776
[0.059]
employed
(0.629)
0.001
(0.564)
0.002
OLF → employed
−1.331
[−0.021]
2.243
[0.095]
(0.890)
0.135
(0.597)
0.000
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Table 6.9 (continued)
Employed →
unemployed
Unemployed →
unemployed
OLF → unemployed
Employed or
unemployed → OLF
Employed → OLF

Male youth
2.087
[0.118]
(0.537)
0.000
2.211
[0.130]
(0.706)
0.002
1.285
[0.054]
(0.764)
0.093
1.959
[0.106]
(0.806)
0.015

Unemployed → OLF
OLF → OLF
Family income $3,000–
$9,000
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
Family income >
$15,000
Constant
Number of observations

2.387
(0.699)
3.867
(0.748)
1.552
(0.746)
1.011
(0.764)
−6.787
(0.976)

[0.150]
0.001
[0.309]
0.000
[0.055]
0.038
[0.028]
0.186
[0.000]
0.000
436

Female youth
3.648
[0.293]
(0.664)
0.000
2.638
[0.137]
(0.591)
0.000
3.292
[0.229]
(0.614)
0.000

1.462
(0.498)
0.845
(0.886)
1.201
(0.549)
−0.386
(0.536)
0.261
(0.691)
1.765
(0.535)
−4.732
(0.753)

[0.041]
0.003
[0.017]
0.340
[0.030]
0.029
[−0.015]
0.472
[0.013]
0.706
[0.149]
0.001
[0.000]
0.000
540

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets, and
p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimates reflect
weighting to account for choice-based sampling. Omitted categories in the logit are
Corpus Christi, white, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young
children, not currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, “Employed → employed,” and family income less than $3,000. The categories “Employed
→ OLF” and “Unemployed → OLF” are combined due to small sample sizes. Using
the population proportion of persons accepted into JTPA (assumed to be three percent
overall) as the cutoff, the within sample prediction rates for male youth are 68.66 for
controls (applied and accepted into JTPA) and 76.47 for ENPs (did not apply or not
accepted into JTPA). The corresponding rates for female youth are 67.91 for controls
and 69.57 for ENPs.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Food Stamp receipt has a positive influence in all cases. Interpreting
the AFDC coefficient as the marginal effect of family AFDC receipt in
addition to Food Stamps, it appears that among aware eligibles, AFDC
recipients have much lower probabilities of application/acceptance into
JTPA than do those receiving only Food Stamps. As the effect of young
children in the home is being controlled for, this difference does not result from young children acting as a barrier to work or training outside
the home.
The effects of family income differ across groups. High levels of
family income reduce the probability of application/acceptance among
adult males, have little effect for adult females, and raise the probability
of participation for both youth groups. The availability of income from
other family members to provide support during training appears to encourage youth to apply to JTPA.
We do not include measures of the state of the local economy at
the four sites during the time that the ENP and control samples were
collected in the specifications reported here. In other work, we estimate
models including both county-level monthly unemployment rates averaged over the counties constituting each of the sites, and interactions
between these unemployment rates and the site indicators. Surprisingly,
given the strong effects of individual unemployment found here, these
variables never attain statistical significance and never have a noticeable impact on the proportion of correct predictions. One reason for this
is that the number of ENPs whose month of measured (via the screening interview) eligibility occurs in a given calendar month depends not
only on the size of the eligible population in that month, but also on
the administrative schedule of the consulting firm doing the screening.
A second reason is that the flow into the program, as measured by the
number of persons randomly assigned in each calendar month, depends
strongly on factors besides the local economy, including the academic
schedule of the community colleges that provide much of the JTPA
classroom training at these sites.
Our analysis of application/acceptance into JTPA conditional on
eligibility reveals the fundamental importance of labor force status dynamics in determining who applies and is accepted into the program
conditional on program awareness. A number of other factors including age, schooling, marital status, and family income play important
supporting roles. In terms of cream skimming, the institutions appear

Program Participation Data and Cream Skimming 159

to drive some measurable effects here, as caseworkers can affect the
process once a potential participant applies to JTPA. For example,
caseworkers sometimes required extra visits as a way of weeding out
potential participants not seriously interested in services and/or employment. The overrepresentation of unemployed individuals who recently
lost a job or reentered the labor market is consistent with a creamskimming story, though it is also consistent with the use of JTPA as a
form of job search by such persons. The age, education, marital status,
welfare, and family income patterns we estimate do not suggest a dominant role for cream skimming, but they do not rule out a modest one,
either.

ThE DETERMInAnTS OF EnROLLMEnT In JTPA
Formal enrollment constitutes the final stage in the JTPA participation process. In this section we examine the determinants of the
transition from acceptance into the program (defined as reaching random assignment) to formal enrollment.14 A key difference between
acceptance and enrollment is that, as noted in Chapters 3 and 4, only
the outcomes of persons formally enrolled in JTPA influenced the rewards (or punishments) that a site received under the JTPA performance
standards system. Training centers in JTPA had considerable (but not
unlimited) discretion regarding whether (and when) to enroll persons
accepted into the program. The performance standards system provided
an incentive for training centers to delay enrollment until accepted applicants provided evidence that they were likely to obtain a job or to
otherwise count favorably toward center performance. In practice, this
sometimes meant that individuals receiving job search assistance were
not enrolled until they found a job and that persons assigned to receive
subsidized on-the-job training at private firms were not enrolled until a
firm willing to provide them with such training had been located. For
persons assigned to receive classroom training, training centers would
often wait until trainees successfully attended class before enrolling
them in the program.
Another factor influencing enrollment decisions for persons recommended for classroom training is their ability to maintain themselves
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during the time they are enrolled in training. Classroom training typically lasts longer than employment-related services such as job search
assistance. At the same time, unlike earlier programs such as CETA,
JTPA provided no stipends to trainees except in unusual circumstances.
Thus, the willingness of a person to pursue classroom training could
depend on the availability of a stable income from outside sources. Two
important sources of such income are transfer programs such as AFDC
and family income. Thus, we would expect AFDC receipt and family
income to have positive effects on the probability of enrollment.
At the same time, the lag between acceptance into the program
and enrollment may lead to changes in the opportunity costs of participation. Accepted applicants may receive job offers that dominate
the training offered by JTPA, or they may experience illness or family
problems that make it impossible for them to enroll. Alternatively, they
may not care for the particular services offered by their caseworkers, or
may not expect them to provide sufficient benefits to justify their time,
hassle, and opportunity costs. Thus, even though enrollment represents
the stage in the participation process where JTPA staff members have
both the greatest incentive to cream-skim and the most leverage to do
so, the patterns we observe still represent the combined influence of
their efforts and of individual decisions to continue in or drop out of
the program.
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 present the results of logit analyses of enrollment for the four demographic groups using data on the experimental
treatment group. The notes to the tables discuss the within-sample predictive performance of the model, which is quite good. We find that the
four training centers have very different overall enrollment rates, even
controlling for the observable characteristics of their accepted applicants. For all four demographic groups, accepted applicants at the Fort
Wayne and Jersey City centers have enrollment probabilities substantially lower than similar persons at Corpus Christi, which is the omitted
training center in our analysis. These differences reflect in part the differing mix of services offered at the various sites. As documented in
Table 6.1, Corpus Christi offered mainly classroom training. This form
of service leads to a higher enrollment rate than other JTPA services;
see Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993). In contrast, Fort Wayne
and, to a lesser extent, Jersey City, primarily offered on-the-job training and job search assistance. Centers offering these services will have
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lower enrollment rates among accepted applicants because those who
fail to locate a job or for whom no firm is willing to provide on-the-job
training often do not ever get enrolled in the program.
Conditional on acceptance into JTPA, older adults are less likely
to enroll than younger adults. This finding is consistent with the lower
expected returns to training for older persons, which would make them
relatively more likely to drop out of the program in response to a given
outside opportunity. Family participation in the Food Stamp Program
has a negative effect for three of the four demographic groups, with
the effect both large and statistically significant for adult females. To
the extent that Food Stamp recipients are less likely to find employment than other accepted applicants, this is consistent with creaming
induced by the operation of JTPA performance standards. Also consistent with these incentives is our finding that for women and male youth,
having no employment experience strongly reduces the probability of
enrollment.
Finally, we estimate a large positive effect of family income on
the enrollment probability for adults. Family income may allow an accepted applicant to undertake training even in the absence of a stipend.
Thus, even though higher family income lowers eligibility, it raises the
probability of enrollment among accepted applicants.
Taken together, our findings on the determinants of enrollment provide some suggestive, but not definitive, evidence of cream skimming.
The strongest evidence comes from the systematic relationship between
enrollment probabilities and service types across sites. Sites emphasizing subsidized on-the-job training, which provides greater enrollment
flexibility than classroom training, appear to make strategic use of that
flexibility. In terms of the covariates, explanations other than cream
skimming can account for the age and family income effects. The rest
lack any consistent pattern of precisely estimated coefficients across
demographic groups. As such, we conclude only that, based primarily
on site effects, our analysis of enrollment offers suggestive evidence in
favor of cream skimming.
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Table 6.10 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Enrollment into JTPA
Experimental Treatment Group: Adults
Adult males
Adult females
Fort Wayne
−0.692
[−0.163]
−1.030
[−0.232]
(0.177)
0.000
(0.177)
0.000
Jersey City
−1.157
[−0.274]
−1.280
[−0.292]
(0.204)
0.000
(0.195)
0.000
Providence
0.447
[0.090]
−0.563
[−0.121]
(0.198)
0.024
(0.199)
0.005
Black
−0.180
[−0.041]
−0.240
[−0.056]
(0.129)
0.165
(0.132)
0.069
Hispanic
0.271
[0.060]
0.196
[0.045]
(0.181)
0.135
(0.176)
0.265
Other race/ethnicity
−0.024
[−0.005]
0.637
[0.141]
(0.283)
0.933
(0.350)
0.068
Low English ability
0.288
[0.065]
−0.082
[−0.019]
(0.241)
0.231
(0.210)
0.697
Aged 30–39
−0.105
[−0.023]
0.056
[0.013]
(0.114)
0.358
(0.115)
0.629
Aged 40–49
−0.483
[−0.109]
−0.324
[−0.075]
(0.165)
0.003
(0.160)
0.042
Aged 50–54
−0.370
[−0.083]
0.055
[0.013]
(0.285)
0.195
(0.305)
0.856
Highest grade < 10
−0.129
[−0.029]
−0.168
[−0.038]
(0.140)
0.357
(0.132)
0.203
Highest grade 10–11
−0.210
[−0.047]
−0.041
[−0.009]
(0.130)
0.105
(0.124)
0.738
Highest grade 13–15
0.001
[0.000]
−0.035
[−0.008]
(0.156)
0.993
(0.151)
0.817
Highest grade > 15
−0.204
[−0.046]
−0.216
[−0.049]
(0.260)
0.432
(0.302)
0.475
[0.024]
Currently married
0.325
[0.073]
0.106
(0.154)
0.034
(0.167)
0.525
Div.-wid.-sep.
0.273
[0.061]
0.203
[0.046]
(0.135)
0.044
(0.121)
0.093
Child age < 6 years
0.109
[0.024]
0.336
[0.077]
(0.154)
0.480
(0.115)
0.004
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Table 6.10 (continued)
Current AFDC receipt
Current Food Stamp receipt
Employed 1–6 months ago
Employed 7–12 months ago
Employed > 12 months ago
Never employed
Family income $3,000–
$9,000
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
Family income
> $15,000
Constant
Number of observations

Adult males
0.132
[0.029]
(0.353)
0.709
−0.070
[−0.016]
(0.132)
0.595
−0.060
[−0.013]
(0.164)
0.715
−0.058
[−0.013]
(0.210)
0.781
0.032
[0.007]
(0.211)
0.880
−0.085
[−0.019]
(0.227)
0.709
−0.108
[−0.024]
(0.122)
0.378
0.057
[0.013]
(0.165)
0.728
0.483
[0.105]
(0.204)
0.018
0.498
[0.000]
(0.365)
0.172
1,886

Adult females
0.158
[0.036]
(0.138)
0.253
−0.237
[−0.054]
(0.117)
0.044
0.308
[0.071]
(0.150)
0.040
0.216
[0.050]
(0.198)
0.276
0.287
[0.066]
(0.177)
0.106
0.061
[0.014]
(0.192)
0.750
0.211
[0.049]
(0.118)
0.073
0.441
[0.100]
(0.166)
0.008
0.599
[0.135]
(0.256)
0.019
0.596
[0.000]
(0.350)
0.088
2,012

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets,
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimation
includes observations with imputed covariates due to relative high levels of item nonresponse. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, normal English
ability, aged 22–29, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young children, not
currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, currently employed,
and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample proportion of accepted applicants enrolled into JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for adult
males are 62.48 percent for enrollees and 67.94 percent for nonenrollees. The corresponding rates for adult females are 57.64 percent for enrollees and 66.41 percent
for nonenrollees.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).

164 Heckman and Smith
Table 6.11 Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Enrollment into JTPA
Experimental Treatment Group: youth
Male youth
Female youth
Fort Wayne
−1.213
[−0.241]
−1.266
[−0.253]
(0.273)
0.000
(0.271)
0.000
Jersey City
−1.350
[−0.274]
−1.557
[−0.324]
(0.297)
0.000
(0.266)
0.000
Providence
−0.554
[−0.096]
−0.597
[−0.103]
(0.276)
0.045
(0.276)
0.031
Black
−0.291
[−0.061]
−0.223
[−0.048]
(0.191)
0.127
(0.210)
0.287
Hispanic
−0.044
[−0.009]
0.212
[0.043]
(0.241)
0.854
(0.250)
0.396
Other race/ethnicity
0.531
[0.102]
(0.533)
0.319
Low English ability
−0.360
[−0.070]
0.113
[0.023]
(0.392)
0.358
(0.391)
0.773
Aged 19–21
−0.429
[−0.087]
0.036
[0.007]
(0.175)
0.014
(0.167)
0.830
Highest grade < 10
0.060
[0.012]
0.084
[0.017]
(0.213)
0.779
(0.204)
0.680
Highest grade 10–11
0.000
[0.000]
0.131
[0.027]
(0.192)
0.999
(0.183)
0.476
Highest grade > 12
0.064
[0.013]
−0.111
[−0.023]
(0.405)
0.874
(0.355)
0.755
Currently married
0.138
[0.028]
−0.052
[−0.011]
(0.335)
0.680
(0.302)
0.864
Div.-wid.-sep.
0.338
[0.066]
0.424
[0.083]
(0.729)
0.643
(0.381)
0.267
Child age < 6 years
0.279
[0.055]
0.092
[0.019]
(0.313)
0.373
(0.193)
0.632
Current AFDC receipt
−0.699
[−0.151]
0.135
[0.028]
0.576
(0.336)
0.038
(0.241)
Current Food Stamp receipt
0.157
[0.032]
−0.060
[−0.012]
(0.219)
0.474
(0.195)
0.757
Employed 1–6 months ago
−0.228
[−0.044]
−0.220
[−0.044]
(0.254)
0.370
(0.239)
0.357
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Table 6.11 (continued)
Employed 7–12 months ago
Employed > 12 months ago
Never employed
Family income $3,000–
$9,000
Family income $9,000–
$15,000
Family income > $15,000
Constant
Number of observations

Male youth
−0.467
[−0.093]
(0.341)
0.170
−0.413
[−0.082]
(0.409)
0.312
−0.657
[−0.134]
(0.302)
0.030
−0.057
[−0.012]
(0.185)
0.758
−0.463
[−0.099]
(0.234)
0.048
0.301
[0.058]
(0.278)
0.279
2.505
[0.000]
(0.586)
0.000
923

Female youth
−0.415
[−0.085]
(0.332)
0.211
−0.353
[−0.072]
(0.328)
0.282
−0.276
[−0.055]
(0.280)
0.324
0.086
[0.018]
(0.176)
0.627
0.207
[0.042]
(0.272)
0.446
0.116
[0.024]
(0.280)
0.680
1.453
[0.000]
(0.557)
0.009
962

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses, mean derivatives are in square brackets,
and p-values are below the mean derivatives. National JTPA Study data. Estimation
includes observations with imputed covariates due to relative high levels of item nonresponse. Omitted categories in the logit are Corpus Christi, white, normal English
ability, aged 16–18, highest grade equals 12, never married, no young children, not
currently receiving AFDC, not currently receiving Food Stamps, currently employed,
and family income less than $3,000. Using the sample proportion of accepted applicants enrolled into JTPA as the cutoff, the within-sample prediction rates for male
youth are 60.20 percent for enrollees and 65.08 percent for nonenrollees. The corresponding rates for female youth are 57.51 percent for enrollees and 68.75 percent
for nonenrollees.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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DECOMPOSInG ThE PROCESS OF SELECTIOn InTO JTPA
In order to determine at what stage—enrollment (en), awareness
(aw), acceptance (ac), or eligibility (el)—and in which direction particular observed characteristics operate to determine participation in the
program, we use the chain rule to decompose the probability of participation in the following way:
(6.7)

∂ Pr(en = 1| x)
=
∂x
 ∂cond (en) 

 ⋅ cond (ac) ⋅ cond (aw) ⋅ cond (el)
∂x
 ∂cond (ac)
+cond (en) ⋅ 
 ⋅ cond (aw) ⋅ cond (el)
∂x

 ∂cond (aw) 
+cond (en) ⋅ cond (ac) ⋅ 
 ⋅ cond (el)
∂x

 ∂cond (el) 
+cond (en) ⋅ cond (ac) ⋅ cond (aw) ⋅ 

∂x


where cond (en) = Pr(en = 1| ac = 1, aw = 1, el = 1, x)
cond (ac) = Pr(ac = 1| aw = 1, el = 1, x)
cond (aw) = Pr(aw = 1| el = 1, x)
cond (el) = Pr(el = 1| x) .
This equation decomposes the effect of a change in x on the probability of participation in the program into its effect on each constituent
probability weighted by the remaining probabilities. In each term, the
component in square brackets is the effect of a change in x on one of
the conditional probabilities leading to participation in the program. For
dichotomous variables, we replace derivatives with finite changes.
Using Equation (6.7), we can assess through which channels, if any,
variation in x operates to affect the probability of participation in JTPA.
In this section, we present results for two different decompositions. The
two decompositions differ in terms of the number of steps included, the
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set of variables included, and the data used to perform the decomposition. These criteria are interrelated because the probability estimates
are derived from different datasets and not all of the datasets contain all
of the variables used to estimate the conditional probabilities discussed
in the preceding sections. Reducing the number of stages enables us
to estimate the effects of more explanatory variables. In addition, for
certain variables some of the stages in Equation (6.7) are effectively
eliminated. For example, belonging to a family that receives AFDC or
Food Stamps makes the probability of eligibility equal to one. It is only
informative to examine the effects of AFDC and Food Stamp receipt on
the remaining components of the decomposition.
The first decompositions we present appear in Tables 6.12–6.15.
The format of each table corresponds directly to Equation (6.7). The estimates of the probability of eligibility are based on the SIPP data. The
estimates for the conditional probabilities of awareness, of application/
acceptance, and of enrollment all draw on data from the four sites in the
National JTPA Study, with the first two constructed using the pooled
ENP and control group data and the last obtained from the experimental
treatment group. The stark difference in geographic coverage between
the samples for the first stage and the later stages of the decomposition
weakens our analysis, but this is unavoidable given the lack of comparable data on the ineligible population at the four ENP sites. As in the
earlier tables, the reported derivatives consist of sample averages of individual derivatives (or finite differences). They are not the derivatives
evaluated at the sample means of the characteristics.15
The first column in the table presents the overall effect of a change
in the indicated characteristic x on the probability of enrollment; this
is the term on the left-hand side of Equation (6.7). These values are
expressed in terms of the expected change in the probability of participation resulting from the indicated change in characteristics, multiplied
by 100 for ease of presentation. To put the terms in context, note that
the unconditional probability of participation is around 0.03, so that an
overall effect of −0.867, which is the effect for adult males of switching
from a family income of $0–$3,000 to one over $15,000, translates into
a change in the probability of −0.00867, or a reduction of nearly onethird relative to the unconditional probability.
The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns of the first panel
present the four chain rule terms that compose the overall effect. Thus,

Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 22–29 to
30–39
40–49
50–54

Overall
effect
0.15813
(0.00174)
−0.09954
(0.00121)
0.19616
(0.00202)

Weighted
eligibility
term

Percent
of overall

Weighted
awareness
term

Weighted
Percent acceptance
of overall
term

Weighted
Percent enrollment Percent
of overall
term
of overall

0.17989
113.76
(0.00194)
(0.21)
0.12535 −125.93
(0.00137)
(1.30)
0.17773
90.61
(0.00193)
(0.16)

0.06623
(0.00068)
−0.08245
(0.00086)
−0.07631
(0.00081)

41.88
(0.20)
82.83
(0.54)
−38.90
(0.19)

−0.05204
(0.00054)
−0.18921
(0.00198)
0.08834
(0.00084)

−32.91
(0.21)
190.08
(1.03)
45.03
(0.19)

−0.03595
(0.00041)
0.04676
(0.00053)
0.00643
(0.00007)

−22.74
(0.15)
−46.98
(0.30)
3.28
(0.02)

34.86
(0.05)
36.33
(0.06)
41.51
(0.05)

−0.04524
(0.00046)
−0.04657
(0.00048)
−0.00039
(0.00000)

21.81
(0.05)
19.51
(0.04)
0.012
(0.00)

−0.08232
(0.00083)
−0.05507
(0.00056)
−0.12280
(0.00127)

39.69
(0.06)
23.07
(0.04)
39.45
(0.05)

−0.00752
(0.00009)
−0.05034
(0.00058)
−0.05886
(0.00067)

3.63
(0.01)
21.09
(0.05)
18.91
(0.04)

−22.68
(0.15)
28.66
(0.10)

0.01334
(0.00014)
0.10393
(0.00106)

−24.07
(0.14)
107.16
(0.18)

−0.12037
(0.00117)
−0.06582
(0.00068)

217.11
(0.69)
−67.86
(0.37)

0.03899
(0.00044)
0.03110
(0.00035)

−70.33
(0.45)
32.06
(0.16)

−0.20738 −0.07229
(0.00213) (0.00078)
−0.23873 −0.08673
(0.00252) (0.00095)
−0.31125 −0.12920
(0.00330) (0.00139)

Single, never married to
Married
−0.05544
(0.00052)
Div.-wid.-sep.
0.09699
(0.00106)

0.01257
(0.00014)
0.02779
(0.00030)
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Table 6.12 JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics
on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA Eligibles: Adult Males
(80,598 observations)

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10

−0.07920
0.08490 −107.19
(0.00091) (0.00093)
(0.93)
0.02426
0.03716
153.13
(0.00027) (0.00041)
(0.52)
0.01822 −0.02288 −125.56
(0.00019) (0.00026)
(0.88)
−0.24466 −0.00939
3.84
(0.00245) (0.00010)
(0.01)

−0.06366
(0.00067)
−0.01861
(0.00019)
0.00813
(0.00008)
−0.05869
(0.00060)

80.37
(0.44)
−76.70
(0.46)
44.64
(0.25)
23.99
(0.04)

−0.01038
(0.00105)
0.02108
(0.00021)
0.01885
(0.00019)
−0.17448
(0.00174)

126.74
(0.53)
86.89
(0.44)
103.44
(0.41)
71.32
(0.05)

−0.00008
(0.00000)
−0.01537
(0.00018)
0.01412
(0.00016)
−0.00210
(0.00002)

0.10
(0.00)
−63.33
(0.44)
77.48
(0.31)
0.86
(0.00)

−0.09757 −0.02979
(0.00097) (0.00032)

30.53
(0.07)

−0.00915
(0.00009)

9.38
(0.02)

−0.07291
(0.00072)

74.72
(0.10)

0.01429
(0.00016)

−14.64
(0.05)

Family income < $3,000
to
$3,000–$9,000
−0.32777 −0.10544
(0.00344) (0.00116)
$9,000–$15,000
−0.47674 −0.25404
(0.00484) (0.00259)
> $15,000
−0.86666 −0.32102
(0.00493) (0.00250)

32.17
(0.04)
53.29
(0.05)
37.04
(0.09)

−0.02445
(0.00025)
−0.03367
(0.00035)
0.01048
(0.00011)

7.46
(0.02)
7.06
(0.02)
−1.21
(0.01)

−0.15696
(0.00161)
−0.15563
(0.00158)
−0.56750
(0.00274)

47.89
(0.06)
32.64
(0.04)
65.48
(0.07)

−0.04095
(0.00047)
−0.03338
(0.00038)
0.01143
(0.00013)

12.49
(0.03)
7.00
(0.02)
−1.32
(0.01)

10–11
13–15
> 15
No child < 6 years of
age to child
< 6 years of age

(continued)
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Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 22–29 to
30–39
40–49
50–54
Single, never married to
Married
Div.-wid.-sep.

Unweighted
eligibility
term

Unweighted
awareness
term

Unweighted
acceptance term

Unweighted
enrollment
term

0.06693
(0.00018)
0.04687
(0.00013)
0.06753
(0.00020)

0.11697
(0.00005)
−0.14448
(0.00011)
−0.13250
(0.00009)

−0.00968
(0.00005)
−0.03352
(0.00020)
0.01774
(0.00009)

−0.07041
(0.00005)
0.08792
(0.00000)
0.01230
(0.00000)

−0.02757
(0.00007)
−0.03277
(0.00009)
−0.04864
(0.00014)

−0.08029
(0.00004)
−0.08247
(0.00004)
−0.00068
(0.00000)

−0.01583
(0.00009)
−0.01053
(0.00006)
−0.02274
(0.00013)

−0.01445
(0.00000)
−0.09820
(0.00003)
−0.11663
(0.00008)

0.00468
(0.00001)
0.01056
(0.00003)

0.02359
(0.00001)
0.18502
(0.00006)

−0.02424
(0.00012)
−0.01223
(0.00007)

0.07681
(0.00006)
0.05862
(0.00002)
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Table 6.12 (continued)

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10
10–11
13–15
> 15
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years of age
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000

0.03184
(0.00008)
0.01406
(0.00004)
−0.00856
(0.00002)
−0.00355
(0.00001)

−0.11108
(0.00007)
−0.03287
(0.00001)
0.01443
(0.00000)
−0.10503
(0.00003)

−0.01834
(0.00010)
0.00410
(0.00002)
0.00364
(0.00002)
−0.03325
(0.00017)

−0.00016
(0.00000)
−0.02980
(0.00000)
0.02700
(0.00000)
−0.00404
(0.00000)

−0.01129
(0.00003)

−0.01621
(0.00001)

−0.01379
(0.00007)

0.02742
(0.00001)

−0.03797
(0.00013)
−0.08709
(0.00035)
−0.27189
(0.00040)

−0.04304
(0.00000)
−0.05927
(0.00000)
0.01851
(0.00001)

−0.02817
(0.00017)
−0.03101
(0.00019)
−0.22959
(0.00043)

−0.08075
(0.00006)
−0.06552
(0.00000)
0.02226
(0.00000)

NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variation
due to the sample used to perform the simulations.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Table 6.13 JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in
Characteristics on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA
Eligibles: Adult Females (89,196 observations)
Overall
effect

Weighted
eligibility
term

Percent
of overall

Weighted
awareness
term

Weighted
Weighted
Percent acceptance Percent enrollment Percent
of overall
term
of overall
term
of overall

0.18225
(0.00074)
0.05725
(0.00027)
0.08121
(0.00037)

0.17694
(0.00074)
0.06722
(0.00028)
0.06315
(0.00026)

97.09
(0.08)
117.41
(0.26)
77.76
(0.15)

0.04858
(0.00024)
−0.03759
(0.00018)
−0.05323
(0.00025)

26.66
(0.09)
−65.65
(0.28)
−65.54
(0.22)

−0.01011
(0.00005)
−0.03785
(0.00018)
0.00495
(0.00002)

−5.55
(0.01)
−66.11
(0.25)
6.10
(0.02)

−0.03316
(0.00016)
0.06547
(0.00033)
0.06633
(0.00033)

−18.20
(0.05)
114.36
(0.36)
81.68
(0.18)

−0.06881
0.00439
(0.00031) (0.00002)
−0.13415
0.00954
(0.00064) (0.00004)
−0.17226 −0.02104
(0.00078) (0.00008)

−6.38
(0.01)
−7.11
(0.02)
12.21
(0.02)

−0.00849
(0.00004)
−0.02645
(0.00013)
−0.02611
(0.00013)

12.34
(0.02)
19.72
(0.03)
15.16
(0.02)

−0.07057
(0.00032)
−0.08264
(0.00039)
−0.13052
(0.00061)

102.56
(0.00)
61.60
(0.00)
75.77
(0.05)

0.00587
(0.00003)
−0.03461
(0.00017)
0.00540
(0.00003)

−8.53
(0.02)
25.80
(0.03)
−3.13
(0.01)

Single, never married to
Married
−0.25809 −0.11003
(0.00096) (0.00037)
Div.-wid.-sep.
0.05775 −0.00537
(0.00028) (0.00002)

42.63
(0.03)
−9.30
(0.02)

−0.03753
(0.00018)
0.00975
(0.00005)

14.54
(0.02)
16.88
(0.03)

−0.13273
(0.00054)
0.02610
(0.00012)

51.43
(0.03)
45.20
(0.03)

0.02221
(0.00011)
0.02727
(0.00014)

−8.61
(0.02)
47.21
(0.04)

Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 22–29 to
30–39
40–49
50–54

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10
10–11
13–15
> 15
No child < 6 years of
age to child
< 6 years
Family income
< $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000

−0.00028
0.12478 −45004.11
(0.00039) (0.00050) (61725.88)
−0.02252
0.00440
−19.54
(0.00011) (0.00002)
(0.05)
0.00983 −0.02878 −292.81
(0.00010) (0.00012)
(2.80)
−0.17329 −0.11342
65.45
(0.00072) (0.00045)
(0.07)

−0.09553 34456.05
−0.01200 4329.50
(0.00048) (47143.37) (0.00006) (5926.98)
−0.00229
10.17
−0.01690
75.04
(0.00001)
(0.02)
(0.00008)
(0.06)
−0.02655 −270.11
0.06390
650.14
(0.00013)
(2.40)
(0.00030)
(5.07)
−0.08481
48.94
0.04682
−27.02
(0.00039)
(0.04)
(0.00022)
(0.03)

−0.01752 6320.56
(0.00009) (8658.46)
−0.00773
34.34
(0.00004)
(0.03)
0.00125
12.70
(0.00001)
(0.10)
−0.02190
12.64
(0.00011)
(0.02)

0.00212
(0.00012)

0.03731 1763.02
(0.00015) (103.67)

−0.00557 −263.19
(0.00003) (15.97)

−0.06759 −3193.65
(0.00033) (194.88)

0.03797 1794.02
(0.00019) (107.23)

0.00364 −0.08450 −2322.85
(0.00022) (0.00037) (139.38)
−0.14105 −0.18756
132.98
(0.00068) (0.00084)
(0.13)
−0.37947 −0.33806
89.09
(0.00114) (0.00098)
(0.00)

0.06882 1891.74
(0.00034) (108.34)
0.03819 −27.08
(0.00019)
(0.11)
0.00612
−1.61
(0.00003)
(0.01)

0.01681
(0.00008)
−0.02034
(0.00009)
−0.08725
(0.00036)

0.00250
(0.00001)
0.02862
(0.00014)
0.03971
(0.00020)

462.23
(27.00)
14.42
(0.04)
22.99
(0.05)

68.81
(4.04)
−20.29
(0.08)
−10.46
(0.04)

(continued)
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Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 22–29 to
30–39
40–49
50–54
Single, never married to
Married
Div.-wid.-sep.

Unweighted
eligibility
term

Unweighted
awareness
term

Unweighted
acceptance
term

Unweighted
enrollment
term

0.11936
(0.00025)
0.04523
(0.00010)
0.04237
(0.00009)

0.10254
(0.00000)
−0.07589
(0.00003)
−0.10664
(0.00004)

−0.00213
(0.00000)
−0.00796
(0.00001)
0.00105
(0.00000)

−0.07239
(0.00003)
0.13711
(0.00006)
0.13905
(0.00000)

0.00292
(0.00001)
0.00633
(0.00001)
−0.01395
(0.00004)

−0.01759
(0.00000)
−0.05442
(0.00002)
−0.05343
(0.00003)

−0.01495
(0.00003)
−0.01792
(0.00004)
−0.02759
(0.00004)

0.01270
(0.00000)
−0.07575
(0.00003)
0.01166
(0.00000)

−0.08046
(0.00017)
−0.00355
(0.00001)

−0.07888
(0.00004)
0.02033
(0.00001)

−0.03365
(0.00004)
0.00566
(0.00001)

0.04852
(0.00002)
0.05814
(0.00000)
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Table 6.13 (continued)

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10
10–11
13–15
> 15
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000

0.08384
(0.00017)
0.00292
(0.00001)
−0.01898
(0.00005)
−0.07569
(0.00020)

−0.18277
(0.00014)
−0.00474
(0.00000)
−0.05459
(0.00000)
−0.17394
(0.00009)

−0.00254
(0.00001)
−0.00356
(0.00001)
0.01348
(0.00002)
0.00970
(0.00002)

−0.03823
(0.00001)
−0.01680
(0.00000)
0.00270
(0.00000)
−0.04777
(0.00002)

0.02473
(0.00006)

−0.01154
(0.00001)

−0.01397
(0.00003)

0.08169
(0.00004)

−0.05266
(0.00015)
−0.11255
(0.00035)
−0.26155
(0.00039)

0.14643
(0.00006)
0.08099
(0.00000)
0.01266
(0.00001)

0.00361
(0.00001)
−0.00431
(0.00001)
−0.02135
(0.00003)

0.00541
(0.00000)
0.06103
(0.00000)
0.08726
(0.00000)

NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variation
due to the sample used to perform the simulations.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA Eligibles: Male youth
(10,280 observations)
Overall
effect

Weighted
eligibility
term

Percent
of overall

Weighted
awareness
term

0.18985
(0.00359)
0.16202
(0.00461)
0.11554
(0.00528)

0.13157
(0.00251)
0.27921
(0.00559)
0.21151
(0.00417)

69.30
(0.59)
172.33
(2.31)
183.06
(6.88)

0.19817
(0.00360)
0.00435
(0.00008)
0.19799
(0.00348)

104.38
(1.21)
2.68
(0.07)
171.37
(7.34)

−0.08387
(0.00185)
−0.16337
(0.00334)
−.35420
(0.00742)

−44.18
(0.94)
−100.84
(3.13)
−306.57
(16.67)

−0.05602
(0.00127)
0.04183
(0.00098)
0.06022
(0.00144)

−29.51
(0.59)
25.82
(0.80)
52.12
(2.69)

−0.04099 −0.05230
(0.00217) (0.00098)

127.60
(5.88)

−0.12499
(0.00224)

304.94
(15.65)

0.17496
(0.00386)

−426.86
(26.88)

−0.03866
(0.00091)

94.32
(5.52)

Single, never married to
Married
−0.09644 −0.14673
(0.00327) (0.00262)
Div.-wid.-sep.
−0.45773 −0.18594
(0.00827) (0.00319)

152.14
(3.74)
40.62
(0.18)

0.22705 −235.42
(0.00400)
(7.59)
−0.16515
36.08
(0.00311)
(0.10)

−0.20505
(0.00430)
−0.12806
(0.00267)

212.61
(4.65)
27.98
(0.16)

0.02827
(0.00067)
0.02142
(0.00051)

−29.31
(0.66)
−4.68
(0.04)

Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 16–18 to
19–21

Weighted
Weighted
Percent acceptance Percent enrollment Percent
of overall
term
of overall
term
of overall
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Table 6.14 JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10
10–11
> 12
No child < 6 years of
age to child
< 6 years
Family income <
$3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000

0.27423
0.19428
(0.00480) (0.00358)
0.31709
0.15118
(0.00559) (0.00287)
−0.15662 −0.00644
(0.00291) (0.00012)

−0.06653
(0.00296)

70.85
(0.36)
47.68
(0.35)
4.11
(0.05)

0.00450
(0.00008)
0.06286
(0.00112)
−0.08392
(0.00152)

1.64
(0.01)
19.82
(0.13)
53.58
(0.17)

0.05394
(0.00110)
0.09853
(0.00200)
−0.06819
(0.00140)

19.67
(0.25)
31.07
(0.27)
43.54
(0.20)

0.02152
(0.00051)
0.00451
(0.00011)
0.00192
(0.00005)

7.85
(0.10)
1.42
(0.02)
−1.23
(0.01)

0.13831 −207.91
(0.00276)
(9.74)

−0.02807
(0.00051)

42.20
(1.50)

−0.20069
(0.00411)

301.67
(9.40)

0.02392
(0.00057)

−35.95
(1.18)

−0.09657
(0.00178)
0.00376
(0.00007)
−0.07077
(0.00126)

329.20
(147.80)
−0.60
(0.01)
6.26
(0.07)

0.47009 −1602.39
(0.00977) (750.37)
−0.18625
29.74
(0.00378)
(0.08)
−0.22640
20.02
(0.00358)
(0.18)

−0.01638
(0.00038)
−0.08230
(0.00188)
0.02411
(0.00056)

55.82
(25.52)
13.14
(0.08)
−2.13
(0.04)

−0.02934 −0.38646
(0.00890) (0.00892)
−0.62620 −0.36139
(0.01208) (0.00660)
−1.13101 −0.85797
(0.00927) (0.00564)

1317.34
(577.07)
57.71
(0.13)
75.86
(0.21)

(continued)
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Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 16–18 to
19–21
Single, never married to
Married
Div.-wid.-sep.

Unweighted
eligibility
term

Unweighted
awareness term

Unweighted
acceptance
term

Unweighted
enrollment
term

0.06224
(0.00033)
0.12856
(0.00071)
0.09938
(0.00059)

0.23652
(0.00027)
0.00515
(0.00001)
0.24597
(0.00029)

−0.01464
(0.00011)
−0.02811
(0.00023)
−0.05971
(0.00051)

−0.10033
(0.00009)
0.07099
(0.00011)
0.10316
(0.00017)

−0.02447
(0.00013)

−0.14922
(0.00014)

0.02848
(0.00020)

−0.06538
(0.00006)

−0.06715
(0.00043)
−0.08370

0.28561
(0.00023)
−0.18808

−0.03700
(0.00032)
−0.02320

0.04882
(0.00007)
0.03693

(0.00060)

(0.00048)

(0.00018)

(0.00006)
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Table 6.14 (continued)

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10
10–11
> 12
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000

0.09339
(0.00051)
0.07254
(0.00039)
−0.00299
(0.00002)

0.00533
(0.00001)
0.07497
(0.00009)
−0.09993
(0.00013)

0.01010
(0.00007)
0.01866
(0.00013)
−0.01283
(0.00009)

0.03660
(0.00005)
0.00780
(0.00001)
0.00333
(0.00000)

0.06409
(0.00038)

−0.03296
(0.00006)

−0.03545
(0.00029)

0.04130
(0.00006)

−0.13607
(0.00150)
−0.17195
(0.00229)
−0.57966
(0.00228)

−0.10801
(0.00018)
0.00445
(0.00001)
−0.08677
(0.00010)

0.09427
(0.00035)
−0.03412
(0.00027)
−0.05300
(0.00026)

−0.02889
(0.00003)
−0.14599
(0.00013)
0.04362
(0.00006)

NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variations
due to the sample used to perform the simulation.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/
ethnicity
Aged 16–18 to
19–21
Single, never
married to
Married
Div.-wid.-sep.

Overall
effect

Weighted
eligibility
term

Percent
of overall

Weighted
awareness
term

Weighted
Percent acceptance Percent
of overall
term
of overall

Weighted
enrollment
term

Percent
of overall

0.60673
(0.00343)
0.33973
(0.00237)
0.52914
(0.00323)

0.25958
(0.00170)
0.13234
(0.00086)
0.21732
(0.00135)

42.78
(0.17)
38.95
(0.18)
41.07
(0.24)

0.15867
(0.00122)
0.07296
(0.00055)
−0.15091
(0.00124)

26.15
(0.08)
21.48
(0.07)
−28.52
(0.12)

0.23113
(0.00153)
0.03803
(0.00031)
0.39674
(0.00309)

38.09
(0.13)
11.19
(0.04)
74.98
(0.24)

−0.04265
(0.00043)
0.09640
(0.00103)
0.06597
(0.00071)

−7.03
(0.04)
28.38
(0.14)
12.47
(0.07)

−0.13182
(0.00103)

0.00600
(0.00004)

−4.55
(0.04)

−0.04413
(0.00033)

33.48
(0.09)

−0.09964
(0.00080)

75.58
(0.09)

0.00594
(0.00006)

−4.51
(0.02)

−0.11438
(0.00122)
0.43598
(0.00272)

0.04948
(0.00031)
0.16794
(0.00102)

−43.26
(0.52)
38.52
(0.22)

0.02279
(0.00017)
−0.13812
(0.00113)

−19.93
(0.15)
−31.68
(0.13)

−0.21716
(0.00170)
0.34108
(0.00267)

189.86
(0.81)
78.23
(0.23)

0.03049
(0.00032)
0.06509
(0.00070)

−26.66
(0.20)
14.93
(0.08)
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Table 6.15 JTPA Participation Simulation Results—weighted and Unweighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics
on the Probability of Participation in JTPA 1986 SIPP Panel Sample of JTPA Eligibles: Female youth
(11,165 observations)

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10
10–11
> 12
No child < 6 years of
age to child
< 6 years
Family income
< $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000

0.02402
0.10392
(0.00062) (0.00064)
−0.04111
0.00763
(0.00034) (0.00005)
−0.23797 −0.08057
(0.00153) (0.00052)

432.68
(10.15)
−18.55
(0.16)
33.86
(0.16)

−0.13596 −566.07
(0.00105) (17.22)
−0.03043
74.01
(0.00023)
(0.21)
−0.00592
2.49
(0.00004)
(0.01)

0.03667
(0.00030)
−0.03857
(0.00032)
−0.15552
(0.00120)

152.69
(4.69)
93.82
(0.27)
65.35
(0.16)

0.01939
(0.00020)
0.02026
(0.00021)
0.00405
(0.00004)

80.72
(2.47)
−49.28
(0.33)
−1.70
(0.01)

0.04561
(0.00111)

0.16064
(0.00095)

352.24
(7.62)

−0.01929
(0.00015)

−42.29
(1.20)

−0.11019 −241.62
(0.00094)
(7.36)

0.01445
(0.00015)

31.68
(0.95)

−0.21200 −0.20549
(0.00173) (0.00166)
−0.26501 −0.31212
(0.00243) (0.00277)
−0.29814 −0.64432
(0.00588) (0.00390)

96.93
(0.09)
117.78
(0.12)
216.11
(3.51)

0.04033
(0.00030)
−0.01785
(0.00014)
−0.06660
(0.00050)

−19.02
(0.10)
6.73
(0.03)
22.34
(0.46)

−0.02672
12.60
(0.00022)
(0.08)
0.05881
−22.19
(0.00049)
(0.11)
0.43046 −144.38
(0.00460)
(4.09)

−0.02013
(0.00021)
0.00615
(0.00006)
−0.01767
(0.00018)

9.49
(0.06)
−2.32
(0.01)
5.93
(0.13)
(continued)
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Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 16–18 to
19–21
Single, never married to
Married
Div.-wid.-sep.

Unweighted
eligibility
term

Unweighted
awareness
term

Unweighted
acceptance
term

Unweighted
enrollment
term

0.07514
(0.00020)
0.03805
(0.00010)
0.06344
(0.00017)

0.18894
(0.00012)
0.08826
(0.00004)
−0.17801
(0.00019)

0.08124
(0.00038)
0.01283
(0.00007)
0.13083
(0.00058)

−0.06723
(0.00006)
0.14839
(0.00011)
0.10252
(0.00011)

0.00172
(0.00000)

−0.05334
(0.00000)

−0.03352
(0.00016)

0.00931
(0.00001)

0.01431
(0.00004)
0.04896
(0.00013)

0.02747
(0.00002)
−0.16342
(0.00015)

−0.07153
(0.00036)
0.11298
(0.00052)

0.04781
(0.00003)
0.10116
(0.00011)
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Table 6.15 (continued)

Highest grade = 12 to
< 10
10–11
> 12
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000

0.03018
(0.00008)
0.00219
(0.00001)
−0.02355
(0.00005)

−0.16072
(0.00015)
−0.03662
(0.00002)
−0.00714
(0.00000)

0.01233
(0.00006)
−0.01290
(0.00007)
−0.05464
(0.00028)

0.03028
(0.00003)
0.03163
(0.00003)
0.00635
(0.00001)

0.04769
(0.00012)

−0.02320
(0.00002)

−0.03586
(0.00019)

0.02259
(0.00002)

−0.05959
(0.00019)
−0.09455
(0.00035)
−0.19203
(0.00017)

0.04868
(0.00002)
−0.02149
(0.00001)
−0.08038
(0.00002)

−0.00894
(0.00005)
0.01981
(0.00010)
0.11196
(0.00045)

−0.03154
(0.00002)
0.00962
(0.00001)
−0.02763
(0.00002)

NOTE: Simulations use 1986 SIPP full panel data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. The standard errors reflect variations
due to the sample used to perform the simulation.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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for the decomposition in Tables 6.12–6.15, the weighted eligibility term
is given by the first term on the right-hand side of Equation (6.7), the
weighted acceptance term by the second term, the weighted awareness
term by the third term, and the weighted enrollment term by the fourth
term. The third, fifth, seventh, and ninth columns present the percentage of the overall effect attributable to each of the four components.
Thus, the third column indicates the percentage of the overall effect that
results from the effect of the indicated change in x on the conditional
probability of eligibility, which is given by the ratio of the weighted eligibility term to the overall effect multiplied by 100. The second panel of
each table presents the unweighted effect of the indicated change in x on
each of the conditional probabilities. This unweighted effect is just the
average partial derivative (or finite difference) of the probability with
respect to the characteristic.
The results for race and ethnicity are especially striking. Blacks
consistently have an overall probability of participation higher than that
of whites. For three of the four demographic groups, this higher overall
probability decomposes into higher conditional probabilities of eligibility and awareness, but lower conditional probabilities of acceptance
and enrollment. Decomposing the overall effect in this way makes it
clear where blacks fall out of the participation process, and suggests
that policy measures designed to increase their participation should
likely focus relatively more attention on the stages of application, acceptance, and enrollment, rather than on changes in eligibility rules or
on outreach efforts to increase awareness, although such measures may
still bear fruit. This evidence indicates that the concerns expressed in
GAO (1991) regarding minority participation may not have been misplaced. Administrative discretion may have played a role in reducing
black participation in JTPA, and may continue to do so under WIA.
A different pattern emerges for the categorical age variables. For
adults, older persons nearly always have lower conditional probabilities at every stage in the participation process relative to persons aged
22–29. The same is true of youth, where a modest overall negative effect for 19–21-year-olds relative to 16–18-year-olds is mirrored at each
stage in the process except for the application/acceptance stage for male
youth and the eligibility and enrollment stages for female youth.
Overall, being married rather than being single decreases the probability of participation in JTPA for all four demographic groups. The
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dominant factor lowering enrollment among married persons is a strong
negative effect of marriage on the conditional probability of application/
acceptance. For adult males, this negative term outweighs a positive
effect of marriage on the conditional probabilities of eligibility, awareness, and enrollment. The probability of participation for divorced,
widowed, or separated persons exceeds that for single persons in three
of the four groups. For adult males, positive effects of having once been
married on eligibility, awareness, and enrollment dominate the negative
acceptance term, while all but the eligibility term are positive for adult
females.
For adults, the relationship between the overall probability of
participation in JTPA and years of completed schooling is roughly hillshaped, with its peak occurring at 10–11 years of completed schooling
for men and 13–15 years for women. The decompositions reveal that
the overall relationship results from combining a negative relationship
between years of schooling and eligibility, and generally hill-shaped relationships between schooling and awareness, application/acceptance,
and enrollment. For youth, the overall relationship between participation and years of completed schooling peaks at 10–11 years for males
and at less than 10 years for females.
For three of the four demographic groups, the overall effect of
having an own child under six years of age in the home breaks down
into a positive component due to increased conditional probabilities of
eligibility and enrollment, and negative components due to decreased
probabilities of awareness and acceptance. The overall effect is negative for men and positive for women.
The overall probability of participation in JTPA decreases monotonically in family income for adult males and male and female youth,
and peaks in the $3,000–$9,000 category for adult females. The strong
negative relationship between family income and the probability of
eligibility described earlier in the chapter dominates the overall effect in almost every case. The exception is the peak for adult females,
which results from the influence of a similarly peaked pattern in the
relationship between family income and the conditional probabilities of
awareness and of application/acceptance for that group.
Tables 6.16–6.19 present a second set of decompositions. In these
tables, we decompose the probability of application/acceptance conditional on eligibility into components due to awareness and due to

Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 22–29 to
30–39
40–49
50–54
Highest grade 12 to
< 10
10–11
13–15
> 15
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt
Two most recent labor force
statuses from employed →
employed to

Weighted
awareness
term

Overall
effect

Weighted
acceptance
term

Percent
of overall
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Table 6.16 JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Adult Males (1,552 observations)
Percent
of overall

2.5149
−2.9536
5.8446

(0.0675) 1.5521
(0.0902) −2.6335
(0.1485) −1.4193

(0.0495) 61.72
(0.0844) 89.16
(0.0457) −24.28

(0.66)
(0.25)
(0.85)

0.9628
−0.3201
7.2639

(0.0257) 38.28
(0.0087) 10.84
(0.1668) 124.28

(0.66)
(0.25)
(0.85)

−3.7082
−4.2680
−2.5991

(0.0993) −1.3499
(0.1146) −1.2858
(0.0765) 0.1994

(0.0433)
(0.0412)
(0.0064)

36.40
30.13
−7.67

(0.62)
(0.55)
(0.22)

−2.3583
−2.9822
−2.7985

(0.0664) 63.60
(0.0838) 69.87
(0.0803) 107.67

(0.62)
(0.55)
(0.22)

−6.5763
−1.4067
2.1957
−7.3700

(0.1825) −2.1992
(0.0380) −0.7153
(0.0557) 0.5977
(0.2089) −1.6050

(0.0693)
(0.0233)
(0.0192)
(0.0516)

33.44
50.85
27.22
21.78

(0.54)
(0.70)
(0.57)
(0.40)

−4.3771
−0.6914
1.5980
−5.7650

(0.1279)
(0.0193)
(0.0430)
(0.1688)

66.56
49.15
72.78
78.22

(0.54)
(0.70)
(0.58)
(0.40)

−5.5477

(0.1714)

0.4306

(0.0138)

−7.76

(0.22)

−5.9783

(0.1800) 107.76

(0.23)

4.4612

(0.1165)

2.8726

(0.0897)

64.39

(0.68)

1.5886

(0.0424)

(0.68)

35.61

Unemployed → employed
OLF → employed
Employed → unemployed
Unemployed → unemployed
OLF → unemployed
Employed → OLF
Unemployed → OLF
OLF → OLF
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site
Jersey City site
Providence site
Never married to
Currently married
Married 1–24 months ago
Married > 24 months ago

11.1319
15.2249
23.9905
15.9797
28.6514
25.9317
30.8787
6.8828

(0.2484) 2.8784
(0.3061) 2.6670
(0.4532) 2.8125
(0.3196) 3.6041
(0.4525) 6.4026
(0.3865) −1.6591
(0.4021) −4.9403
(0.1859) −0.0298

(0.0920) 25.86
(0.0845) 17.52
(0.0946) 11.72
(0.1122) 22.55
(0.2087) 22.35
(0.0530) −6.40
(0.1627) −16.00
(0.0009) −0.43

(0.60)
(0.45)
(0.31)
(0.55)
(0.59)
(0.22)
(0.67)
(0.01)

8.2535
12.5578
21.1780
12.3756
22.2488
27.5908
35.8191
6.9126

(0.1969) 74.14
(0.2646) 82.48
(0.3998) 88.28
(0.2652) 77.45
(0.3654) 77.65
(0.3904) 106.40
(0.3365) 116.00
(0.1864) 100.43

(0.60)
(0.44)
(0.31)
(0.55)
(0.59)
(0.22)
(0.67)
(0.03)

−0.9468

(0.0270) −0.5962

(0.0190)

62.97

(0.71)

−0.3506

(0.0114)

37.03

(0.71)

−5.2227
−2.4054
−6.8375

(0.1744) −0.1078
(0.0750) −0.1520
(0.2571) 1.6230

(0.0034)
2.06
(0.0048)
6.32
(0.0511) −23.74

(0.06)
(0.18)
(0.94)

−5.1149
−2.2535
−8.4605

(0.1725) 97.94
(0.0722) 93.68
(0.2804) 123.74

(0.04)
(0.19)
(0.94)

12.6473
6.3780
6.4292

(0.3162) 1.0828
(0.1534) 0.3288
(0.1691) −1.5965

(0.0346)
8.56
(0.0105)
5.16
(0.0509) −24.83

(0.22)
(0.15)
(0.95)

11.5644
6.0492
8.0257

(0.2958) 91.44
(0.1490) 94.84
(0.1824) 124.83

(0.23)
(0.16)
(0.95)

−4.9098
4.3002
5.3340

(0.1401)
(0.1261)
(0.1391)

(0.0145)
(0.1252)
(0.1166)

(0.31)
(0.04)
(0.73)

−5.3660
0.0923
1.7147

(0.1467) 109.29
(0.0025)
2.15
(0.0441) 32.15

(0.31)
(0.07)
(0.73)

0.4562
4.2079
3.6192

−9.29
97.85
67.85
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NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation
in the samples used to do the simulations.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).

Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 22–29 to
30–39
40–49
50–54
Highest grade 12 to
< 10
10–11
13–15
> 15
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt
Two most recent labor force
statuses from employed →
employed to

Weighted
awareness
term

Overall
effect

Weighted
acceptance
term

Percent
of overall
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Table 6.17 JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Adult Females (2,438 observations)
Percent
of overall

0.3406
2.5843
−0.5642

(0.0082) 0.5807
(0.0514) −1.5509
(0.0140) −0.9772

(0.0110) 170.49
(0.0312) −60.01
(0.0192) 173.22

(1.57)
(1.29)
(1.55)

−0.2401
4.1352
0.4130

(0.0044)
(0.0709)
(0.0074)

−70.49
160.01
−73.22

(1.57)
(1.29)
(1.55)

−1.5293
−1.0421
−0.9142

(0.0272) −0.2304
(0.0184) −0.3973
(0.0163) −0.3667

(0.0044)
(0.0075)
(0.0071)

15.07
38.12
40.12

(0.18)
(0.30)
(0.30)

−1.2989
−0.6449
−0.5474

(0.0238)
(0.0120)
(0.0102)

84.93
61.88
59.88

(0.17)
(0.30)
(0.30)

−2.6424
−0.8521
1.4035
−3.5102

(0.0495)
(0.0151)
(0.0265)
(0.0668)

(0.0393) 76.06
(0.0050) 30.57
(0.0103) −39.14
(0.0283) 40.86

(0.21)
(0.27)
(0.72)
(0.26)

−0.6325
−0.5916
1.9527
−2.0760

(0.0119)
(0.0109)
(0.0332)
(0.0410)

23.94
69.43
139.14
59.14

(0.21)
(0.27)
(0.72)
(0.26)

−3.9558

(0.0809) −0.0051

(0.0001)

0.13

(0.00)

−3.9507

(0.0808)

99.87

(0.00)

(0.0416)

(0.0242)

55.79

(0.30)

1.0908

(0.0201)

44.21

(0.30)

2.4674

−2.0099
−0.2605
−0.5493
−1.4343

1.3765

Unemployed → employed
OLF → employed
Employed → unemployed
Unemployed → unemployed
OLF → unemployed
Employed → OLF
Unemployed → OLF
OLF → OLF
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years
Family income < $,3000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site
Jersey City site
Providence site
Never married to
Currently married
Married 1–24 months ago
Married > 24 months ago

10.1978
6.0237
20.0536
19.1886
13.1690
7.3442
13.9890
4.2671

(0.1374) 0.2336
(0.0963) −0.6424
(0.2370) 1.9825
(0.2369) 1.1889
(0.1825) 0.8147
(0.1160) 0.2988
(0.1926) −0.6109
(0.0845) −0.9764

(0.0044)
2.29
(0.0123) −10.66
(0.0363)
9.89
(0.0234)
6.20
(0.0151)
6.19
(0.0056)
4.07
(0.0118) −4.37
(0.0188) −22.88

(0.04)
(0.17)
(0.15)
(0.12)
(0.09)
(0.06)
(0.08)
(0.45)

9.9642
6.6660
18.0711
17.9997
12.3543
7.0454
14.5999
5.2435

(0.1353)
(0.1040)
(0.2195)
(0.2287)
(0.1737)
(0.1125)
(0.1989)
(0.0952)

97.71
110.66
90.11
93.80
93.81
95.93
104.37
122.88

(0.00)
(0.18)
(0.15)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.46)

−0.8987

(0.0173) −0.1516

(0.0029)

16.87

(0.21)

−0.7471

(0.0151)

83.13

(0.20)

2.1865
1.0367
0.5172

(0.0390) 1.1198
(0.0183) 0.6227
(0.0107) −0.0683

(0.0208) 51.22
(0.0117) 60.07
(0.0013) −13.20

(0.38)
(0.38)
(0.22)

1.0667
0.4140
0.5855

(0.0215)
(0.0083)
(0.0116)

48.78
39.93
113.20

(0.38)
(0.37)
(0.23)

7.6811
5.4065
7.3382

(0.1556) −0.6637
(0.0990) −0.7513
(0.1506) −2.0068

(0.0124) −8.64
(0.0147) −13.90
(0.0412) −27.35

(0.19)
(0.24)
(0.62)

8.3448
6.1578
9.3450

(0.1608)
(0.1084)
(0.1711)

108.64
113.90
127.35

(0.18)
(0.23)
(0.62)

−3.7900
3.1004
6.3540

(0.0758) −0.3984
(0.0569) −0.0496
(0.1107) 0.5205

(0.0077)
(0.0009)
(0.0100)

(0.13)
(0.02)
(0.11)

−3.3915
3.1499
5.8335

(0.0697)
(0.0576)
(0.1038)

89.49
101.60
91.81

(0.12)
(0.00)
(0.12)

10.51
−1.60
8.19
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NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation
in the samples used to do the simulations.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).

Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 16–18 to
19–21
Never married to
Currently married
Div.-wid.-sep.
Highest grade 12 to
< 10
10–11
> 12
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt

Overall
effect
4.8041 (0.2699)
5.9390 (0.2145)
−3.1888 (0.3835)

Weighted
awareness
term
6.6041
0.2688
6.6837

Weighted
acceptance
term

Percent
of overall
(0.2893) 137.47
(0.0123)
4.53
(0.3157) −209.60

(2.52)
(0.22)
(28.11)

−1.7999 (0.0720)
5.6701 (0.2112)
−9.8724 (0.4783)
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Table 6.18 JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Male youth (530 observations)
Percent
of overall
−37.47
95.47
309.60

(2.52)
(0.22)
(28.11)

−1.1238 (0.2264) −5.3078

(0.2366)

472.32 (109.67)

2.1384 (0.3343) 7.4097
−3.4641 (0.1330) −2.0780

(0.3489)
(0.0950)

346.50
59.99

(54.91)
(1.04)

−0.3731 (0.0267) −0.6401
1.9636 (0.0810) 1.6799
−1.8382 (0.0667) −0.6697

(0.0292)
(0.0760)
(0.0305)

171.56
85.55
36.43

(6.06)
(0.59)
(1.04)

0.2670 (0.0103)
0.2837 (0.0110)
−1.1685 (0.0468)

−71.56
14.45
63.57

(6.06)
(0.59)
(1.04)

−11.1117 (0.4965) −4.2387

(0.1942)

38.15

(0.74)

−6.8730 (0.3298)

61.85

(0.74)

(0.0835)

49.13

(1.20)

1.9037 (0.0692)

50.87

(1.20)

3.7423 (0.1253)

1.8386

4.1840 (0.1576) −372.32 (109.67)
−5.2712 (0.2273) −246.50
−1.3862 (0.0561)
40.01

(54.91)
(1.04)

Two most recent labor force
statuses from employed →
employed to
Unemployed → employed
OLF → employed
Employed → unemployed
Unemployed → unemployed
OLF → unemployed
Employed → OLF
Unemployed → OLF
OLF → OLF
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years
Family income < $,3000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site
Jersey City site
Providence site

14.4300
−4.5935
16.6120
10.3782
0.3517
26.9129
5.5548
6.9113

(0.3934) 1.1809
(0.2030) 0.5569
(0.4569) 3.5322
(0.2823) 3.2308
(0.0666) −1.2450
(1.1099) −8.8298
(0.3447) 7.5616
(0.5004) −6.8417

(0.0536)
8.18
(0.0255) −12.12
(0.1670)
21.26
(0.1478)
31.13
(0.0573) −354.01
(0.4202) −32.81
(0.3597) 136.13
(0.3147) −98.99

(0.40)
(0.57)
(0.93)
(1.11)
(72.52)
(2.70)
(2.89)
(10.08)

13.2491
−5.1505
13.0798
7.1474
1.5967
35.7427
−2.0068
13.7529

(0.3886)
(0.2159)
(0.4174)
(0.2211)
(0.0634)
(0.8344)
(0.0916)
(0.4157)

91.82
112.12
78.74
68.87
454.01
132.81
−36.13
198.99

(0.40)
(0.57)
(0.93)
(1.11)
(72.52)
(2.70)
(2.89)
(10.08)

−9.2754 (0.4498) −1.9897

(0.0911)

21.45

(0.67)

−7.2856 (0.3823)

78.55

(0.67)

9.3512 (0.4811) −4.6211
−2.6233 (0.1288) −3.1610
−4.7303 (0.1979) −3.8578

(0.2073)
(0.1402)
(0.1714)

−49.42
120.50
81.56

(3.64)
(1.17)
(0.69)

13.9722 (0.4734)
0.5377 (0.0256)
−0.8725 (0.0425)

149.42
−20.50
18.44

(3.64)
(1.17)
(0.69)

10.3470 (0.3620) 0.3657
3.0515 (0.1968) −1.4890
18.4090 (0.6361) −2.3738

(0.0169)
(0.0675)
(0.1081)

3.53
−48.80
−12.89

(0.17)
(3.80)
(0.76)

9.9813 (0.3578)
4.5406 (0.2061)
20.7827 (0.6359)

96.47
148.80
112.89

(0.17)
(3.80)
(0.75)

NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation
in the samples used to do the simulations.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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Change from:
White to
Black
Hispanic
Other race/ethnicity
Aged 16–18 to
19–21
Never married to
Currently married
Div.-wid.-sep.
Highest grade 12 to
< 10
10–11
> 12
Not receiving AFDC to
Current AFDC receipt
Not receiving Food Stamps to
Current Food Stamp receipt

Weighted
awareness
term

Overall
effect

Weighted
acceptance
term

Percent
of overall

3.9275
1.0273
2.8539

(0.1724) 3.0290
(0.0415) 0.5037
(0.1085) −2.4043

(0.1451)
77.12
(0.0249)
49.03
(0.1197) −84.25

(0.49)
(0.75)
(5.34)

−2.3024

(0.0867) −0.5579

(0.0272)

24.23

−1.5024
−1.1802

(0.0587) 0.6539
(0.0922) −2.5635

−2.0172
−1.7373
1.0272

Percent
of overall
(0.0322) 22.88
(0.0189) 50.97
(0.1592) 184.25

(0.49)
(0.75)
(5.34)

(0.54) −1.7445

(0.0634)

75.77

(0.54)

(0.0321) −43.52
(0.1267) 217.21

(1.63) −2.1563
(7.55) 1.3833

(0.0833) 143.52
(0.0481) −117.21

(1.63)
(7.55)

(0.0973) −2.0554
(0.0661) −0.4037
(0.0355) −0.0518

(0.0984)
(0.0200)
(0.0025)

101.89
23.24
−5.04

(0.00) 0.0381
(0.50) −1.3336
(0.16) 1.0790

(0.0014) −1.89
(0.0487) 76.76
(0.0375) 105.04

(0.05)
(0.51)
(0.15)

−2.3463

(0.0926)

1.2829

(0.0633) −54.68

(2.33) −3.6292

(0.1378) 154.68

(2.33)

6.5595

(0.2010)

0.1105

(0.0054)

(0.06)

(0.1971)

(0.07)

1.68

0.8985
0.5236
5.2582
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Table 6.19 JTPA Simulation Results—Two-Step Decomposition
weighted Effects of Changes in Characteristics on the Probability of Acceptance into JTPA
national JTPA Study Eligible nonparticipant Sample: Female youth (701 observations)

6.4490

98.32

Two most recent labor force
statuses from employed →
employed to
Unemployed → employed
OLF → employed
Employed → unemployed
Unemployed → unemployed
OLF → unemployed
Employed → OLF
Unemployed → OLF
OLF → OLF
No child < 6 years of age to
child < 6 years
Family income < $3,000 to
$3,000–$9,000
$9,000–$15,000
> $15,000
Corpus Christi site to
Fort Wayne site
Jersey City site
Providence site

9.5744
11.3506
24.0502
17.0906
21.6456
8.6803
7.1564
4.6998

(0.2550)
(0.2832)
(0.4336)
(0.4181)
(0.4132)
(0.2773)
(0.2625)
(0.1774)

−1.3768

−0.4118
−1.8182
−1.4540
1.2007
0.3991
1.4078
3.3152
−1.0262

(0.0203) −4.30
(0.0898) −16.02
(0.0712) −6.05
(0.0580)
7.03
(0.0197)
1.84
(0.0686)
16.22
(0.1614)
46.32
(0.0503) −21.84

(0.18)
(0.81)
(0.31)
(0.29)
(0.09)
(0.52)
(0.97)
(0.98)

9.9862
13.1688
25.5041
15.8899
21.2465
7.2725
3.8412
5.7260

(0.2662)
(0.3136)
(0.4422)
(0.3908)
(0.4105)
(0.2306)
(0.1313)
(0.2065)

104.30
116.02
106.05
92.97
98.16
83.78
53.68
121.84

(0.18)
(0.81)
(0.32)
(0.29)
(0.08)
(0.53)
(0.97)
(0.99)

(0.0594) −0.8447

(0.0417)

61.36

(0.74) −0.5320

(0.0210)

38.64

(0.74)

−0.8170
−0.7310
8.3821

(0.0328) 0.1014
(0.0416) −0.9901
(0.2512) −1.1948

(0.0050) −12.41
(0.0490) 135.45
(0.0593) −14.25

(0.43) −0.9184
(1.50) 0.2591
(0.59) 9.5768

(0.0366) 112.41
(0.0101) −35.45
(0.2877) 114.25

(0.43)
(1.50)
(0.59)

3.5282
0.3881
3.5378

(0.1269) 0.3522
(0.0532) −1.5274
(0.1675) −2.1585

(0.0173)
9.98
(0.0769) −393.62
(0.1040) −61.01

(0.1138) 90.02
(0.0728) 493.62
(0.2075) 161.01

(0.30)
(69.53)
(3.86)

(0.30)
(69.52)
(3.86)

3.1761
1.9155
5.6963

NOTE: Simulations use National JTPA Study data. Bootstrap standard errors appear in parentheses. These standard errors reflect variation
in the samples used to do the simulations.
SOURCE: Heckman and Smith (2004).
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application/acceptance given awareness. Omitting the stages of eligibility and enrollment allows us to simulate using the same ENP and
control data from the National JTPA Study that we use to estimate the
conditional probabilities of awareness and of application/acceptance.
Omitting the enrollment stage allows us to include variables representing recent labor force status transitions, which are not available in the
treatment group data we use to estimate the probability of enrollment.
Otherwise, the format of the tables and the construction of the individual terms parallels that for the decompositions already discussed.
The basic patterns for those variables, such as age and schooling,
included in the earlier decompositions remain essentially the same as
for the decompositions previously discussed, so we do not dwell on
them here. Of great interest are the decompositions of the overall effects of family receipt of AFDC and Food Stamps on the application/
acceptance probabilities. The overall effect of AFDC receipt is negative for all four groups. For both groups of adults, the overall effect
decomposes into a small effect due to awareness, combined with a large
negative effect of living in a family receiving AFDC on the probability
of application/acceptance conditional on awareness. For male youth,
living in a family receiving AFDC has negative effects of equal size on
awareness and on application/acceptance given awareness. For female
youth positive awareness and negative application and acceptance effects cancel to yield a small overall effect.
All four demographic groups show a positive impact of living in a
family receiving Food Stamps on the probability of application/acceptance. For all the groups except female youth, this effect decomposes
into roughly equal positive effects of Food Stamp receipt on the probabilities of awareness and of application/acceptance conditional on
awareness. For female youth, the contribution of the awareness term
is negligible, leaving the impact of living in a family receiving Food
Stamps on application/acceptance to dominate the overall effect. Interpreting the effect of AFDC receipt as measuring the difference between
receiving both AFDC and Food Stamps and just Food Stamps, we find
that AFDC receipt primarily discourages application/acceptance.
Finally, examination of the decompositions for the variables representing the two most recent labor force statuses at the time of random
assignment or eligibility screening shows that in all cases it is the effect
of these statuses on the probability of application/acceptance condi-
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tional on awareness that accounts for their large positive effects on the
unconditional probability of application/acceptance. The estimated effects of labor force status transitions on awareness are small and are
of mixed sign, with negative estimated effects usually associated with
transitions out of the labor force.
These decompositions offer unique insights regarding the effects
of characteristics such as race, age, education, transfer program participation, labor force status, and family income on the various stages
of the process by which individuals select and are selected into the
JTPA program. For many characteristics, such as race and ethnicity,
the same characteristic has competing effects at different stages of the
process. Other characteristics, such as age among adults, operate in the
same direction on the conditional probabilities of program eligibility,
awareness, application/acceptance, and formal enrollment. Sorting out
the effects of particular characteristics at each step enriches our understanding of the overall participation process and demonstrates quite
clearly that much of the action in terms of subgroup differences arises
at stages in the participation process over which JTPA staff have little
or no control.

SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS
This chapter lays out a framework for studying the determinants
of participation in social programs using data on random samples of
individuals at each stage in the participation process. We outline the
evidence our framework can provide regarding cream skimming by
program staff, perhaps motivated by the incentives resulting from
administrative performance standards, in the context of what we call
mutually voluntary programs. In such programs, participation depends
on the choices of both potential participants and program staff. In that
context, our framework can provide only suggestive evidence for or
against cream skimming based on characteristics observed by both the
researcher and the program staff, except in the special case where program staff completely control certain stages of the process. Except in
that special case, our framework cannot provide the sort of definitive
positive evidence of caseworker responses to performance incentives
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obtained by studies that rely on exogenous variation in the existence or
nature of those incentives, such as Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forthcoming). When caseworkers (or other program staff) have little or no
control over specific stages of the process, our framework also reveals
the importance of factors other than cream skimming in generating differences in participation among groups.
We apply our framework to data from the JTPA program, which
allows us to decompose participation into the stages of eligibility,
awareness, application/acceptance, and enrollment. From the perspective of this volume, two major empirical findings emerge from this
analysis. Although they arise from data on JTPA, the similarity between
JTPA and other programs (including its successor WIA) documented in
Chapter 2 suggests that they likely apply more broadly.
The first major finding is that much of the action in terms of differences in participation rates across groups occurs at stages in the
participation process over which program staff have little or no control.
This finding highlights the dangers of inferring cream skimming from
simple comparisons of program participants and program eligibles.
The second major finding is that we find only modest evidence of
cream skimming at the stages of the participation process where JTPA
caseworkers arguably do have some influence, namely enrollment, and
to a lesser extent, application and acceptance. Several factors may account for this lack of strong evidence, particularly relative to the amount
of attention cream skimming receives in discussions of performance
management systems for employment and training programs.
First, caseworkers may have goals that conflict with those of the
performance management system. Given the relatively indirect and
low-powered incentives offered by the system, they may choose to indulge those goals. Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) use data from
Corpus Christi, the only site in the NJS to collect good data on applicants, to study the transition from application to enrollment. They find
evidence that caseworkers prefer applicants with relatively weak, rather
than relatively strong, expected labor market outcomes in the absence
of the program. This suggests that caseworker preferences for serving
the most disadvantaged may overcome the incentives provided by the
performance standards system in some contexts.
Second, JTPA caseworkers faced many constraints other than the
performance standards system. Local JTPA offices faced political con-
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straints emanating from politicians, businesspeople, community groups,
and service providers. For example, Smith (1992) shows that three of
the four sites analyzed here underserve (relative to its representation in
the eligible population) the race/ethnic group locally in the majority,
even when that group is black. This may reflect political pressures to
cater to marginal voting blocks. Some or all of these other pressures
may weigh against the incentives for cream skimming provided by the
performance measures. They may also lead program staff to focus on
alternative forms of strategic behavior aimed at improving their measured performance, such as those discussed in Chapter 7.
Third, Courty, Kim, and Marschke (forthcoming) suggest a role
for the regression model developed by the USDOL and used to adjust
the performance standards faced by local JTPA offices for differences
in participants’ observed characteristics. Although optional for states
at the time, all of the states with sites in the NJS used the regression
adjustment model. The model relied on data from prior years on the
relationship between participants’ characteristics and their postprogram
labor market outcomes. If the model worked as intended, it should have
diminished or even eliminated the incentive sites faced to cream-skim
based on the observed characteristics included in the adjustment model.
Many of those same characteristics appear in our model, with the result
that if the regression adjustment did its job, we should not expect to find
much evidence of cream skimming in our analysis. Of course, program
staff may still have tried very hard to select participants based on characteristics not included in the adjustment model.
Fourth, the empirical patterns generated by participant choices may
simply overshadow the efforts of the caseworkers, even at the stages of
the participation process where caseworkers have the most influence.
Overall, the results of our empirical analysis provide valuable insights into the importance of cream skimming under JTPA and suggest
the value of a similar but richer analysis using data from the current
WIA program.
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notes
1. In addition to issues related to the effects of performance standards, Heckman and
Smith (2004) focus on how decomposing the participation process illuminates the
causes of differences in program participation across groups more generally and
how it contributes to the selection and specification of econometric evaluation
estimators.
2. More recent work in this area includes Aizer (2007); Bitler, Currie, and Scholz
(2003); Burton, Macher, and Mayo (2007); Dahan and Nisan (2009); and Kleven
and Kopczuk (2008).
3. A related literature considers how participants get allocated to services within programs that provide more than one service. See Plesca and Smith (2007) and Mitnik
(2009) and the references therein.
4. The act also specifies additional eligibility criteria for several small groups. In the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) data used in our analysis, we
are not able to accurately measure foster child status, disability, or homelessness
on a monthly basis, and so are unable to implement the special eligibility rules
applicable to these groups in selecting our sample of eligibles. However, these
groups represent a very small portion of the overall eligible population, and many
of those eligible under the special provisions will also be eligible under the basic
family income and program participation criteria described in the text.
5. Program year 1991 covers the period from July 1991 to June 1992.
6. Two other details regarding JTPA eligibility deserve note. First, the implementation of the rules varied somewhat across localities, as states and training centers
had some discretion over exactly what did and did not constitute family income
and what did and did not constitute a family for the purposes of the program.
Devine and Heckman (1996) find these differences too small to affect the patterns
discussed here. Second, the eligibility rules described here are those in place at
the time our data were collected. Some small changes in rules took place after that
time; see Devine and Heckman (1996) or USDOL (1993).
7. See Doolittle and Traeger (1990) for a discussion of the implementation of the
NJS and Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996) for summaries of the impact
estimates.
8. Appendices A and B in Heckman and Smith (2003) provide additional detail regarding the NJS and SIPP samples used in our analyses.
9. Doolittle and Traeger (1990), Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993), and Orr et
al. (1996) all provide even more detail about the sites in the National JTPA Study.
10. We present mean derivatives and not derivatives evaluated at the mean of the x.
That is, we calculate the derivative (or finite difference for binary variables) for
each observation and report the (weighted) sample mean. The literature sometimes
refers to these as mean marginal effects. The standard errors take account of the
use of multiple observations on the same individuals.
11. The English language ability variable should be interpreted with caution as it
arises from different underlying measures in the ENP and control group samples.
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12.
13.
14.

15.

For the ENPs, lack of English ability is measured by the language in which the
respondent chose to complete the baseline survey, while for the controls it is obtained from a question on language preference administered around the time of
random assignment.
Appendix C of Heckman and Smith (2003) provides additional details regarding
the methods used to obtain the reported results.
Heckman and Smith (1999) discuss the importance of these variables at greater
length. See also Card and Sullivan (1988) and Dolton and Smith (2010).
Heckman, Smith and Taber (1998) discuss nonenrollment within the experimental treatment group and its implications for the evaluation of JTPA. See also the
general discussions of treatment group dropout and control group substitution in
Heckman et al. (2000) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
Appendix C of Heckman and Smith (2003) contains a detailed discussion of the
simulations.
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Measuring Government Performance
An Overview of Dysfunctional Responses
Pascal Courty
Gerald Marschke

Explicit performance measurement systems may elicit unintended
and dysfunctional responses, also known as gaming responses. Understanding when such responses take place, their extent and their nature,
is essential for improving the design of measurement systems and the
overall effectiveness of performance incentives. This concern is reflected
in the recent growth in empirical studies focusing on unintended behavioral responses to explicit incentives. We review this literature and try
to provide a unifying framework to put into perspective the various
classes of dysfunctional responses that have been identified in practice.
We use this framework to discuss implications for the design of performance measurement systems.
The performance measure is the rule used to collect and aggregate
the data generated by the agent’s actions. The performance outcome
is the value generated when that rule is applied to specific data. The
next section proposes a formal classification of dysfunctional responses
based on the terminology of the multitasking literature. Dysfunctional
responses occur when the performance measure does not communicate
correctly the marginal impact of decision making on the true objective of the organization. We distinguish three kinds of dysfunctional
responses: 1) accounting manipulations, which are responses that boost
the performance outcome but have no other impact on the organization;
2) gaming responses, which boost the performance outcome and have
a negative impact on the organization; and 3) marginal misallocations,
which have a positive impact on the organization but are suboptimal in
the sense that alternative allocations would have a higher impact.
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This classification is useful because it can help guide the organization’s response to different dysfunctional behaviors. In the case of
accounting manipulation, for example, the organization only has to
invert the performance inflation relation and appropriately discount the
rewards to performance achievement. If this cannot be done satisfactorily, however, accounting manipulations will have an indirect negative
impact on the organization because the information contained in performance outcomes may be misinterpreted. Gaming responses should
unambiguously be eliminated as they have both a direct negative impact
on the organization (misallocation of resources) and an indirect one
(misinterpretation of outcomes). Marginal misallocations often originate from the fact that the performance measure is too coarse and does
not capture some dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to
complement the performance measure with finer measures or with alternative evaluation methods (i.e., subjective performance evaluation).1
After that we summarize the empirical literature on dysfunctional
responses to performance measurement systems in public and private sector organizations, with an emphasis on the former. We then
review the evidence on dysfunctional responses in the JTPA organization. Our point of departure is the earlier discussion of the weaknesses
of the JTPA incentive system presented in Chapter 4. We exploit the
analytical framework introduced there to understand the sources and
consequences of dysfunctional responses. We conclude that section
with some thoughts on the implications of the JTPA experience for WIA
and its new performance incentive system.
The chapter ends with an assessment of the extent to which dysfunctional responses may impede the performance of measurement
systems and draws lessons for policymakers. An important lesson of
this review is that much progress has been made in identifying dysfunctional responses. A growing literature has produced studies that go
beyond anecdotal reports and impressionistic evidence and try to identify dysfunctional behavior and measure performance inflation. Still, we
find that this literature typically focuses on a narrow set of responses. In
addition, the evidence reviewed rarely addresses the fundamental efficiency question of measuring the welfare impact of the dysfunctional
responses identified. These conclusions suggest that much work is still
necessary to further our understanding of dysfunctional behavior.
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Before proceeding, we should acknowledge that others have discussed the existence of problems with performance measurement in
both private and public organizations. See in particular Prendergast
(1999), Propper and Wilson (2003), and Smith (1995). Other chapters
in this book also discuss problems with performance measurement
in JTPA and WIA. The main contribution of this chapter is to focus
exclusively on the issue of dysfunctional responses, leaving aside more
general problems associated with performance measurement, and to try
to provide a comprehensive overview of such responses. To achieve
this goal, we provide a theoretical framework to develop a formal
classification of dysfunctional responses. This classification is useful
to understand the practical challenges of identifying dysfunctional
responses, to evaluate the negative impact of such responses, and to
formulate appropriate remedies. We hope that this formal framework
will be helpful in understanding the difficulties organizations face to
correctly measure and reward productivity, and ultimately that it will
support the design of more effective models of performance measurement and incentive systems.

DEFInITIOnS OF DySFUnCTIOnAL RESPOnSES
A central assumption of the incentive literature is that performance
measurement influences behavior, and most importantly, that it may be
sometimes difficult to anticipate how it does so. Performance measures
encourage the right kind of behavioral responses only if they successfully communicate the organization’s true objectives. In an early
discussion of the subject, Blau (1955) warns that if performance measures are not perfectly aligned with the organization’s objective, they
may generate, in addition to intended responses, what could be called
unintended or dysfunctional responses.
A dysfunctional response is an action that increases the performance measure but is unsupported by the designer because it does
not efficiently further the true objective of the organization (see, for
example, Kerr [1975] and Jensen and Meckling [1992]). The multitasking framework captures the notion that the investment allocation
that maximizes performance outcomes does not necessarily correspond
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to the allocation that maximizes value added (Baker 1992; Holmstrom
and Milgrom 1991).2
Although all dysfunctional responses share the general property
that they were not intended by the incentive designer, there are types
of dysfunctional responses that correspond to different ways in which
the measurement technology may be imperfect. To provide a more precise classification of dysfunctional responses, we borrow the language
of the multitasking literature. The starting point of this literature is to
assume that the agent invests in tasks. One could think of a task as a
project. In the context of JTPA, for example, a task could be a single
enrollee or a group of enrollees. The agent has to allocate resources
across tasks and the issue is how the performance measure guides, or
misguides, the agent’s resource allocation. Each task is characterized by
its type a. The agent privately observes the task’s type a and invests in
effort, e. The performance outcome for task a is
Ma(e,g) = mae.
We assume without loss of generality that ma ≥ 0. Our specification
ignores additive performance measurement noise.3 This assumption is
not restrictive for the analysis, which focuses on defining dysfunctional
responses.4 The principal’s objective or social value added on task a is
Va(e) = vae.
Finally, we assume that investment in effort is costly:
Ca(e,g) = (½)cae2,
where ca ≥ 0. The performance outcome is
M = Sa Ma(e).
The fundamental assumption of the multitasking literature is that
the principal can observe only M. The performance measure, however, is an imperfect measure of the agent’s effectiveness because it
aggregates the outcome of multiple tasks. As a result, the performance
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measure may not be aligned with the true objective of the principal.
Stated formally, this will be the case when the marginal return of effort
on the measure is not the same as the marginal return of effort on the
principal’s objective, ma ≠ va.
Several comments are in order. First, this setup focuses exclusively
on problems that are associated with the inadequacy of the measure
to convey the true objective. It omits problems relating to the principal’s ability to select the right measure and implement it properly and
to the agent’s willingness or capacity to respond to performance measurement. Although we briefly discuss the limitations imposed by these
assumptions next, see Smith (1995) and Kravchuk and Schack (1996)
for a more complete discussion of the problems that emerge when these
assumptions do not hold. Some of these additional concerns regarding
the implementation of performance measurement are also discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4.
Second, the multitasking framework assumes that the principal’s
objective, Va(e), is well defined. In practice, performance measurement
sometimes fails because the principal’s objective is poorly defined or
because the principal must strike a compromise between potentially
conflicting goals. Our analysis does not address these problems. Consider next our assumption that the agent chooses the resource allocation
that achieves the highest outcome on the performance measures. This
assumption rules out the possibility that the agent has his/her own
preferences over resource allocation that conflict with performance
measurement. It also rules out the possibility that the agent is actually an organizational unit composed of multiple decision makers with
conflicting objectives, as is frequently the case in the real world. In
addition, we assume that the agent understands the technology of production of the performance measure, Ma(e). Finally, our model abstracts
from issues related to the dynamics of performance measurement. Here
we consider a static model, ignoring the possibility that the principal
may change the performance measure and the potential dysfunctional
responses associated with such a possibility (Courty and Marschke
2003a).
Keeping these qualifications in mind, our setup suggests a formal
definition of dysfunctional responses. A dysfunctional response is an
investment choice that is different from the investment choice that max-

208 Courty and Marschke

imizes the organizational goal. Formally, an agent who maximizes the
performance outcome invests
ea = ma/ca
in task a, while the investment that maximizes the organizational objective is
*e = v /c .
a
a a
A dysfunctional response occurs when ea ≠ *ea. We distinguish three
types of dysfunctional responses:
1) Marginal misallocation: actions that enter the principal’s objective but are distorted in the performance measure. Formally,
ma ≠ va > 0 and ca > 0. To illustrate, consider the case of performance measurement in schools (Jacob 2005; Hannaway 1992).
In recent years some policy analysts and public officials have
advocated setting up performance measures for local school
districts, possibly backed by educational subsidies as incentives
(e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2002). Such performance
measures are based on scores from standardized tests of reading,
writing, and arithmetic. These tests do not measure the results
of teaching citizenship, conflict resolution, and interpersonal
skills—skills that are an important aim of primary schools.
Because the tests do not measure citizenship, for example, the
theory predicts that teachers will invest less, or possibly neglect
altogether, this skill. Instituting performance measurement can
produce distortions by causing agents to spend little time on
activities that are productive but not fully taken into account in
the performance measure.
2) Accounting manipulation: actions that increase the performance measure but do not enter the principal’s objective and
do not enter the cost function. Formally, ma > 0 and va = ca =
0. Accounting manipulations are activities that boost the performance measure and do not waste resources. Such responses
are informally known as “cooking the books” or “window
dressing.” Accounting manipulation increases the agent’s
chances of earning the rewards associated with higher perfor-
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mance outcomes. They may not create welfare loss since the
organization could, in principle, neutralize this behavior by
appropriately discounting the rewards to higher performance
outcomes (Courty and Marschke 2004). If such adjustment in
rewards is possible, this class of dysfunctional responses does
not have direct inefficiency implications (since ea = ea on all
tasks that actually enter the organization’s objective). Often,
however, the principal may not be aware of such responses.
When this is the case, the informative power of the performance measure decreases and the principal may overreward
those agents who invest more in accounting manipulation.
Such dysfunctional manipulation would have indirect negative
efficiency impacts on the organization.
3) Gaming: actions that increase the performance outcome negatively enhance the principal’s objective and/or positively
increase the cost function. Formally, ma > 0, va ≤ 0, and ca ≥ 0,
with at least one of the last two inequalities strict. The distinction between accounting manipulation and gaming is that the
latter imposes a cost to the organization because the agent ends
up wasting resources to boost performance. For example, if
the activities involved in “cooking the books” waste resources,
then they fall within the category of gaming. Gaming implies
not only some kind of accounting manipulation but also a costly
misallocation of resources.
This classification is useful because the organization’s optimal
response depends on the type of dysfunctional behavior under consideration. As mentioned earlier, the organization does not care
about accounting manipulation if it can invert the performance inflation relation and appropriately discount the rewards to performance
achievement. If this cannot be done satisfactorily, then accounting
manipulations will have an indirect negative impact on the organization. Gaming responses should unambiguously be eliminated as they
have both a direct negative impact (ea ≠ ea) and an indirect impact on
the organization. Marginal misallocations often originate from the fact
that the performance measure is too coarse and does not capture some
dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to complement the
performance measure with additional measures or with alternative evaluation methods (i.e., subjective performance evaluation).
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REvIEw OF EvIDEnCE OF DySFUnCTIOnAL RESPOnSES
In PUBLIC AnD PRIvATE SECTORS
Casual reports of dysfunctional responses to performance incentives abound. Although sometimes insightful, such accounts only give
a very impressionistic view of the actual extent and impact of such
responses. It is typically not possible to establish on the basis of such
reports the amount of performance inflation that actually goes on, or to
determine the existence of welfare loss. To draw relevant lessons for the
design of performance measurement systems, one must develop systematic methods to identify and measure distortions. We start by discussing
why it is difficult to systematically measure dysfunctional responses in
practice. Next, we review different methods that have been successful
at producing hard empirical evidence on dysfunctional responses.
Challenges in Identifying Dysfunctional Responses
Several difficulties arise when one tries to assess the extent of
dysfunctional behavior. To start, demonstrating the existence of dysfunctional responses involves estimating relationships that are typically
hidden from the researcher. One needs to identify actions that are not
perfectly aligned with the principal’s objective. Using the notation of
the model, one needs to show that ma ≠ va, and also possibly that ca > 0,
depending on the type of dysfunctional responses considered. But the
researcher does not typically observe the marginal impacts of decision
making on the production and cost functions.
To illustrate, consider the case of marginal misallocation.
Researchers who study agent responses to performance measures often
find evidence of actions that raise performance outcomes, but then
find it difficult to demonstrate that these actions are suboptimal (i.e.,
to show that these responses are not the ones that maximize the stated
objective of the organization). The difficulty lies in establishing the
counterfactual of what the agent’s value added would have been absent
the agent’s actions. Consider the cream skimming literature in job
training programs that has studied enrollment responses to performance
measurement in the JTPA organization (Chapters 6 and 9). Critics of
JTPA’s performance incentive system feared that the measures used,
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which focus on labor market success (e.g., employment status) at the
end of training, would encourage managers to enroll only those participants likely to perform well on employment measures—the most
“job ready”—irrespective of how much they might gain from the program (that is, increase their human capital). Some studies have found
evidence that program managers prefer the job ready, but this alone is
not evidence of dysfunctional responses. To demonstrate dysfunctional
response, one must show that the job-ready applicants are also those
who do not benefit the most from the program (see Chapters 5 and 8, and
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith [2002]). Using our notation, although it
seems intuitive that ma /ca is high for the job ready, one needs to prove
that va /ca is low for this target population to establish the existence of
marginal misallocation.
The literature has circumvented this challenge by focusing on incentive schemes where dysfunctional responses can be unambiguously
identified from the specifics of the contract. A substantial fraction of
the literature focuses on accounting manipulation responses where the
agent uses its discretion over the timing and reporting of performance
outcomes to meet performance thresholds (Asch 1990; Courty and
Marschke 2004; Healy 1985; Jacob and Levitt 2003; Oettinger 2002;
and Oyer 1998). The advantage of focusing on such timing and misreporting strategies is that the observed responses can only be consistent
with the specifics of the contract. Using the notation introduced earlier,
these actions are unambiguously dysfunctional since ma > 0 while va = 0.
The main shortcomings of this approach, however, are that it can be
applied only to a narrow set of dysfunctional responses and requires
detailed information on the contracts and behavior that is often hidden
from the researcher. Another shortcoming of this approach is that it will
work only to identify accounting manipulations, to the extent that ca = 0,
and such responses are likely to have lower direct efficiency impact
than the other two types of dysfunctional responses.
A final approach to identify dysfunctional responses focuses on
changes in performance outcomes that follow the introduction of a new
performance measure. We discuss this approach in more detail in the
next section.
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Evidence of Dysfunctional Responses
Propper and Wilson (2003) present some evidence of dysfunctional
responses in their review of the empirical literature on the use and usefulness of performance measures in the public sector. In this section,
we review some of this evidence, as well as new evidence, using the
classification presented above.
health sector
Dranove et al. (2003) study whether the introduction of report cards
changes how health care providers select patients. Report cards provide information about the performance of hospitals. Skeptics argue
that health report cards may encourage providers to game the system
by cream skimming, that is, by avoiding sick and/or seeking healthy
patients. Their evidence shows that report cards led to substantial selection by providers, with a decline in the illness severity of patients, a
finding consistent with a cream skimming hypothesis. They conclude
that the overall impact of the report card was to reduce welfare. This
evidence is consistent with marginal misallocation, since performance measurement generates a reallocation of resources that reduces
efficiency.
Goddard et al. (2000) present a general discussion of the difficulties
in implementing performance measurement. They consider the impact
of the “Performance Framework,” an initiative by the UK National
Health Service to increase the importance attached to formal performance indicators in the health sector. They present qualitative interview
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that performance measurement
may generate a wide range of unintended responses.
School and training program
Jacob and Levitt (2003) investigate teacher cheating, a behavioral
response consistent with accounting manipulation. Some school districts allocate school budgets on the basis of schools’ performance. A
number of highly publicized incidents of teacher cheating have fueled
the suspicion that teachers have responded by “teaching the test” and
manipulating students’ grade-to-grade promotions to boost scores.
However, most of this evidence is anecdotal. Jacob and Levitt propose
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an innovative way to measure the extent of teacher cheating that combines measures on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious
patterns of answers for students. They show that the joint distribution
of these two variables should demonstrate systematic patterns if some
teachers cheat and others do not.
Jacob (2005) presents some evidence of marginal misallocation.
He examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in
the Chicago Public Schools in 1996–1997. He finds that math and
reading achievement increased sharply following the introduction of
the accountability policy. He also finds that teachers responded strategically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions—by increasing
special education placements, preemptively retaining students, and substituting away from low-stakes subjects like science and social studies.
Oettinger (2002) presents a study of academic performance evaluations and shows that undergraduate students respond to nonlinear
incentives. Due to the threshold effects implied by a discrete grade
system, students tend to cluster slightly above grade boundaries. Using
our terminology, this evidence is consistent with marginal misallocation because students strategically change effort decisions to meet
performance thresholds, a behavior that is unlikely to be efficient. In
fact, Oettinger’s evidence suggests that the performance incentive generates allocations of effort over the duration of the term that depend on
the realized grade history. The efficient allocation of effort, however,
should not depend on grade history.
Burgess et al. (2003) evaluate the impact of a pilot incentive scheme
in Jobcentre Plus, a large UK public job training agency, and present
some evidence of marginal misallocation. The incentive scheme they
consider gives team bonuses for five different targets that measure with
varying degrees of precision the bureaucrats’ effectiveness at placing
the unemployed into jobs. The authors hypothesize that in such a multitasking environment, where different tasks are measured with different
degrees of precision, workers may choose to exert effort on the tasks
for which their actions are more easily verifiable. Consistent with this
hypothesis, they find an impact on job placement (quantity measure)
but little impact on less precise measures (quality measures).
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Private sector: managers and salespeople
Explicit performance measures are commonly used in private
sector occupations such as firm executives (using both accounting and
stock market based measures) and salespeople.5 Evidence of accounting
manipulations from these occupations abounds. In an early contribution
to the accounting manipulation literature, Healy (1985) documents that
managers who are compensated for meeting annual income thresholds
use their discretion over the timing of income reporting to smooth their
compensation across accounting years. Similarly, Oyer (1998) uses differences in the date of the end of the fiscal year for companies that are
otherwise similar to show that there is more variability in firms’ sales
at the end of the fiscal years—when salespersons’ bonuses are computed—than in the middle. Oyer’s evidence should be interpreted as
accounting manipulation, if salespeople only manipulate sales reports.
Alternatively, if salespeople reallocate effort over the accounting year,
then the evidence should be interpreted as marginal misallocation.6
Gibbs et al. (2009) present some evidence that incentive designers
are aware of marginal misallocations and actually structure measurement systems to address such problems. They use data on incentive
contracts for auto dealership managers to investigate whether incentive
designers internalize multitasking concerns. They show that incentive
designers select pools of incentive measures that complement each
other, and set the relative weights on the different measures selected to
address multitasking concerns. For example, the extent to which a measure distorts incentives (by discouraging cooperation or encouraging
a short-term focus) reduces the weight it receives. In addition, firms
use additional performance bonuses, based on subjective performance
evaluation, to balance multitasking and manipulation incentives.

EvIDEnCE FROM JTPA
This section reviews the evidence of dysfunctional responses in the
JTPA organization. Here we draw from our own work but also refer to
the work of Heckman and Smith presented in Chapter 6 and Heinrich
in Chapter 8 of this monograph. The evidence presented in this section
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builds upon the characteristics of the JTPA incentive system presented
in Chapter 4 (see also Courty and Marschke [2003b] ).
We present two kinds of evidence. The first summarizes the econometric evidence of behavioral responses to JTPA’s attempts to evaluate
organizational performance, as well as estimates of the costs that are
incurred when performance measures lead to dysfunctional behavior.
This evidence establishes a clear link between the specifics of the incentive policies faced by bureaucrats and their behavior. The second kind
of evidence is based on survey data of self-reported behavior. This evidence reviews a wider set of hypotheses regarding the implications of
the incentive system but because the evidence is based on self-reported
behavior, the inference is more anecdotal in nature and sometimes subject to interpretation.
Timing Strategies
Using data from the National JTPA Study, we document how in
the first decade of JTPA, agencies delayed terminating unemployed
enrollees, even after their training concluded, to maximize the performance outcomes (Courty and Marschke 1997, 2004). This strategic
termination behavior can be of two types. The first type takes advantage
of the fact that training agencies do not need to report the employment
status of the enrollees who have completed their training on the date
training ends but have a 90-day window to do so. Because labor market
outcomes vary over time naturally on their own, training agencies
have an incentive to strategically choose the date they report enrollees’
employment outcomes. At the end of an enrollee’s training, training
agencies face a decision: terminate the enrollee and report her labor
market outcomes or postpone termination in hopes that the outcome
improves. The optimal termination strategy leads the training agency
to terminate enrollees who are employed within the 90-day period following training either on the last day of training or on the first day
of employment, whichever occurs first, and all others on the 90th day
following training end. Courty and Marschke (2004) report evidence
consistent with this hypothesis. They find that this strategic reporting
increases the overall employment rate at termination, which was the
most important performance measure at the time, by 11.3 percentage
points, from 47.0 percent to 58.3 percent. Stated differently, training
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agencies in their study would produce an employment rate outcome 20
percent lower if they were required to graduate enrollees (and report
their performance outcomes) on the date they actually finish training.
The second type of strategic termination behavior takes place at
the end of the fiscal year. Consider a stylized two-program-year incentive system where the training agency receives an award if the yearly
labor market–based performance outcome exceeds a fixed performance
standard. The training agency does not know its final aggregate performance outcome until the end of the program year because the labor
market outcomes depend on random factors, such as the state of the
local economy, which are outside its control. Because of the graduation
strategy described above, the training agency reaches the end of the
year with an inventory of enrollees who have finished training within
the previous 90 days but are unemployed. At the end of the first program year, the training agency chooses how many from this inventory
to graduate in the present program year, with the remainder to be graduated in the following program year. Assume there are n such persons,
of whom n1 will be graduated in the first program year and n2 = n – n1
in the next one. The training agency chooses n1 to maximize the present
value of the sum of the two awards.
The optimal graduation strategy on the last day of the first program
year depends on the difference between the performance outcome and
the standard as the last day arrives. Let N = Ne + Nu be the number of
persons who were graduated during the year (excluding the year’s last
day), where Ne and Nu and are the numbers of such persons graduated
employed and unemployed, respectively. Let S be the performance
standard. Three cases can be distinguished (see Figure 7.1). In case 1, on
the last day of the year, the cumulative performance outcome exceeds
the standard by so much that the training agency can graduate all unemployed enrollees. This corresponds to the HIGH region in Figure 7.1.
In case 1, because Ne /(N+n) ≥ S , n1 = n. In case 2, which corresponds
to the MED region in Figure 7.1, the cumulative performance outcome
exceeds the standard, but not by much. In case 2, because graduating
all unemployed enrollees would push the outcome below the standard, it pays the training agency to graduate persons from its inventory
only until the performance outcome equals the performance stan-
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dard. That is, the training agency chooses n1 such that Ne /(N+n) = S .
Rearranging yields

Ne
− N.
S
This equation implies that n1 lies between zero and n, approaching
zero when the training agency just meets the standard and n when the
training agency outperforms the standard by n/N percentage points or
more. In case 3, corresponding to the LOW region in Figure 7.1, the
training agency fails to meet the standard at the end of the year (Ne /N ≤
S ). In this case, because it cannot win an award this year, the training
agency “takes a bath,” graduating all n persons from its inventory to
maximize the probability of an award next year.
Courty and Marschke (2004) find evidence that training agencies
pursued such a termination strategy. In particular, they found that JTPA
training agencies delayed graduating idle, unemployed enrollees longer
than idle, employed ones; graduated idle, unemployed enrollees sooner
if they finished in the last three months of the program year than if they
finished within the first nine months of the program year; and graduated
n1 =

Figure 7.1 The Graduation Decision
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unemployed enrollees who finished training in the last three months
of the program year sooner if the training agencies were doing either
very well or poorly relative to the employment standard. These findings
are consistent with the two-period graduation model. Thus the evidence
suggests that by timing performance measurement in this way, training
agencies boosted their performance and their awards without providing
higher-quality services or providing services more efficiently.
Courty and Marschke (2004) make the important distinction between
responses that divert resources (e.g., agents’ time) from productive
activities and responses that simply reflect an accounting phenomenon.
Using our terminology, the former would be labeled gaming and the
latter accounting manipulations. Others have documented timing strategies but have not shown any efficiency impact. Courty and Marschke,
however, provide evidence that the responses they identify, by consuming programmatic resources, have a negative impact on the true
goal of the organization and thus conclude that these responses are more
than a mere accounting phenomenon. They are evidence of gaming.
For example, they find that earnings impacts are lower in those training
agencies that engage more in termination strategies, which is consistent with the hypothesis that graduation timing is inefficient. In addition,
they find that year-end timing is inefficient on two counts. First, training
agencies are more likely to suddenly truncate training in June, an input
distortion that is a direct consequence of the strategic manipulation of
yearly performance that takes place in the month of June. Second, they
find that earnings impacts are lower for those enrollees who receive
training in June. They interpret this finding as evidence that training
agencies substitute time and effort away from training toward the end of
the program year.
Other Dysfunctional Responses
We review additional evidence also consistent with dysfunctional
behavior. To start, we show that accounting manipulation behavior is
not limited to the employment at termination performance measure by
presenting evidence from other performance measures. Then we present
evidence that the incentive system may also distort the enrollment decision and the training allocation decision.
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Manipulating the wage and earning measures
The graduation decision was also influenced by the other class
of JTPA performance measures: the performance measures based on
wages and earnings. Courty and Marschke (2004) focus on the optimal
termination strategy for employed enrollees. They show that training
agencies may choose to terminate employed enrollees who have little
chance of experiencing a wage increase, but wait on those employed
enrollees who have a high likelihood of experiencing a wage increase.
The training agency does not wait on all enrollees because by doing so it
might lose credit for some employment. This risk is significant because
approximately one-quarter of the enrolled who were employed on their
graduation date were not employed at the same job three months later.
The refined strategy that takes the wage measure into account implies
that some employed enrollees should be terminated later than is predicted under the simple strategy presented earlier. Focusing on the
enrollees who were employed at the end of training and who experienced a second employment spell under a new employer before the close
of the 90-day window, Courty and Marschke show that those enrollees
who experience a wage decrease are more likely to be terminated during
the first employment spell. They also show that those participants who
are graduated after the start of their secondary employment spell should
experience higher wage offers. They conclude that the covariation of
graduation delay and the wages in secondary employment spells appear
consistent with a graduation strategy that maximizes the wage and
earnings performance outcomes. This behavior qualifies as accounting
manipulation or gaming depending on its efficiency impact.
Manipulating the follow-up measures
The switch from termination-based follow-up measures may have
provoked several kinds of responses by local decision makers. First, the
follow-up measures may have encouraged training centers to emphasize
intensive training services (as opposed to employment-focused services,
such as job search) in the hopes of producing larger and longer-lasting
impacts on earnings and employment. Second, the follow-up measures
may have induced caseworkers to extend their contact with enrollees
beyond their termination dates. Courty and Marschke (2007) present
some evidence suggesting that the follow-up performance measures
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captured how effective training centers were at offering postprogram
“quick fixes” (such as transportation allowances) to enable the enrollees
to stay employed on the follow-up measurement date. These responses
qualify as marginal misallocation because such quick fixes, although
potentially productive, divert resources away from other activities that
would have increased long-term earning and employment.
Manipulating the cost measure
In addition to employment and wage/earning measures, in the
early years JTPA training centers faced a cost-based measure that
judged the program’s managers by how much they spent to produce
an employment at termination. The incentives inherent in the cost and
employment rate at termination measures were very similar (Courty
and Marschke 2007). Thus, in time, JTPA officials came to believe that
the cost measure also was encouraging short-run, “quick fix”–type job
placement activities in lieu of longer-term activities with more training
content. In 1990, when they replaced the termination-based measures
with follow-up-based measures, they also phased out the cost measure
because they believed “that the use of cost standards in the awarding of
incentives [had] the unintended effect of constraining the provision of
longer-term training programs” (italics ours) (Federal Register 1990).
Such responses—if they indeed occurred—belong to the category of
marginal misallocation.
Enrollment
Cream skimming—the use of the training center’s considerable
discretion to select enrollees on the basis of their expected effect on
performance outcomes—is the core concern of most empirical analyses of JTPA’s incentive system. The system judged training centers
on the basis of postprogram employment and earnings levels, whereas
the objective of training was skill development. Such performance outcomes induce training centers to choose persons with high levels of
human capital at the expense of persons who would most benefit from
training. The nature and evidence of cream skimming is discussed at
length in Chapters 6 and 9.
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Training selection
Researchers have also investigated the effects of JTPA performance
incentives on training centers’ training strategies. While training choice
has received less attention than the cream skimming issue, its study is
motivated by similar concerns—that short-term performance measures
encourage training centers to emphasize “quick fixes,” services that
have no long-term impact on enrollee skills.
Marschke (2002) studies the effects of two performance measure
reforms on the training strategies of JTPA training centers. In the early
1990s, the USDOL moved away from termination-based measures
toward performance measured three months after termination. The
USDOL also eliminated measures that rewarded training agencies
that kept low the average cost of training an enrollee. Both reforms
occurred in response to a growing perception that the training centers
were relying heavily on job-placement-oriented services at the expense
of more intensive kinds of training. Many policymakers also felt that
the typical JTPA training spell was too short to be effective (average
enrollment in the first decade of JTPA lasted only about five months).
Marschke (2002) finds that these performance reforms produced
mixed results. The switch to performance measurement three months
after training ends appeared to encourage agencies to offer the kinds
of intensive training that raise the long-term earnings abilities of JTPA
enrollees, but the impacts from this reform were offset by the elimination
of the cost measure. Apparently the cost measure had been discouraging
training agencies from offering classroom vocational training because it
was the longest and most expensive of the major kinds of training. After
the cost measure was removed, training agencies offered more classroom vocational training, but earnings impacts fell because classroom
vocational training produced the smallest earnings impacts of the main
kinds of training offered.7
In the context of the multitasking model, rewarding the employment
rate at termination measure, for example, was leading the center to prescribe training activities that increased the training center’s employment
rate but reduced the earnings ability of JTPA enrollees. The employment
rate at termination measure and earnings impacts are misaligned. The
cost measure, on the other hand, was leading training centers to favor
training types that increased both earnings impacts and the training cen-
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ter’s award. Thus, the cost measure, insofar as it discouraged the use of
vocational training, a relatively low-gain and high-cost activity, appears
to have been aligned. To conclude, this discussion presents some evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the choice of performance
measure influences the agent’s choice of resource allocation, and that
different performance measures are imperfect in different ways in the
sense that each produces different patterns of marginal misallocation.
General Test of Dysfunctional Responses
Courty and Marschke (2008) propose a different approach to identify dysfunctional responses. They look at how the correlation between
the objective of the organization and the performance measure changes
after a measure is introduced. The multitasking model predicts that this
correlation should decrease after a measure is introduced if the agent
engages in any kind of dysfunctional response. Courty and Marschke
conclude that one can identify dysfunctional responses by estimating
the change in correlation between a performance measure and the true
goal of the organization before and after the measure has been activated.
Using data from the JTPA incentive system, they test the hypothesis
for the introduction of the follow-up measures, which corresponds to
one of the most important changes in the history of JTPA’s incentive
system. They find some evidence consistent with the hypothesis and
draw implications for the choice of performance measures.
wIA
WIA’s performance incentive system is still relatively new and
therefore little studied. Nonetheless, the record on JTPA may allow us
to draw some conclusions about the performance of WIA’s system. As
Chapters 2 and 5 show, there are many similarities and some differences
between performance incentives under JTPA and performance incentives under WIA. As in JTPA, most of the performance measures in
WIA are based on enrollees’ labor market outcomes. All labor market
outcomes are measured after training ceases (as opposed to on the
date of termination), as in latter-day JTPA. Moreover, WIA focuses on
outcomes six months after job placement. In JTPA, performance outcomes were far more short term. This may be an improvement over
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JTPA in two ways. First, because labor market outcomes are measured
six months after an enrollee leaves the program, outcomes are harder
to manipulate in WIA by the strategic timing of graduation. Second,
measuring outcomes six months after graduation reduces the return
to “quick fix”–type training strategies. As the JTPA evidence seems
to show, longer-term measures lead to greater earnings gains from
training. WIA also reinstates cost measures, which the evidence seems
to show also improve earnings gains.
Interestingly, in its early years WIA includes among the JTPA-style
performance measures a before-after measure of enrollees’ earnings.
Conceptually, the difference between an enrollee’s earnings before
enrollment and after termination is more similar to an earnings or
employment gain—and thus more similar to the objective of job training
under JTPA and WIA—than is a posttraining labor outcome. While it is
more similar to a job training impact, a before-after earnings measure
also suffers from potential problems. For the average enrollee, earnings
dip just before entering job training, suggesting that her earnings would
eventually rise even if the job training program had no value. This
phenomenon, the so-called Ashenfelter dip, means that before-after
earnings differences are distorted measures of the true impact of job
training (see Heckman and Smith [1999] for a discussion of this point.)
Thus, whether before-after measures lead to less cream skimming is a
question that must be answered with empirical studies.

COnCLUSIOnS
This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of dysfunctional
responses covering theoretical concepts, empirical evidence from both
the public and private organizations, and summarizing studies of dysfunctional responses that focus on the JTPA organization. We assess the
extent to which dysfunctional responses may impede the performance
of the measurement system, and we draw lessons for policymakers.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that performance measures
elicit unanticipated responses because line workers and their managers
gain a superior understanding of how to influence these measures. Managers and workers acquire through their day-to-day operation of their
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programs an expert’s knowledge of the levers available to manipulate
performance outcomes. Because the designers of the performance
measures are remote from the everyday operations of the agencies
they oversee, they lack this knowledge. This information asymmetry
means that the designers of performance measures cannot anticipate
all behavioral responses ex ante. An implication is that dysfunctional
responses can present substantial challenges to the design of performance measurement systems. At least three lessons can be drawn from
the evidence.
1) Designers of performance measures should consider how local
decision makers respond to the performance measures and
accept that they cannot anticipate all responses. Most performance measures elicit unanticipated responses because agents
gradually gain a superior understanding of how to influence
them. Designers should encourage some of these unanticipated
responses and discourage others.
2) Designers should respond differently to different types of dysfunctional behavior. In the case of accounting manipulation, for
example, the organization only has to appropriately discount
the rewards to performance achievement. Gaming responses
should unambiguously be eliminated as they have both a
direct negative impact on the organization (misallocation of
resources) and an indirect one (misinterpretation of outcomes).
Marginal misallocations often originate from the fact that the
performance measure is too coarse and does not capture some
dimensions of value added. The typical remedy is to complement the performance measure with finer measures.
3) The evidence reinforces the conjecture that explicit performance measures impose costs—monitoring and improvement
consume resources (Prendergast 1999). Until performance
measure designers discover them, the dysfunctional responses
that imperfectly conceived performance measures engender
can undermine the organization’s mission. These costs make
the use of performance measurement systems uneconomical for
many public sector organizations because they raise more management problems than they solve. This may explain why such
organizations rarely implement explicit performance measures.
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In a separate line of research, we characterize a process by which
the designers of performance measures learn about and respond to local
decision maker responses (Courty and Marschke [2003a]; see also
Heinrich and Marschke [2010]). This feedback loop suggests that performance measurement systems must be continuously monitored and
improved. We conclude that implementation is not a static, one-time
challenge but a dynamic one.
An important lesson of this review is that much progress has been
made in identifying dysfunctional responses. A growing literature has
produced studies that go beyond casual reports and anecdotal evidence
and try to measure performance inflation and assess the impact of these
responses on the organization. Still, we find that this literature typically
focuses on a narrow set of responses. In addition, the evidence reviewed
rarely compellingly addresses the fundamental efficiency question of
measuring the welfare impact of the dysfunctional responses identified.
This suggests that there is still much work to be done to further our
understanding of dysfunctional behavior.
notes
We would like to thank James Heckman and Carolyn Heinrich.
1. Subjective performance evaluation is based on judgment and is more qualitative
and flexible than explicit performance incentives. Unlike explicit performance measures, subjective performance measures cannot be verified by outside parties and
therefore organizations cannot contract upon them.
2. The theoretical literature on incentive provision is reviewed in Gibbons (1997) and
Prendergast (1999). Marschke (2001), Courty and Marschke (2003a), and Propper and
Wilson (2003) also review this literature and draw implications specific to government organizations. Dixit (2002) and Burgess and Ratto (2003) review the broader
literature on organizational design and focus on issues that are specific to the public
sector. Interestingly, this framework was introduced to explain why high-powered
explicit incentives, whose canonical illustration is a piece rate system, appeared far
less frequently in practice than is predicted by standard principal-agent models. The
point of the theoretical literature on multitasking was to extend the principal-agent
model to accommodate the possibility that high-powered explicit incentives may
not be optimal when the principal cannot perfectly measure the objective she wants
the agent to pursue.
3. Our specification is very similar to the specification in Baker (2002), who assumes
that V = f.a + e and P = g.a + f, where f and g are vectors of marginal products
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4.
5.

6.
7.

of actions, a, in the principal’s objective and performance outcome equations. We
ignore the error terms e and f as they do not influence the agent’s action choice (see
the following note).
In the standard principal-agent model, measurement noise plays a role in the determination of the optimal contract, but it does not directly influence the agent’s
investment decisions.
When output can be measured, manual work is another occupation where explicit
performance measurement is common. In an unusual study, Lazear (2000), for example, discusses how an installer of automobile glass minimized the impact of potential dysfunctional responses to the introduction of piece rate rewards.
Asch (1990) also presents some evidence of reporting timing. She shows that navy
recruiters who receive awards for meeting year-end recruitment quotas respond by
reallocating their work efforts over the year.
This finding is consistent with the results of the National JTPA Study, which found
that compared with job search assistance and on-the-job training, vocational classroom training produced the weakest earnings and employment gains (see Orr et al.
1994). One interpretation of Marschke’s finding is that the deactivation of the cost
measure in the early 1990s was misguided. The finding does not rule out, however,
that at the same time it discouraged the use of vocational classroom training, the
cost measure encouraged training centers to cut corners in the delivery of services,
or to dilute or prematurely shorten training activities for enrollees.
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8
Local Responses to Performance
Incentives and Implications
for Program Outcomes
Carolyn J. Heinrich

In his classic piece on “street-level” bureaucracy, Lipsky (1980)
describes the critical position occupied by public employees engaged
in social service delivery. These employees, he argues, constitute the
scope and function of government services, and the individual decisions of these workers become agency policy. Street-level bureaucrats
shape citizens’ expectations of government services, determine who
qualifies for services, and implement service delivery.
This chapter presents research that explores how local (street-level)
bureaucrats in the JTPA program shaped or moderated the role and
effects of performance standards in program administration and service
delivery. A case-study approach is used to investigate these effects in a
county-level agency (located in the Chicago metropolitan area), using
data on subunits (contractors) and their staff and individual participants.
The local JTPA participant selection and service assignment processes
are modeled using quantitative and qualitative data to facilitate a more
precise understanding of how and the extent to which performance standards and related administrative policies influence participant access to
training and the types of services provided to participants.
Although WIA superseded the JTPA program, the WIA program
preserves major elements of the JTPA performance standards system
and extends its role in managing local program processes and service
delivery. WIA requires states to institute a performance-based certification system for training service providers that establishes a minimum performance level for all providers receiving individual training
account (voucher) dollars. Local workforce investment boards and service providers continue to be responsible for guiding service and fund-
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ing allocations, performance data collection, and the management and
use of this information at the local level.
In this research, unique access to information from and about the
job training agency’s program administration, service providers, and the
terms of their contracts with the agency facilitated the in-depth study of
local JTPA program processes. Detailed information on individual participants from management information system (MIS) records (1984–
1994) and detailed case management records maintained by staff also
make possible the analysis of factors that are sometimes overlooked or
obscured in aggregate (e.g., state-level) studies of program operations.
The findings of this research show that program administrators
and service provider staff in this agency were highly conscious of the
agency’s performance goals. A contractual and administrative focus on
specific levels of (or standards for) performance outcomes had direct
and indirect effects on participant selection and training service assignment decisions of program staff. Both deliberate screening on applicant
characteristics to advance performance goals and indirect cream skimming grounded in contractual arrangements and program administrative decisions appeared to occur in this agency, with possible negative
implications for the participants and net value added of the program.
The remaining sections of this chapter are organized as follows.
First, local-level administrative and service delivery processes and concerns about the role and influence of performance standards in these
processes are described. The goals of the case study of participant
selection and service assignments and hypotheses that were tested in
a simulation of these processes are then explained. The next section
presents the findings of the simulation and other multivariate analyses,
as well as a discussion of these findings. The final section summarizes
the findings and their implications for current employment and training
programs and policies.
Role of Performance Standards in Local-Level Program
Administration and Service Delivery
The substantial discretion accorded to local-level program administrators in deciding how performance standards are used and the extent
to which they are used has confounded efforts to fully understand their
influence and implications. The design and institution of performance
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standards systems varies not only across states but also at the local
level, where the main responsibility for making these systems function effectively lies. Along with their own target population and service goals, job training agencies transmit federal- and state-level goals
and requirements to training professionals who serve clients and manage job training programs on a daily basis. As both Lipsky (1980) and
Brodkin (1987) have pointed out, bureaucratic discretion of this type
provides the means for administrative agencies and program managers
to make policy by shaping it as they implement it.
The county job training agency in this study relied primarily on
contracts with other public and private sector organizations to deliver
program services.1 Service providers acted, in effect, as agents of the
administrative entity and entered into a competitive bidding process
to obtain contracts with the agency for service provision. Through the
contract awards and negotiation processes, job training agency officials attempted to exert control over who received services, the types of
training services made available, and program outcomes.
Federal and state governments generally specified few guidelines or
requirements for contracts between agencies and their service providers. Yet one would expect job training agencies to design contracts that
facilitate satisfactory job training program outcomes as measured by
state performance evaluation models. Contracts between this agency
and its service providers contained detailed information about target
population demographic characteristics; the types of training to be
made available and anticipated wages-at-placement, estimated service
costs, including tuition, wage subsidies, and supportive service costs;
and performance-based payment benchmarks for reimbursement of program costs. Service providers were also required to establish detailed
program budgets and service plans before contracts were finalized, and
any subsequent modifications to the contracts had to be approved and
documented by agency officials.
In the contract awards process, the largest weights were accorded to
service providers’ proposed placement rates, costs per placement, and
average wage rates at placement. Secondary criteria used in this process
included service provider experience with targeted population(s), labor
market need for proposed services, private sector linkages and coordination with other agencies, and service provider in-kind contributions.
Service providers’ performance in the previous year also factored into

234 Heinrich

the decision process. Service providers who attained at least 90 percent
of their planned goals for enrollment, job placements, and expenditures
were eligible for exemplary service points that increased their competitive point totals.
If, in fact, service providers who satisfied or exceeded contract
requirements—ostensibly furthering the performance and target population goals of the job training agency—were more likely to secure
future contracts, the system would likely establish strong incentives for
service providers to achieve high placement rates and wages at placement. Some research, discussed below, suggests that this type of performance evaluation system is also likely to contribute to unintended,
negative program effects.
Arguments and Evidence on the Role and Influence of
Performance Standards in JTPA Programs
Two fundamental issues underlie concerns about the influence of
performance standards on employment and training programs: 1) who
should have access to these services, and 2) what types of program
services should be provided to achieve program goals. JTPA program
eligibility guidelines required 90 percent of all enrollees to be disadvantaged; an equitable distribution of services among substantial segments
of the eligible population; and minimum levels of service to youth, high
school dropouts, and welfare recipients. WIA, however, has introduced
a new universal access approach to service delivery in which all adults
are eligible for core workforce development services, although local
workforce investment boards are still encouraged to give priority for
skills training services to public aid recipients and other low-income
persons when program funds are sparse. A universal access approach to
service does not eliminate the possibility that access to varying levels of
service might still be constrained locally.
A primary concern expressed by JTPA program administrators was
that performance standards might encourage cream skimming, or the
selection of participants who are expected to have good postprogram
outcomes, regardless of what the program contributes. In cases where
participants would do nearly as well or equally well in the labor market without receiving program services, the program’s measured performance would be high, but its net impact would be small or zero. (In
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Chapter 6, Heckman and Smith define and discuss the cream skimming
problem more extensively.)
Research on JTPA operations has generated mixed findings on the
influence of performance standards, depending on the types of performance standards used and the local-level practices adopted. In a review
of this research, Heinrich (1999) notes the general finding that state and
local agencies with policies that emphasized exceeding performance
standards while minimizing training costs tended to discourage services
to hard-to-serve eligible applicants and reduced the intensity and average length of services for adults. Changes in the legislated performance
standards requirements in 1988 were designed to deemphasize the role
of performance standards in federal and state JTPA program evaluations
and to encourage agencies to focus more on providing higher-quality
training as measured by earnings and employment retention rather than
job placement rates.2
From the program administrator’s point of view, there was little
effect of these legislated changes on service provider performance
incentives. The system still focused on employment and earnings levels
rather than gains or net value added of training programs. In the casestudy agency, cost-per-placement standards were still included in
contracts and were one of the primary criteria for evaluating service
provider performance in contract award decisions. The 1988 legislative amendments that changed the evaluation of placement and earnings outcomes to three months after termination did not affect retention
measures in this agency’s contracts until the 1992 program year. Even
then, the changes affected less than one-fourth of the contracts. This
suggests that it is important to know what incentives went into contracts
between job training agencies and their services providers and were
used to guide competition among service providers. The findings also
suggest that despite legislative changes, incentives to “cream-skim”
may still have been present at the local level.
Because one does not observe participant outcomes in the counterfactual state (in the absence of program services), it is difficult to determine if intake staff participant selection decisions are unduly influenced
by applicants’ probable labor market success. Most research focuses
on direct cream skimming by intake staff, or cream skimming based
on their observations of applicant characteristics during the participant
selection process. For example, one intake worker observed in this study
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described an applicant who was laid off from a high-wage, high-skilled
job and was hoping to be called back to this position. Anticipating an
easy job placement, the worker enrolled the applicant and assigned him
to job search assistance activities. When the participant was called back
to his previous job, the service provider received credit for this placement. This is a relatively obvious case of cream skimming.
Cream skimming may also operate indirectly, however, through
practices that may be more difficult to identify. Program managers may
influence participant mix indirectly by offering certain types of training
services that may or may not appeal to specific applicant groups. They
may also establish intake and assessment procedures that favor one
type of applicant over another. JTPA’s restrictions on stipends and supportive services and the capabilities or willingness of service providers
to make supportive services available, for example, may have influenced who applied and the level of motivation they needed to secure
an opportunity to participate. In addition, the location of service offices
and focus of outreach activities may also affect program awareness and
the resulting applicant pool.
In this research, I distinguish between indirect cream skimming,
which typically influences who is likely to apply for services and who
is likely to follow through the application process (i.e., decisions made
by the eligible persons), and direct cream skimming, which, alternatively, results from decisions made by intake staff based on their observations of and interactions with applicants during the selection process.
I hypothesize that incentives created by JTPA performance standards
(and continuing under WIA) likely encouraged a combination of direct
cream skimming on participant characteristics and indirect cream skimming that was grounded in program administrative decisions and contractual arrangements at the local level.

CASE STUDy AnD SIMULATIOn OF JTPA PARTICIPAnT
SELECTIOn AnD SERvICE ASSIGnMEnT PROCESSES
While JTPA legislation, state- and local-level program priorities,
and terms of contracts between job training agencies and service providers all provided guidelines for participant selection and service
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assignment, these decisions were typically made by the agency’s job
training professionals or service provider staff under contract with the
agency. A goal of this case study was to uncover the underlying structure of these judgments, model the participant selection and service
assignment processes, and evaluate their implications for employment
and training outcomes.
A number of different factors might influence the judgments of
agency and service provider staff in participant selection and service
assignment decisions, including external influences such as agency
or contract target population goals, training service and expenditures
plans, eligibility requirements, and application procedures. Judgments
of intake staff would also be based on their own knowledge, experience, and preferences, and the observed or measured characteristics
of the applicants. Controls for these factors are necessary to evaluate
their relative influences in participant selection and service assignment
processes.
This study makes use of detailed information from applicants to a
job training program at all stages of the participant selection process.
Participant selection and service assignment decision-making processes
were observed, intake staff were interviewed about these decision processes, and final outcomes (i.e., intake staff judgments) were recorded.
These observations aided the formulation of hypotheses about these
processes. Next, an empirical strategy was developed to assess how different factors interact to produce the final decision outcomes.
Case-Study and Simulation Goals, Methodology, and hypotheses
In studying the structural components of human judgments,
Rossi and Nock (1982) note that there are a relatively small number of
characteristics to which decision makers pay attention when making
judgments about persons. In other words, only a small number of characteristics of the seemingly infinite number of ways in which job training program applicants may differ are actually important to the judgments at hand. Second, they argue that, for the most part, judgments are
“socially structured,” i.e., there is general agreement among persons
on how much weight should be given to relevant characteristics and on
how these characteristics should be combined to arrive at judgments.
A third structural component of human judgments is that each decision
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maker tends toward consistency in his or her own judgments, departing
in a regular way from the socially defined consensus on how such judgments should be made. If these structural components exist for a specific set of judgments, then the judgments can be modeled to determine
what variables or characteristics are most relevant to the judgment, as
well as the nature of their influence.
Using detailed data on intake staff decisions, I formulate an
approach to evaluate the influences of external factors and applicant
characteristics that used both “constructed” and actual program data.
First, based on observations of participant selection and service assignment decisions and discussions with intake staff, I generate a list of factors examined by intake staff in these decision-making processes. Using
actual data collected by program staff on these factors, I construct a
simulation exercise of these processes. The exercise consisted of four
main parts: 1) the selection of job training program participants from a
pool of applicants constructed using actual program data; 2) the assignment of the selected “participants” to training activities; 3) the consideration of alternative scenarios of constraints on participant selection
decisions, including different levels of performance standards and cost
constraints; and 4) a review and open group discussion of the caseworkers’ selection decisions, which included case comparisons chosen to
probe the influences of external factors and applicant characteristics on
their decisions. (See Heinrich [1995] for a detailed description of the
simulation exercise design as well as a transcription of the postsimulation discussion.)
I subsequently analyze a number of hypotheses using these data.
First, are there a relatively small number of observed applicant characteristics which emerge as important in intake staff selection decisions?
What are these characteristics? The relative importance of characteristics associated with applicants’ employability or their probability of
placement was of particular interest, as they relate to analyses of cream
skimming. Using information known about the actual placement outcomes of program applicants, I also evaluate the influence of applicants’ probability of placement on intake staff selection decisions.
A second set of hypotheses posed the following questions: Do
intake staff use the same decision function in selecting participants (as
other staff members), and do they make the same participant selections?
Another hypothesis pertains to the third structural component of human
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judgments: Are intake staff selection decisions consistent, i.e., do they
depart in a regular way from the socially defined consensus? The intake
staff’s actual selections of participants for the job training program
were compared to their simulation selections to evaluate consistency.
The simulation was designed to hold constant or eliminate constraints on decision making that may influence intake staff’s actual
selection decisions. For example, in the simulation, intake staff were
given explicit verbal and written instructions that they should assume
no restrictions on the availability of training service activities. After
making participant selections, intake staff assigned the selected cases
to training service activities based on applicant characteristics. I subsequently analyzed the relationship of observed applicant characteristics
to their assignment to different training service activities.
Intake staff were also provided with a target job placement rate and
approximate cost per participant that reflected job training center contract averages of these performance standards for optional use in the
simulation. I use responses of intake staff to a questionnaire administered during the exercise and postsimulation discussion to uncover
information about the influence of these performance standards during
the simulation and in practice and their interaction with training services constraints in actual job training programs.
Two professional job training program caseworkers who were
employees of a job training service provider under contract with the
agency participated in the simulation.3 These caseworkers were exclusively responsible for selecting program participants and assigning
them to program activities for the job training program studied. Agency
officials and program caseworkers provided copies of all records of
applicants to the program, including caseworkers’ comments written
during case reviews and following meetings with program applicants.
Caseworkers’ participant selection and service assignment procedures
were also observed. While it might have been useful to conduct the
simulation with many intake staff across the job training center, complete access to other applicant records and observations of intake staff
were not possible, so that similar hypothesis testing and data analyses
would not have been feasible.
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Description of JTPA Participant Selection and Service
Assignment Processes
Similar to many job training agencies under JTPA, the number of
applicants eligible for program services in this service delivery area
tended to substantially exceed the number of program openings. There
were 221 applicants to the specific job training program studied, and 50
of these persons were eventually selected to participate. In screening
applicants for the program, intake staff met with them an average of
four times before they made a decision to either enroll them or to refer
them to another organization for services.
All intake staff in Illinois were required to screen applicants for
employment barriers, including basic skills deficiencies, limited work
histories, single head of household with dependent children, displaced
homemaker, child care needs, limited English proficiency, handicapped,
veteran, ex-offender, and substance abuse. Caseworkers conveyed the
importance of identifying applicants’ employment barriers and determining whether they could be overcome with the commitment of the
applicant and the resources of the program.
Caseworkers indicated that they viewed the presence of employment
barriers as an opportunity to serve persons who have a greater need for
program services. Employment barriers that emerged as positive selection criteria included basic skills deficiencies, minimal work histories,
single head of household, and the presence of children in a household.
Persons with employment barriers that could not be addressed with program resources, such as serious medical or mental health conditions,
were referred to other agencies for assistance. In addition, caseworkers
did not view the receipt of public assistance as an employment barrier,
noting that since the stipend provided under CETA was eliminated in
JTPA, the receipt of public aid may have provided an essential source
of income for some participants during their enrollment.
Caseworkers also evaluated applicants’ levels of motivation and
commitment to making the program work. While the average number
of times applicants met with caseworkers was four, case records of program applicants showed a range of as few as one meeting to as many as
eight scheduled appointments over four to six weeks. Applicants were
typically required to come back for at least one additional meeting;
those who did not return again were assumed to be less serious about
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participating. If the applicants kept their appointments, were punctual,
and came prepared, caseworkers interpreted these as signs that they
were capable and willing to make a serious program commitment. In
effect, caseworkers attempted to distinguish between those people who
were only interested in a “quick fix” (i.e., looking for the shortest way
to get money in their hands) and those who had a serious interest in
increasing their skills and finding employment.
The types of information caseworkers sought from applicants also
aided their efforts to assess the applicants’ ability or willingness to commit to the program. In evaluating employment histories, caseworkers
not only sought basic information about employment status, job positions, and recent wages, but they also wanted to know how long applicants stayed with their jobs, the reasons they were no longer at the jobs,
and whether absenteeism was ever a problem. They wanted to know
the types of occupational or job training activities received in order
to avoid duplication or to build upon previously acquired skills. They
asked whether the training was completed, if the applicant obtained a
job after training, and how long the individual then stayed with the
job. If there were gaps in an applicant’s employment history, the caseworkers wanted to find out if there were reasonable explanations for
them, such as pregnancy, health problems, or family responsibilities. As
with employment barriers, their concern was not necessarily how many
problems there were, but rather how much effort the applicant was willing to put forth to overcome these difficulties.
Caseworkers claimed that they were less likely to select individuals with post–high school educations, since they believed they could
do more to serve persons with relatively less education. Their ability
to effectively serve the less educated, however, was also contingent on
contract specifications for training service availability. Caseworkers
indicated in the simulation questionnaire that the types of training services and available training “slots” were determined long before their
initial screening sessions with applicants. In fact, the types of training services and corresponding number of training opportunities were
typically set before the final approval of program funding in the JTPA
program. The program director then told the caseworkers how many
vocational training, on-the-job training (OJT), and other positions could
be made available to participants. “[The program director] will tell us
something like ‘we have five slots for OJT, and we want to fill them
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with $8.00 per hour positions,” explained one caseworker. Caseworkers could make a request to modify the original training service plan,
but this was usually not done. The service assignment process actually began, therefore, when the caseworkers commenced the applicant
screening process.
Caseworkers also frequently arranged specific training opportunities (e.g., a particular apprenticeship position in a manufacturing plant),
and then looked for applicants who met the position requirements. In
effect, they would first “fill the training slots” with appropriate positions to satisfy the service provider contract and then screen for applicants who were suitable to these positions. The responses of 110 JTPA
applicants to follow-up survey questions about their screening sessions
with intake staff also provided evidence of this practice. About 20 percent of the applicants discussed specific training opportunities and jobs
with intake staff. Several were even set up for interviews and offered
jobs before they began intake procedures or before they were notified
of the staff’s decision to either accept them into the program or refer
them elsewhere. One respondent indicated that she was offered a job
during the application process and was worried that if that particular job
closed, she might not be accepted into the program.
Performance standards in service providers’ contracts with the
agency may also have influenced the training opportunities made available and final participant selections. In the simulation, caseworkers
were given a target job placement rate and an approximate cost per
placement to guide their decisions if they chose to use this information.
The caseworkers indicated in the postsimulation questionnaire, however, that this information did not have any influence on their participant selection and service assignment decisions. They pointed out that
their objective was to “place” the participants, not to worry about costs.
“I work with the person, not the money,” wrote one caseworker.
During a meeting with agency officials prior to the start of the program, one of the caseworkers had made the comment that it was difficult to get “numbers” out of his mind, that he was thinking “numbers,
numbers, numbers.” When asked about his comment in the open discussion, this caseworker indicated that it was the job placement rate
number that concerned him. He clarified that the placement rate affects
whether or not his organization will get comparable funding in the next
program year. The director who supervises the caseworkers’ work also
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indicated that the job placement rate achieved by the program would
be a key factor in agency’s evaluation of the service provider’s performance. On the other hand, caseworkers also emphasized the separation
of day-to-day operations “in the field” and issues of the budget that are
the director’s concern: “ . . . we’re not dealing directly with the budget.
We are the implementers of the program.”
The findings of an interview conducted with the agency’s intake
supervisor supported the caseworkers’ assertion about the role and
influence of performance standards (see Heinrich [1995] for the interview transcription). The intake supervisor indicated that participants
were selected on the basis of the professional judgment of intake staff,
and that the performance standards played no direct role in their decisions. Yet the intake supervisor also indicated that intake staff had little
discretion in deciding what types of training services they could make
available to clients. She said they were given strict, detailed guidelines
to which they were expected to closely adhere in assigning participants
to activities. This finding is consistent with the caseworkers’ responses
indicating they did not have a role in determining the availability and
number of training service openings. These decisions were made by the
program director in consideration of contract requirements and budget
specifications negotiated with agency officials. Together, these findings
suggest that the influence of performance standards in the participant
selection and service assignment processes may have been more likely
to operate indirectly, at the administrative or executive level, through
decisions made about service availability by program directors and
agency executives. The reported separation of performance standards
considerations from intake staff duties appears to refute contentions
that performance standards lead to direct cream skimming based on
applicant characteristics at the caseworker level.

SIMULATIOn FInDInGS: JTPA PARTICIPAnT SELECTIOn
AnD SERvICE ASSIGnMEnTS
Figure 8.1 shows how simulated data were analyzed to evaluate
the influence of various factors on participant selection and service
assignment decisions. The columns show the decision of caseworker
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Figure 8.1 Analysis of Counselors’ Simulated Selection Decisions
Counselor 1 selections
Choose applicant
Do not choose
Choose
Both select applicant Only counselor 2
chooses
Counselor 2 applicant
selections
Do not
Only counselor 1
Neither select
choose

chooses

applicant

1 (e.g., choose or do not choose applicant), and the rows reflect the
same decision of caseworker 2. Also shown are the four possible outcomes of caseworkers’ decisions for a given applicant: both select the
applicant, neither selects the applicant, caseworker 1 selects the applicant but caseworker 2 does not, and caseworker 2 chooses the applicant
but caseworker 1 does not. The simulation data for all applicants were
aggregated to form the following variables for analyses: 1) applicants
selected by caseworker 1 (column 1 in the box); 2) applicants selected
by caseworker 2 (row 1 in the box); 3) applicants selected by either
caseworker 1 or caseworker 2 (upper right-hand cell, upper left-hand
cell and lower left-hand cell); and 4) the selection decisions of caseworker 1 plus those of caseworker 2 (all four cells in the box), which
factors in their decisions not to choose applicants as well. The fourth
decision variable is used only in logit analyses of the simulation data.
Comparison of Simulation Selections and Actual
Program Selections
Simple comparisons of the caseworkers’ simulation and actual program selections (e.g., chi-square tests) suggested that the two caseworkers selected similar groups of participants and that they were generally
consistent in their decision-making procedures. Twelve of the 25 cases
selected by the caseworkers in the simulation (48 percent) were the
same. However, these comparisons do not provide information about
which applicant characteristics they emphasized in their selection decisions, how much weight was given to these characteristics, or how different characteristics might have interacted to influence their selection
decisions. To learn more about caseworkers’ decision functions and
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how they arrived at final selections, maximum likelihood logit models
of their participant selections were estimated.
Logit models were used to estimate factors influencing participant
selections.4 Four of the dependent variables employed in the logit analyses were described in Figure 8.1: 1) the simulated participant selections
of caseworker 1; 2) the simulated participant selections of caseworker 2;
3) the simulated selections of either caseworker 1 or caseworker 2; and
4) selections of caseworker 1 plus caseworker 2, where cases selected by
neither caseworker have zero “weight.” Cases selected by one but not the
other are “weighted” by one, and cases selected by both are “weighted”
by two. Errors in these simulated selection models may represent individual errors (e.g., deviations from the caseworkers’ usual judgment
processes), intrinsic uncertainty (e.g., reflecting that the caseworkers’
judgments may naturally vary or not always be 100 percent consistent),
and other possible decision errors.
The fifth dependent variable indicates which of the 50 applicant
cases included in the simulation were actual program participants and
was used to model the influence of applicant characteristics on caseworkers’ actual participant selections. The error term in this model may
reflect the influence of omitted variables (e.g., factors which caseworkers considered but were not incorporated in the simulation), such as the
reasons applicants left their previous jobs. This type of information was
not available for all applicants and therefore was not provided to caseworkers in the simulation.
A large number of possible explanatory variables was reduced
through the modeling process to a core set of independent variables,
including age, sex (male), single head of household, highest grade
completed, previous training services, never married, welfare recipient, number of children, basic skills deficiency, limited work history,
unemployed all of preprogram year, and most recent wage. All of the
dependent and independent variables employed in the logit analyses are
described in Appendix 8A.
The logistic regression model results for the five dependent variables are summarized in Table 8.1. The findings suggest that caseworkers emphasize different factors in their selection decisions, and the
coefficient sizes and signs on many variables suggest that they weighed
these factors differently as well. Four of the explanatory variables in
the model of caseworker 2’s selections attained statistical significance,

Independent variables
Constant
Age
Sex (male)
Single head of household
Highest grade completed
Previous training services
Never married
Welfare recipient
Children

Caseworker 1
selections
(N=46)
45.473***
(16.854)
−0.088
(0.086)
1.332
(1.512)
−0.220
(1.496)
−3.503***
(1.341)
−0.156
(1.016)
0.918
(1.129)
2.200
(1.493)
−0.412
(0.274)

Caseworker 2
selections
(N=46)
−13.098**
(6.596)
0.260***
(0.099)
−0.796
(1.161)
−1.297
(1.472)
0.100
(0.469)
−0.129
(1.034)
4.303***
(1.631)
1.559
(1.156)
0.635**
(0.324)

Selections of
caseworker 1
or 2 (N=46)
12.439
(13.355)
0.472
(0.291)
0.152
(0.865)
−6.275
(4.392)
−2.887*
(1.551)
6.190
(4.256)
10.909
(6.784)
1.978
(1.325)
2.347*
(1.349)
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Table 8.1 Findings from Simulation and Actual Participant Selection Logit Models
Dependent variables

Selections of
caseworker 1
+ caseworker 2
(N=96)
10.537**
(4.841)
−0.021
(0.038)
−0.012
(0.698)
−0.213
(0.744)
−0.910***
(0.374)
−0.100
(0.603)
2.013
(1.461)
0.456
(0.633)
−0.157
(0.167)

Actual
participant
selections
(N=46)
−2.639
(5.203)
0.044
(0.069)
0.979
(1.103)
3.403***
(1.383)
−0.111
(0.370)
0.501
(0.855)
−1.272
(0.949)
−1.472
(0.996)
−0.027
(0.210)

Basic skills deficiency
Limited work history
Unemployed all of
preprogram year
Most recent hourly wage
Log likelihood
Pseudo R2 (%)

2.840**
(1.337)
−1.102
(1.245)
−0.661
(0.995)
0.014
(0.246)
−18.493
37.2

8.054*
(4.835)
1.198
(2.173)
−4.269
(3.111)
0.026
(0.115)
−8.464
15.6

−0.586
(0.654)
0.567
(0.679)
2.603***
(0.682)
0.023
(0.142)
−46.783
84.5

−1.591
(1.202)
1.814
(1.454)
−1.320
(1.326)
−0.163
(0.308)
−16.963
36.9

0.246
(0.938)
0.901
(0.973)
1.528*
(0.919)
0.098
(0.191)
−25.079
48.2

NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below
the coefficient values.
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compared to only one independent variable in the model of caseworker
1’s selections. Caseworker 2 was the older and more experienced intake
staff member. It is possible that as intake staff gain more experience
in this profession, they become more certain about which applicant
characteristics are important and/or more consistent in their decisionmaking procedures.
A formal test of the hypothesis that the caseworkers employed the
same decision function, a test for equality of the coefficients in the
selection models, was performed.5 The results of the likelihood ratio
test rejected the null hypothesis (at α < 0.005) that the caseworkers’
decision functions were the same.6 This finding suggests that there
may not be a strong “social structure” or consensus as to how applicant
characteristics should be evaluated in participant selection processes,
at least for the characteristics measured and included in these models. I also calculated pseudo-R2 values for the models (see Amemiya
1981) and found that when modeled separately, there is considerably
more unexplained variance in the caseworkers’ simulated selections.
This seems to suggest that when combining the decisions made by both
caseworkers and giving more weight to cases in which both agreed to
either admit or reject applicants, we gain a better understanding of their
decision-making processes.
The most consistent finding across the models in Table 8.1 was
the negative coefficient on the highest grade completed variable, statistically significant in three of the five models. This finding implies
that applicants with more education were less likely to be selected into
the program and is consistent with caseworkers’ indications that they
favored applicants with lower education levels.
The two employment barriers mentioned most frequently in case
reviews and in the postsimulation discussion were basic skills deficiencies and limited work histories. Being the most closely related (of the
observed characteristics) to applicants’ employability, one would expect
that if intake staff were cream skimming based on these characteristics,
they would be negatively related to the probability of selection. The
coefficient for basic skills deficiency is positive in three models and
is large and statistically significant in two of these. The limited work
history variable also has a positive coefficient in four models but is not
statistically significant in any model. These findings provide tentative
evidence against the theory that intake staff cream-skim on observed
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characteristics related to employability. Long-term unemployment was
also a statistically significant, positive selection factor in two models.
The variable coefficients in the model of the caseworkers’ actual
program participant selections, however, differed from those in the
caseworkers’ simulation models. These differences might be attributed
to a number of factors, including unobserved and unmeasured factors
(such as applicant motivation or constraints on training service assignments) and decision errors (including random deviations from their
usual judgment processes or inconsistencies in their judgments).
With information about the caseworkers’ actual program participant selections and the employment outcomes of program applicants,
I further analyze the influence of applicants’ probability of placement
on participant selection decisions using a two-stage model. In the firststage regression (shown in Table 8.2), a variable indicating whether
or not employment was obtained following program application was
regressed against applicants’ demographic and employment and training history characteristics to obtain predicted probabilities of placement
for the applicants. These predicted placement probabilities formed a
new variable (the probability of placement) that was used as an explanatory variable in a second-stage regression with caseworkers’ actual
participant selections as the dependent variable (also shown in Table
8.2).
A striking finding of this second-stage regression is the relatively
large, positive, and statistically significant coefficient on the probability
of placement variable, more precisely estimated than any other explanatory variable in the regression. This finding suggests that in the actual
participant selection process, caseworkers were likely influenced by
factors related to applicants’ probability of placement (or employment).
It also indicates that direct cream skimming on applicant characteristics
might have been occurring.
To further evaluate this argument, I also added the probability of
placement variable to the caseworkers’ simulated selection models
and reestimated these logistic regressions (see Table 8.3). In estimating these models, I sought to test whether the probability of placement
was some function of the observed applicant characteristics provided
to caseworkers in the simulation, or a function of additional information the caseworkers acquire during the selection process, i.e., information not captured in the variables made available in the simulation.
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Table 8.2 Two-Stage Logistic Regression Estimation of the Influence
of Applicants’ Probability of Placement on Participant
Selection Decisions
First-stage
Second-stage
logistic regression
logistic regression
Dependent variable:
Placed in employment
(or employed) following
Dependent variable:
program participation
Actual participant
Independent variables
(or application)
selections
1.482
−34.547*
Constant
(6.884)
(19.327)
−0.087
0.360**
Age
(0.106)
(0.161)
0.638
5.715
Sex (male)
(1.397)
(3.650)
3.960**
2.835
Single head of household
(1.750)
(3.026)
−0.232
Highest grade completed
1.171
(0.487)
(0.942)
0.615
Previous training
0.576
(1.092)
services
(0.898)
−2.896**
Never married
4.046*
(1.375)
(2.398)
−2.358*
Welfare recipient
3.500
(1.352)
(2.365)
−0.148
0.206
Children
(0.284)
(0.669)
−0.297
4.597
Basic skills deficiency
(1.316)
(3.027)
0.070
7.146*
Limited work history
(1.217)
(3.983)
2.365**
−4.095*
Unemployed all of
(1.191)
(2.227)
preprogram year
−0.126
−0.472
Most recent hourly wage
(0.260)
(0.354)
6.392***
n/a
Probability of placement
(2.114)
Model log likelihood
−18.360
−9.150
Pseudo R2 (%)
37.1
17.1
NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the coefficient values.
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The results presented in Table 8.3 indicate that the probability of placement was not a significant factor in the caseworkers’ simulation selection decisions. There are several possible interpretations of these findings. One is that the caseworkers did evaluate and weigh applicants’
observed characteristics to estimate their probability of placement, but
that in the simulation (free of performance pressures and constraints),
they did not use this information. A more plausible explanation, however, is that the probability of placement was judged mainly using
information not made available in the simulation. For example, some
of these unmeasured variables might include information that provides
clues about the applicants’ motivation (from details of employment history to physical appearance). Although this type of information is not
systematically collected by employment and training program staff, in
their actual participant selection decisions, caseworkers seemed to predict placement probabilities very well and to use this information to
guide their decisions.
In his classic study on bureaucracy, Blau (1955) finds similar participant screening philosophies and practices among state employment
agency staff. Like the JTPA intake workers, employment agency staff
who exercised discretion in client selection indicated they derived satisfaction from helping those most in need and “welcomed the opportunity to assist them.” However, in actual client selections, Blau finds the
majority of agency staff favored “strivers,” or persons who were most
likely to be successful in society. He concluded that personal preferences for helping the most disadvantaged were set aside as a result of
the orientation toward maximizing placements and in the interest of
efficient performance. Forty years later, Blau’s conclusions seem to garner support from this case study as well.
Multinomial Logit Analyses of Factors Influencing Participant
Assignment to Training Activities
During the simulation, the caseworkers assigned each person they
selected to a training service activity. They were given no guidelines as
to the number of “participants” they could assign to each of four available program activities (vocational training, on-the-job training, remedial education, and job search assistance). In making these assignments,
caseworkers were asked to consider only applicant characteristics.
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Table 8.3 Logistic Regressions of Simulated Participant Selections from
Caseworker 1 and Caseworker 2, Including Probability of
Placement variable
Dependent variables
Caseworker 1’s
Caseworker 2’s
simulated participant
simulated
Independent variables
selections
participant selections
−18.037**
45.367***
Constant
(8.503)
(16.987)
0.362***
−0.105
Age
(0.140)
(0.096)
−0.860
Sex (male)
1.180
(1.220)
(1.545)
−1.643
Single head of household
−0.432
(1.518)
(1.591)
0.239
Highest grade completed
−3.458***
(0.500)
(1.347)
−0.220
Previous training services
−0.136
(1.089)
(1.014)
5.884***
Never married
0.753
(2.192)
(1.172)
1.806
Welfare recipient
2.125
(1.191)
(1.484)
0.824**
−0.422
Number of children
(0.375)
(0.274)
4.045**
−1.610
Basic skills deficiency
(1.748)
(1.207)
−0.920
1.557
Limited work history
(1.256)
(1.557)
−1.081
−1.223
Unemployed all of
(1.075)
(1.334)
preprogram year
0.064
−0.191
Most recent hourly wage
(0.259)
(0.321)
−2.816
0.806
Probability of placement
(2.224)
(1.886)
Model log likelihood
−16.726
−18.493
Pseudo R2 (%)
36.8
37.2
NOTE: ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses below the coefficient values.
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The multinomial logit analyses examine the factors that influenced
intake staff service assignment decisions. The dependent variables are
categorical variables for four main types of program activities made
available in JTPA programs: vocational training, on-the-job training,
basic or remedial education, and job search assistance. The independent
variables in these models were the characteristics of the selected participants, i.e., the same core set of variables employed in the models of
participant selection. Table 8.4 shows the multinomial logit estimation
of participant service assignments using the simulation data. Despite
the small sample of 38 simulation assignees (only those cases selected
were assigned to services), there are a number of statistically significant
findings among these results.
A multinomial logit regression of service assignment was also estimated for adult JTPA Title IIA program participants in the job training
agency. The management information system (MIS) data provided by
the agency for all JTPA program years was used, yielding a total of
18,120 observations. The dependent variable employed in the job training center multinomial logit model included assignment to the same
four categories of training as the simulation model. The independent
variables were also the same as those available for the simulation models, with a few exceptions.7 The job training center multinomial logit
model is shown in Table 8.5.
One of the more important findings of the multinomial logit models suggests that access to training opportunities for persons with basic
skills deficiencies and low education levels may have been relatively
limited. High school dropouts and persons with basic skills deficiencies were significantly more likely to be assigned to receive remedial
education, while persons with more education were significantly less
likely to receive these services. Persons with basic skills deficiencies
were significantly less likely to be assigned to vocational training, onthe-job training, or job search assistance, while persons with post–high
school educations were significantly more likely to receive job search
assistance. These findings support the theory that individuals assigned
to on-the-job training and job search assistance require basic education and skill levels that make them more “job-ready.” Discussions
with the program caseworkers and findings of the National JTPA Study
also revealed that vocational training providers often have enrollment
requirements that preclude the entry of persons with basic skills defi-
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Table 8.4 Multinomial Logit Model of Training Activity Assignments Using Simulation Data
Categorical dependent variable
Basic or remedial
Independent variables
Vocational training
On-the-job training
education
−9.800
110.385
8.676
Constant
(13.93)
(258.1)
(5.799)
0.121
−0.307*
−0.006
Age
(0.114)
(0.179)
(0.060)
0.427
0.324
0.301
Sex (male)
(1.867)
(2.920)
(0.852)
3.618*
−3.555
0.725
Single head of household
(2.222)
(2.639)
(0.900)
−0.584
−8.869
−1.094**
Highest grade completed
(0.887)
(20.93)
(0.483)
0.305
−1.049
0.562
Welfare recipient
(1.527)
(1.767)
(0.721)
0.344
−0.571
−0.008
Number of children
(0.352)
(0.660)
(0.206)
1.169
−42.929**
1.828**
Basic skills deficiency
(1.664)
(20.15)
(0.926)
3.601**
0.571
0.539
Limited work history
(1.782)
(3.122)
(1.045)
0.500
10.278**
2.183***
Unemployed all of
(1.288)
(4.167)
(0.761)
preprogram year

Job search assistance
−4.052
(15.53)
−0.579
(0.460)
−1.605
(4.188)
−34.639
(46.71)
0.724
(1.991)
7.679*
(4.465)
−1.801*
(0.919)
−1.203
(3.050)
−39.705**
(16.40)
20.488
(14.47)

Never married
Most recent hourly wage
Model log likelihood

0.624
(1.386)
0.850**
(0.431)
−61.396

4.391
(2.768)
0.546
(0.322)

−0.514
(0.753)
0.114
(0.182)

0.117
(0.116)
0.010
(0.008)

NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; ** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below
the coefficient values.
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Table 8.5 Multinomial Logit Model of Training Activity Assignments Using Service Records of 18,120 Adult JTPA
Title IIA Participants, Program years 1984–1993
Categorical dependent variable
Basic or remedial
Independent variables
Vocational training
On-the-job training
education
Job search assistance
−0.297*
−0.303**
−4.899***
−2.951***
Constant
(0.153)
(0.138)
(0.357)
(0.142)
−0.016***
−0.029***
−0.033***
0.026***
Age
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.002)
−0.107*
0.571***
0.202
−0.007
Sex (male)
(0.064)
(0.058)
(0.130)
(0.054)
0.171**
0.155**
−0.120
0.188***
Single head of household
(0.075)
(0.065)
(0.148)
(0.064)
0.098
−0.039
1.233***
0.169
High school dropout
(0.076)
(0.068)
(0.129)
(0.704)
0.016
−0.197***
−0.519***
0.152***
Post–high school education
(0.063)
(0.058)
(0.168)
(0.055)
0.147**
−0.573***
−0.466***
−0.023
Welfare recipient
(0.069)
(0.067)
(0.123)
(0.061)
−0.013
0.029***
0.033*
−0.011
Household size
(0.015)
(0.010)
(0.019)
(0.036)
−0.148***
−0.097*
0.593***
−0.087*
Basic skills deficiency
(0.058)
(0.051)
(0.110)
(0.051)
0.067
−0.282***
0.346***
0.029
Limited work history
(0.059)
(0.054)
(0.113)
(0.053)

Unemployed at application
Unemployed all of
preprogram year
Employed–unemployed
Unemployed–employed
African American
Program year 1989
Program year 1990
Program year 1991
Program year 1992
Model log likelihood

−0.321
(0.338)
−0.060
(0.076)
−0.088
(0.074)
−0.047
(0.700)
0.064
(0.061)
0.806***
(0.096)
0.993***
(0.082)
0.930***
(0.093)
−0.228**
(0.097)

−0.135**
(0.060)
−0.293***
(0.069)
0.044
(0.060)
−0.092
(0.058)
−0.340***
(0.052)
0.970***
(0.078)
0.670***
(0.077)
0.698***
(0.079)
−0.244***
(0.079)

−0.029
(0.138)
0.688***
(0.151)
−0.160
(0.148)
0.145
(0.144)
0.963***
(0.145)
2.177***
(0.205)
2.496***
(0.184)
2.030***
(0.093)
0.308
(0.252)

0.027
(0.063)
0.234
(0.157)
0.031
(0.065)
0.249***
(0.061)
−0.176***
(0.054)
1.072***
(0.090)
0.830***
(0.089)
0.613***
(0.099)
0.354***
(0.060)

NOTE: * significant at α = 0.100; −20,586.83
** significant at α = 0.050; *** significant at α = 0.010. Standard errors are shown in parentheses below
the coefficient values.
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ciencies, e.g., requirements such as a high school diploma or minimum
scores on tests of adult basic education.
Another noteworthy finding was that males were more likely to be
assigned to on-the-job training, which has consistently been shown to
be the most effective employment and training service (Barnow and
Gubits 2002). During case reviews and the postsimulation discussion,
the caseworkers pointed out that men tended to be more eager to get
into training activities that generated a faster monetary payoff. Since
on-the-job training participants received wages during the training
period, males found these training opportunities more lucrative. In
addition, male applicants were more likely to have had previous job
experience that was expected to aid a successful outcome in on-thejob training activities. In general, women and welfare recipients were
more likely to be assigned to vocational training activities, and welfare
recipients were also significantly less likely to be assigned to on-the-job
training activities. Also consistent with the above findings, persons with
limited work histories (i.e., minimal job experience) were significantly
less likely to be assigned to on-the-job training and job search assistance; they were significantly more likely to receive remedial education
or vocational training services.
The coefficients for the program year indicators (Table 8.5) show
a pattern of declining assignment probabilities in the 1990s, most
likely reflecting the decline in JTPA program funding and reduced
number of training opportunities during these years. Studies suggest
that with fewer resources, job training agencies are more likely to allocate funds to less expensive, shorter-term training activities and to avoid
serving those who require more intensive services to become job-ready
(Dickinson and West 1988; Zornitsky et al. 1988; Orfield and Slessarev
1986). Table 8.6 shows that corresponding to funding declines in the
1990s, there was a noticeable shift in this agency toward less expensive
services (e.g., job search assistance and job club activities). There was
also a less definitive trend away from the provision of more expensive
training such as remedial education services, on-the-job training and
vocational training (with costs per placement ranging from $2,917.90
to $2,834.10). Job search assistance and job club activities (a less intensive form of job search) were much less expensive services (approximately $1700). (See Table 8.7 for job placement rates, wages at place-

Table 8.6 number of Training Services Received by JTPA Title 2A Adult Participants, Program years 1986–1993
PY 1986 PY 1987 PY 1988 PY 1989 PY 1990 PY 1991 PY 1992 PY 1993
JTPA training service activitya
N=2,732 N=2,302 N=1,811 N=1,633 N=1,314 N=1,010 N=1,101 N=1,065
Vocational training
n
1,145
947
730
733
654
527
544
409
%
(41.9)
(41.1)
(40.3)
(44.9)
(49.8)
(52.2)
(49.4)
(38.4)
On-the-job training
n
815
609
530
473
340
288
325
281
%
(29.8)
(29.5)
(26.4)
(26.5)
(29.3)
(29.0)
(25.9)
(28.5)
Remedial education
n
n/ab
n/a
n/a
186
96
51
38
50
%
(11.4)
(7.3)
(5.0)
(3.5)
(4.7)
Job search assistance
n
n/a
n/a
216
204
157
84
197
184
%
(12.5)
(11.9)
(8.3)
(17.9)
(17.3)
(9.1)
Job club
n
n/a
n/a
135
189
127
51
170
151
%
(7.5)
(11.6)
(9.7)
(5.0)
(15.4)
(14.2)
Counseling and
n
1,149
1,040
653
419
300
195
0
9
assessment
%
(42.1)
(45.2)
(36.1)
(25.7)
(22.8)
(19.3)
(0.0)
(0.8)
n/a
950
1,036
Case management
n
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
%
(86.3)
(97.3)
a
b

Supportive services were not shown in this table since the identifier codes were used inconsistently in the JTPA MIS system.
For some of the early program years, these data were either not available or were coded inconsistently.
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ment, and estimated service costs for adult JTPA Title IIA participants
by program activity.)
In addition, Table 8.6 shows that counseling and assessment activities were replaced by case management services beginning in program
year 1992. To generate an official record of the provision of case management services, program staff had to make contact with a participant
at least once per month. This minimal case-management requirement
made these services very inexpensive to provide. In program year 1993,
23.8 percent of JTPA Title IIA program participants received only case
management services while enrolled. It is possible that as program
resources continued to decline, job training agencies found that providing only case-management services was an inexpensive way to maintain participant numbers despite squeezed budgets.
It is also possible that agency officials were struggling to manage
trade-offs among the costs of services, the benefits to participants as
measured by performance standards, and the number of training opportunities they could make available. The job placement rate was accorded
the highest weight in this agency’s performance evaluation process. The
provision of on-the-job training services, which were more costly to
provide but generated higher average job placement rates (by a margin
of 21–38 percent) than other training activities, was not declining over
time. Vocational training, however, had a substantially lower average
Table 8.7 Job Placement Rates, wages at Placement, and Estimated
Costs of Service for Adult JTPA Title IIA Participants by
Program Activity
Mean job
Mean
Estimated cost
placement rate
wage at
per placement
Program activity
(%)
placement ($)
($)
Vocational training
58.3
5.87
2,834.10
On-the-job training
81.2
6.72
2,844.13
Remedial education services
43.0
5.73
2,917.90
Job search assistance
47.7
6.82
1,789.06
Job club
51.2
6.90
1,642.90
Counseling and assessment
59.9
6.17
2,541.46
Case management
58.4
7.03
n/aa
a

For most service provider contracts and participant records, the costs of case management activities are not specified separately from other service costs.
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job placement rate (58.3 percent) that is about the same as the placement rate for counseling/case management activities, but is considerably more expensive to provide than counseling and case management.
In a 1992 review of job training program evaluations, LaLonde finds
that less expensive services provided to a larger segment of the eligible
population yielded higher returns for each training dollar invested. It
is also important to remember that costs per placement continued to
be a primary factor in this agency’s performance reviews and contract
award decisions long after the federal government eliminated cost-perplacement standards.
Synthesis of Findings on Participant Selection, Service
Assignment, and Program Management
The analyses of participant selection and service assignment
decisions, in conjunction with the implications of declining program
resources in this job training agency, suggest that declining program
funds may have compelled the provision of cheaper training services.
This, in turn, may have required the recruitment of more job-ready persons to attain successful outcomes (i.e., job placements). For example,
given budgetary pressures due to declining federal program resources,
service providers may have been led in competitive bidding and contract negotiations to increase the number of job search assistance (i.e.,
less expensive) positions budgeted for their programs. As intake staff
typically worked with fixed numbers of available training positions
when they began the applicant screening process, they may have been
required to recruit more individuals suitable to job search assistance
activities.
One of the most consistent findings in the simulated and actual
participant selection models was the negative relationship of years of
schooling completed to the probability of selection. On the other hand,
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 showed that the number of years of schooling completed was positively related to assignment to job search assistance
activities. Therefore, given a specific and growing number of job search
assistance positions they were required to fill, intake staff may have
been induced to select more applicants with higher education levels.
The participant selection models also indicated that applicants with
basic skills deficiencies were more likely to be selected, and the ser-
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vice assignment models showed these persons were significantly more
likely to receive remedial education services. However, remedial education was one of the more expensive training activities, and provision
of these services declined over time under JTPA. Nonprofit agencies
(independent of the JTPA program) were likewise under increasing
performance accountability pressures and less likely to offer remedial
education on their “menu” of services. As fewer remedial education
opportunities were made available, it is possible that caseworkers were
less likely to enroll persons with basic skill deficiencies. In addition,
the findings also showed that participants with basic skills deficiencies
were significantly less likely to be assigned to vocational training, onthe-job training, and job search assistance, suggesting that more disadvantaged participants might not have had access to the full range of
training services if remedial education services were not made available
to them.
Other case study findings generally supported these assertions
about the effects of budgetary constraints on the availability of training
opportunities and the selection of program participants. Service provider managers indicated that contract cost-per-placement standards
discouraged the provision of multiple services (e.g., remedial education
followed by vocational training), since these services raised average
cost per placement figures and could negatively affect future contract
awards. Even though intake staff asserted that they are not influenced by
performance standards, the continued emphasis on placement rates and
costs per placement in local-level service provider contracts seemed to
be a pervasive force. A separate study (Heinrich 1999) of this agency’s
administrative and service provider contracting practices showed that
service providers’ performance relative to cost standards established in
their contracts with the local JTPA agency was the most important factor
influencing the agency’s contract renewal and funding level decisions.
In conclusion, the strong emphasis on placement rates and costs
per placement in the local-level performance evaluation system seemed
to inevitably pervade intake staff participant selection and service
assignment decisions, contributing to both direct and indirect creaming
practices. Other factors affecting program administration and service
delivery decisions exacerbated the pressures generated by performance
standards. These factors included declining program resources (relative
to a large job-training-eligible population), the absence of performance
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standard adjustments in service provider contracts for services to more
disadvantaged applicants, and minimum qualifications required for
entry to more intensive skill-building program activities.

COnCLUSIOn
While the findings of this case study are not generalizable to all
job training programs, some basic policy conclusions emerge that have
implications for the administration of current job training programs
under WIA and other programs (e.g., public welfare). This research produced evidence that “street-level bureaucrats” engaged in job training
program service delivery were responsive to incentives generated by the
performance standards system. The local job training agency designed
its own performance-based contracting and provider performance evaluation system, and program administrators and service provider staff
demonstrated that they were highly conscious of the agency’s emphasis
on placement rate and cost-per-placement outcomes.
The agency’s contractual and administrative focus on placement
rates and cost-per-placement appeared to have both direct and indirect
effects on the participant selection and training service assignment decisions of program staff. Both direct cream skimming on applicant characteristics during the participant selection process and indirect cream
skimming grounded in contractual arrangements and program administrative decisions were likely occurring in this service delivery area, with
potentially negative implications for the achievement of basic program
objectives.
The research findings also suggest that the main sources of indirect
cream skimming were contractual and administrative constraints on the
types of training services that could be made available to program participants. The study of the JTPA service assignment processes showed
that participant selection decisions and service assignment decisions
were most often made concurrently, and that the numbers and types
of available training positions were typically fixed before the intake
process began. Therefore, intake staff were required to find persons
suitable to the available training positions, rather than selecting participants based primarily on their relative need for and interest in training
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services and then assigning them to appropriate activities. This practice
by itself does not constitute cream skimming. However, as job training
program funds declined over time, the availability of remedial education services decreased substantially, and the provision of relatively
less-expensive program services, such as job search assistance and job
club activities, increased. As a result, access to training for persons with
basic skills deficiencies and low education levels appears to be declining, while access for more able, job-ready applicants (better suited to
job search activities) was likely increasing.
In the WIA program, concerns have again been raised about the
influence of performance standards on individuals’ access to program
services. The WIA performance standards, like those in JTPA, still
focus on shorter-term outcome levels, and budgetary constraints likewise limit the types of services that are made available to participants.
In addition, WIA introduced a sequential process of service access,
from core (basic and self-directed job search services) to intensive (job
readiness and job search seminars) to substantive job skills training
services. While local programs have adapted different approaches to
sequencing, early studies show that few clients are receiving the more
expensive intensive or training services (D’Amico et al. 2001). Barnow
and Gubits (2002) note that in one site, the level of training provided
under WIA was reduced by 75 percent.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, a 2002 GAO report suggests that history may be repeating itself. The GAO interviewed WIA
program administrators in 50 states and visited five sites to assess the
effectiveness of the WIA performance management system and reported
that many states have indicated that the need to meet performance standards is a driving factor in who receives WIA-funded services at the
local level. It also described how some local areas were limiting access
to services for individuals who they perceive are less likely to get and
retain a job. Observing the serious challenges that states and localities have faced in implementing the system, the GAO suggested that
“even when fully implemented, WIA performance measures may still
not provide a true picture of WIA-funded program performance” (GAO
2002, p. 3). In a summary report to the USDOL on the implementation
of WIA, Barnow and Gubits (2002, Note 12) also find, based on meetings with officials from about 20 states, that “the greatest dissatisfaction
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in every instance has been with the way the performance management
system has been implemented.”
This study presents evidence of strong links between the types
of services made available in public training programs and who gets
access to these services, and the role and effects of performance standards on key decisions made by program administrators and street-level
bureaucrats in implementing the program. More generally, the collective empirical findings of this book demonstrate the responsiveness of
public organizations and their employees to performance standards, and
suggest that in designing or refining performance standards systems for
public programs, careful consideration should be given to both direct
and indirect potential consequences of these systems for those served
or seeking services.

notes
1. While this administrative structure was common to many JTPA service delivery
areas, WIA now prohibits these local agencies from directly providing training
services, and the only contract or agreement for service provision that may be
established (with few exceptions) is between the workforce investment boards and
One-Stop center operators. The local workforce investment boards are required
to select One-Stop operators through a competitive process or designation of a
consortium that includes at least three of the federal programs providing services
at the One-Stop.
2. The principal 1988 changes included an end to mandatory use of cost-perplacement standards and a shift toward the evaluation of placement and earnings
outcomes three months after participant termination rather than at the time of
termination.
3. The job training program service provider I closely studied has been operating
in this job training center since the CETA years (i.e., before JTPA). It is one of
the primary vendors and has accounted for approximately 7 percent of all service
provider contracts since the start of JTPA. One of the two program caseworkers
had approximately 5 years of experience working in this profession, and the other
was employed as a caseworker for 16 years. Both had worked for this particular
service provider for about 5 years.
4. The logit model estimated was: Pi = E(Y=1 | Xi) = 1 / 1 + e−(b1 + b2Xi1 +. . . + bk Xik ),
where Pi is the probability an applicant is selected, Y is the program caseworker’s
decision, taking on the value “1” if a given applicant is selected, and the Xik are
characteristics of the program applicants. The betas (bk) measure the influence of
applicant characteristics on caseworkers’ judgments.
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5. First, an unrestricted model of the caseworkers’ simulation selections was estimated. This model included two sets of explanatory variables (i.e., the demographic characteristics and employment and training history variables included
in the logit models)—one set interacted with caseworker 1’s simulation selections
and the other interacted with caseworker 2’s selections. This model allowed different estimates of the variable coefficients for each caseworker. The restricted model
used the dependent variable “caseworker 1 plus caseworker 2 selections.”
6. Likelihood ratio statistic = −2 ln λ, where ln λ = ln L(Ωr) − ln L(Ω) = −56.376 −
−33.492 = −22.884. The observed value of −2 ln λ is very large (45.768). With 11
degrees of freedom, it is much greater than χ20.005, which leads me to strongly reject
Ho.
7. In the job training center multinomial logit model: 1) education is represented by
indicator variables (high school dropout, post–high school education, and college
graduate, where the omitted category is high school graduate); 2) household size
is used as a proxy for the number of children; 3) employment status and history
are represented by an indicator variable for employment status at application
(unemployed at application) and variables indicating employment history in the
year prior to application (no preprogram year earnings, employed–unemployed
transition, unemployed–employed transition); 4) an indicator variable for race
(African American) is included in the model; 5) there were no variable measures
available in the MIS data for marital status or previous training activities, and 6)
program year indicators are included to capture the influence of changes in the
availability of different training activities across program years.
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Appendix 8A
variable Descriptions
DEPEnDEnT vARIABLES
Actual participant selections = 1 if actual program participant, 0 if applicant,
nonparticipant.
Counselor 1 selections = 1 if selected by counselor 1 during the simulation, 0
if not selected by counselor 1.
Counselor 2 selections = 1 if selected by counselor 2 during the simulation, 0
if not selected by counselor 2.
Counselor 1 or counselor 2 selections = 1 if selected by either counselor 1 or
counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 if not selected by either counselor 1 or
counselor 2.
Counselor 1 plus counselor 2 selections: based on 100 evaluated exercise cases
(50 by counselor 1 and 50 by counselor 2) = 1 if selected by either counselor
1 or counselor 2 during the simulation, 0 if not selected by either counselor
1 or counselor 2.
Service category = 0 if not selected nor assigned to a training activity, 1 if
selected case was assigned to vocational training, 2 if selected case was
assigned to on-the-job training, 3 if selected case was assigned to remedial
education, and 4 if selected case was assigned to job search assistance.
Wage at placement = JTPA program participants’ wage at placement (i.e., at the
time of their termination from the program, if placed in a job), in dollars.
InDEPEnDEnT vARIABLES
Sex = 1 if male, 0 if female.
Age variables
Age: (continuous, range 19–51).
Age less than 30 years = 1 if under 30 years old, 0 otherwise.
Age 30 to 39 years = 1 if 30 to 39 years old, 0 otherwise.
Age over 39 years = 1 if over 39 years old, 0 otherwise.
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Ethnicity
White = 1 if white (Caucasian), 0 otherwise.
African American = 1 if African American, 0 otherwise.
Hispanic = 1 if of Hispanic origin (including South or Central Americans,
Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and others), 0 otherwise.
Other race = 1 if American Indian, Asian, or any other race excluded in other
categories, 0 otherwise.
Education variables
Highest grade completed: (continuous, range 10–16).
Dropout = 1 if high school dropout, 0 otherwise.
Graduated high school = 1 if high school graduate with no post–high school
education, 0 otherwise.
Post–high school education = 1 if has post–high school education, 0 otherwise.
Any training = 1 if previously received vocational, on-the-job, or other training
services, 0 otherwise.
GED = 1 if has GED, 0 otherwise.
Labor Force Status and Employment history variables
Employed at application = 1 if employed at application, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed at application = 1 if unemployed at application, 0 otherwise.
Not in labor force at application = 1 if not in labor force, 0 otherwise.
Employed–unemployed transition = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior to
application and unemployed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Employed–not in labor force transition = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior
to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to application, 0
otherwise.
Employed all of preprogram year = 1 if employed in 7–12 months prior to
application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed–employed transition = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months prior
to application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed–not in labor force transition = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months
prior to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to application,
0 otherwise.
Unemployed all of preprogram year = 1 if unemployed in 7–12 months prior to
application and unemployed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Not in labor force–employed transition = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12 months
prior to application and employed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
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Not in labor force–unemployed transition = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12
months prior to application and unemployed in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Not in labor force all of preprogram year = 1 if not in labor force in 7–12
months prior to application and not in labor force in 6 months prior to application, 0 otherwise.
Ever worked full time = 1 if ever worked full time, 0 otherwise.
Most recent wage: (continuous, range $4.25– $10.40).
Zero earnings in year prior to enrollment = 1 if no earnings in employment
security records in the four quarters prior to the individual’s enrollment in
JTPA, 0 otherwise.
Employment Barriers
Single head of household = 1 if single head of household, 0 otherwise.
Displaced homemaker = 1 if displaced homemaker, 0 otherwise.
Veteran = 1 if veteran of any war, 0 otherwise.
Vietnam veteran = 1 if veteran of Vietnam War, 0 otherwise.
Limited work history = 1 if limited work history, 0 otherwise.
Transportation = 1 if transportation is a barrier, 0 otherwise.
Basic skills deficiency = 1 if basic skills deficiency, 0 otherwise.
Child care = 1 if child care is a barrier, 0 otherwise.
Medical problem = 1 if medical problem, 0 otherwise.
Welfare recipient = 1 if receiving any public assistance (AFDC, food stamps,
or general assistance), 0 otherwise.
Handicapped = 1 if physically handicapped, 0 otherwise.
Limited English proficiency = 1 if tested and found to have limited ability to
speak English, 0 otherwise.
Ex-offender = 1 if convicted of criminal offense prior to time of application,
0 otherwise.
Substance abuse problem = 1 if determined by intake staff or medical doctor to
be chemically dependent (i.e., a substance abuser), 0 otherwise.
Marital Status variables
Never married = 1 if never married, 0 otherwise.
Married = 1 if married, 0 otherwise.
Married, not living with spouse = 1 if married, not living with spouse, 0
otherwise.
Divorced = 1 if separated, divorced, or widowed, 0 otherwise.
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Family Composition
Number of children: (continuous, range 0–7).
Household size: (continuous variable).
Training history variable
Previous training services = 1 if any vocational, occupational, or on-the-job
training services were received by program applicant prior to his/her application to JTPA, 0 otherwise.
Program year Indicator variables
Program year 1985 through Program year 1993: Each of these indicators takes
on the value 1 if the JTPA participant was enrolled during that program year
(beginning July 1, ending June 30), 0 otherwise.

9
Do Short-Run
Performance Measures
Predict Long-Run Impacts?
James J. Heckman
Carolyn J. Heinrich
Jeffrey Smith

This chapter culminates the analysis in this volume by examining
two closely related questions.1 The first of these is posed in the title: Do
performance measures based on short-run outcomes predict long-run
program impacts? If they do, then performance management systems
like those in JTPA and WIA will provide incentives that enhance the
economic efficiency of program operations. Put differently, if existing
performance measures predict long-term impacts, then their use provides some benefits to weigh against the costs documented in earlier
chapters. The second question concerns the efficiency costs of cream
skimming induced by the performance standards. As noted in Chapter
3, depending on the relationship between the performance measures
and net program impacts, cream skimming may be efficiency increasing (a positive relationship), efficiency decreasing (a negative relationship), or neutral (no relationship).
We address these questions in two different ways. The two analyses
build on different identifying assumptions but both utilize the experimental data from the National JTPA Study (NJS) introduced in Chapter
6. The two analyses represent different ways of dealing with the fact
that, absent additional assumptions, experimental data do not provide
impacts for individuals, only average impacts for groups. Both strategies have important limitations, which we discuss in detail later on in
the chapter.
Both methods yield the same basic findings. First, the short-run
labor market outcomes commonly used as performance measures do
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not predict long-run impacts. Indeed, in some cases we find a perverse
relationship, indicating that the performance measures actually provide
an incentive for program staff to move away from, rather than toward,
economic efficiency. Second, we find little evidence of an efficiency
cost associated with cream skimming; if anything, it may provide a
small efficiency gain.

nJS DATA
We use data gathered as part of the NJS, an experimental evaluation
of the JTPA program described in Chapters 2 and 4, for the analyses in
this chapter. The experiment was conducted at 16 of the more than 600
JTPA training centers (which we will also refer to as sites). Table 9.1
lists the sites that volunteered to participate in the experiment and provides some descriptive statistics. Columns one through three indicate
the racial/ethnic composition of the adult participant population during
the study, while the fourth column indicates adult participants’ average
years of schooling. The fifth and sixth columns display unemployment
and poverty rates.
The final three columns indicate the fraction of participants
assigned to each of the three experimental treatment streams, based on
the services recommended for them prior to random assignment. The
classroom training in occupational skills (CT-OS) stream includes individuals who were recommended to receive CT-OS and possibly other
services not including subsidized on-the-job training (OJT) at private
firms. The OJT treatment stream includes individuals recommended to
receive OJT and possibly other services not including CT-OS. The other
services stream is a residual category that, with only a few exceptions,
includes individuals not recommended to receive either CT-OS or OJT.
As illustrated in Exhibit 3.17 of Orr et al. (1996), individuals in the
CT-OS stream usually received classroom training whether in the form
of basic education or CT-OS or both. Those in the OJT stream often did
not enroll; when they did enroll they tended to receive OJT or, somewhat less often, job search assistance. Individuals in the “other” treatment stream received a wide variety of services.

Table 9.1 Descriptive Statistics for the 16 Sites in the national JTPA Study
Fraction of participants that are:
Site
Corpus Christi, TX
Cedar Rapids, IA
Coosa Valley, GA
Heartland of FL
Fort Wayne, IN
Jersey City, NJ
Jackson, MS
Larimer County, CO
Decatur, IL
Northwest MN
Butte, MT
Omaha, NE
Marion, OH
Oakland, CA
Providence, RI
Springfield, MO

White

Black

23.3
87.8
82.1
50.2
72.3
6.3
13.9
77.9
68.1
81.3
86.6
38.6
95.6
8.0
33.6
96.1

10.4
7.6
17.1
45.7
23.7
68.6
85.5
1.8
31.9
1.8
0.3
53.4
2.3
68.3
33.9
1.8

Avg. yrs. of
schooling for
Hispanic participants
65.5
1.3
0.6
2.8
2.8
20.3
0.3
17.0
0.0
10.9
5.0
4.2
0.9
6.8
24.6
0.0

11.2
11.6
10.7
11.4
11.5
11.5
12.2
12.2
11.8
11.4
11.7
11.7
11.3
12.4
11.3
11.9

Unemp.
rate

Poverty
rate

10.2
3.6
6.5
8.5
4.7
7.3
6.1
6.5
9.2
8.0
6.8
4.3
7.0
6.8
3.8
5.5

13.4
6.0
10.7
11.3
5.9
18.9
12.8
5.9
7.8
11.1
7.5
6.7
7.2
16.0
12.1
10.1

Fraction of participants assigned to:
CT-OS
OJT
Other services
stream
stream
stream
34.3
60.0
36.1
28.9
6.4
46.0
57.9
29.6
14.4
25.6
26.6
77.4
48.8
49.6
32.3
17.7

51.5
35.4
38.1
27.1
66.2
35.7
35.5
7.1
79.1
74.0
40.1
18.9
41.8
7.9
13.0
74.6

14.1
4.6
25.7
44.0
27.3
18.3
6.6
63.3
6.5
0.4
33.3
3.7
9.4
42.6
54.7
7.7

SOURCE: Race/ethnicity and years of schooling for adult participants come from calculations by the authors using the National JTPA
Study data. Race/ethnicity categories do not necessarily sum to one due to the omission of “other.” Unemployment rates are from Orr et
al. (1996, Exhibit 3.3) and are unweighted annual averages for 1987–1989. Poverty rates come from Orr et al. (1996, Exhibit 3.2) and
are for 1979. The treatment stream recommendation fractions for adults come from Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993, Table 7.1).
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The site selection strategy for the evaluation excluded sites with
small enrollments for cost reasons. Attempts to gain external validity
among larger sites by selecting sites at random failed due to high refusal
rates, as described by Doolittle and Traeger (1990) and Hotz (1992).
Without random site selection, external validity in the strict sense
clearly fails. At the same time, Table 9.1 makes clear that the 16 sites
represent a diverse mix in terms of participant demographics, local economic conditions, and service mix. Doolittle and Traeger (1990, Section
5) compare the 16 experimental sites to the population of all JTPA sites
and find that, on average, the two groups look much alike. In our view,
these patterns make our results suggestive, rather than either definitive
or irrelevant, when generalized to the JTPA program more broadly.
At the experimental centers, persons who applied to and were
accepted into the program were randomly assigned to either a treatment
group allowed access to JTPA services or to a control group denied
access to JTPA services for the next 18 months. A short survey at the
time of random assignment collected background information on demographic characteristics, educational attainment, work history, past training receipt, current and past transfer program participation, and family income and composition. This survey was self-administered with
assistance from program staff; it achieved a response rate well over 90
percent as well as only modest item nonresponse conditional on survey
response. We use variables from this baseline survey to define our subgroups (and for the participant descriptive statistics in Table 9.1).
In addition, follow-up surveys collected information on employment and earnings around 18 months after random assignment and, for a
random subsample, at around 30 months after random assignment. The
response rates for the two surveys were 83 and 77 percent, respectively,
with little difference between the experimental treatment and control
groups (see Appendix A of Orr et al. [1994]). Both the program and the
experimental analysis divided participants into four groups based on
age and sex: adult males and females aged 22 and above and male and
female out-of-school youth aged 16–21 (the NJS did not examine the
component of JTPA serving in-school youth). We examine only adult
males and females in this chapter due to the small samples available for
the two youth groups.
We use the data on wages, earnings, and employment from the followup surveys to construct the performance measures and outcome vari-
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ables. Our outcome variables consist of earnings and employment for
18 or 30 months after random assignment. For our analyses using percentiles, we use all observations with valid values of earnings over the
18 months after random assignment. For the analyses using subgroup
variation in experimental impacts, we trim the top 1 percent of the earnings values. The employment variables measure the fraction of months
employed, where we code an individual as employed in a month if they
have positive earnings in that month.
The JTPA performance measures we analyze are hourly wage and
employment at termination from the program and weekly earnings and
employment 13 weeks after termination. In most states at this time, program staff members obtained these outcomes via telephone surveys of
participants. We do not have access to the telephone survey data for our
sample and instead use program termination dates from JTPA administrative data combined with data from the follow-up surveys on job
spells to construct the performance measures. Because program administrators did not necessarily contact participants on the exact date of
termination or follow-up (and to allow for some measurement error in
the timing of the self-reported job spells), we count all job spells within
30 days on either side of the termination date (or 13 weeks after termination, as appropriate) in constructing the performance measures. We
measure employment based on the presence or absence of a job spell
within this window. For the wage measure, we use the highest hourly
wage within the window for persons holding more than one job. For
the earnings measure, we take the average weekly earnings on all jobs
over the 61-day window. Following the definition of the corresponding
official performance measures, we calculate hourly wages and weekly
earnings for employed persons only.
For more information on the NJS experimental data, see the official
impact reports in Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996), the official
implementation reports in Doolittle and Traeger (1990) and Kemple,
Doolittle, and Wallace (1993), and related papers on the design and the
data by Hotz (1992), Smith (1997), Kornfeld and Bloom (1999), and
Heckman and Smith (2000). For discussions of interpretational issues
see Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), Heckman, Smith, and Taber
(1998) and Heckman et al. (2000).
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ECOnOMETRIC AnALySIS STRATEGIES:
nOTATIOn AnD MOTIvATIOn
Ideally, we would like to relate individual program impacts to individual values of the performance measures. Unfortunately, as discussed
in, e.g., Heckman (1992); Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997);
Heckman and Smith (1998); and Djebbari and Smith (2008), without
additional assumptions, even experimental data do not allow us to generate individual-level impact estimates.
To consider this issue more carefully, we return to the notation
defined in Chapter 3. Recall that Ya1,i denotes a labor market outcome
for person i in some period a given treatment, where the 1 superscript
denotes treatment. Similarly, Ya0,i denotes a labor market outcome in
the same period given no treatment, implying that the impact for indi1
− Ya,i0 = D a,i . In this chapter, we distinvidual i in period a equals Ya,i
guish between two periods: the short run, denoted by s, and the long
run, denoted by l. Both periods begin at the time the individual decides
to participate or not. In terms of this notation, we would ideally like to
relate Ys1,i and D l ,i . Finally, recall that S denotes the set of individuals
treated.
Experimental data consist of the marginal distributions of outcomes in the treated and untreated states, that is, f (Ya0 ) and f (Ya1 ) .
Experimental data to not identify the joint distribution of outcomes,
f (Ya0 ,Ya1 ) , and therefore do not identify individual impacts. Experimental data do identify mean impacts for subgroups of individuals
defined by characteristics not affected by the treatment (which usually
means those observed prior to random assignment). Letting g denote
some particular subgroup (such as those with exactly 12 years of
schooling) out of a set G, we can construct the impact estimate for the
subgroup by taking a mean difference between the treated and untreated
units in subgroup g. More formally, we estimate the subgroup impact
D a,g = E (Ya1 | G = g) − E (Ya0 | G = g) by replacing the conditional expectations with the corresponding sample means.2
The next two sections describe the strategies we employ to deal
with the lack of individual impact estimates. The first strategy imposes
additional, nonexperimental, assumptions on the data that allow us to
construct individual impact estimates. The second strategy relies solely
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on subgroup variation in the experimental impacts and, as such, requires
no additional assumptions.

ECOnOMETRIC AnALySIS STRATEGIES:
RAnK PRESERvATIOn
Our first econometric strategy builds on the assumption of rank
preservation outlined in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997).3 We
assume that the joint distribution of treated and untreated outcomes
takes a very simple form: the counterfactual for each quantile of the
treated outcome distribution consists of the corresponding quantile of
the untreated outcome distribution. Thus, for example, the counterfactual outcome for the median treated person consists of the outcome of
the median untreated person. Note that under this assumption, cream
skimming on Ya0 implies the same choices as cream skimming on Ya1. We
can think of the simple world defined by the rank preservation assumption as a “one factor” world in which those who do well in the treated
state also do well in the untreated state and those who do poorly in the
treated state also do poorly in the untreated state.
This assumption may seem quite unusual, but in fact it nests the
widely (though often implicitly) used common effect model in which
D a,i = D a . In the common effect world, the treatment has the same
effect on all participants. In this world, the treated outcome distribution
has the same shape as the untreated outcome distribution but its location
differs by the common treatment effect. For example, if the untreated
outcomes have a normal distribution with mean 100 and variance 20,
and the common treatment effect equals 10, then the treated outcomes
have a normal distribution with mean 110 and variance 20. Moreover,
in the common effect world, quantiles of the treated and untreated outcome distributions again form counterfactuals for one another. The rank
preservation assumption relaxes the assumption of an equal treatment
effect for all participants while keeping the link between the quantiles
of the two outcome distributions. It therefore nests the common effect
model as a special case.
More formally, following Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997),
if each individual has the same rank in the distributions of Ya0 and Ya1,
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then we can associate a Ya0 with each Ya1 ; continuity of the two distributions implies a unique association. The assumptions of rank preservation plus continuity allow us to construct D a as a function of Ya0 (or,
what is the same thing, of Ya1 ). We operationalize this idea by taking
percentile differences across the treated and untreated outcome distributions.4 Let Ya0, j denote the jth percentile of the Ya0 distribution, with
Ya1, j the corresponding percentile in the Ya1 distribution. Thus, we estimate D a (Ya0, j ) = Ya1, j − Ya0, j . Our data include mass points at zero earnings in both the treated and untreated distributions. For the corresponding percentiles we simply assign an impact of zero; because all of the
outcomes equal zero in the lower percentiles of the two distributions,
order does not matter. Thus, the lack of a unique association in this part
of the distribution poses no problems in our application.

ECOnOMETRIC AnALySIS STRATEGIES: SUBGROUP
vARIATIOn In ExPERIMEnTAL IMPACTS
Our second identification strategy relies solely on the exogenous
variation in treatment status induced by the experiment. As noted
above, as a result of random assignment, we can construct unbiased
mean impact estimates for subgroups defined by variables observed
prior to random assignment.
To implement this strategy, we form 43 subgroups based on the
following characteristics measured at the time of random assignment:
race, age, education, marital status, time since most recent employment,
receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC—the predecessor to the current Temporary Aid to Needy Families program),
receipt of Food Stamps, and training center. Individuals with complete
data belong to eight subgroups, while we include those with incomplete
data in as many subgroups as their data allow. Using a regression framework, we construct mean-difference experimental impact estimates for
each subgroup.5 We adjust these estimates by dividing through by the
fraction enrolled in each subgroup to reflect the fact that a substantial
fraction of persons (41 percent of adult males and 37 percent of adult
females) in the treatment group dropped out and did not participate in
JTPA.6 We construct the subgroup average performance measures by
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simply averaging the individual performance measures over the members in each subgroup.

RESULTS BASED On ThE RAnK PRESERvATIOn
ASSUMPTIOn
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 present estimates of D a (Ya0, j ) constructed under
the rank preservation assumption. Self-reported earnings in the 18
months after random assignment constitute the outcome variable. The
horizontal axis in each figure indicates percentiles of the treated and
untreated (i.e., control) outcome distributions. The vertical axis indicates the difference in outcomes at each percentile.
We begin with the estimates for adult women in Figure 9.1, for
whom the sample size is the largest. First, we observe zero impacts
through the 20th percentile. This region corresponds to persons with
zero earnings in the 18 months after random assignment in both the
treated and untreated states under the rank preservation assumption.
Second, we observe a relatively constant positive treatment effect of
around $800 over the interval from the 20th to the 90th percentile.
Third, we note a discernible increase in the estimated impact in the
final decile. Assuming roughly equal costs among participants at different percentiles, the pattern in Figure 9.1 suggests that cream skimming beyond the 20th percentile has little effect on the economic efficiency of JTPA. However, a policy of targeting services at the bottom
two deciles entails clear costs. To the extent that the untreated outcome
proxies for the performance measures, Figure 9.1 suggests only a very
modest (and very nonlinear) positive relationship between the performance measures and the impacts.
Figure 9.2 for adult men tells a similar tale. We observe a relatively
flat relationship over the range from the 10th to the 50th percentile, after
which it dips and then rises again. Given the wide standard errors (and
the smaller region of zero impacts at the lowest percentiles) we can say
with some (but not overwhelming) confidence that cream skimming,
in regard to adult males, also likely has little effect, either positive or
negative, on efficiency. And, to the extent that the untreated outcomes
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Figure 9.1 quantile Treatment Effects, Adult Males
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Figure 9.2 quantile Treatment Effects, Adult Females
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proxy for the performance measures, we see little relationship between
the two for adult males under the rank preservation assumption.

RESULTS BASED On SUBGROUP vARIATIOn: UnIvARIATE
In this section we examine the experimental impact estimates for
subgroups defined by individual baseline characteristics. Put differently, we examine the correlation between predictors of Ya1 and impacts
conditional on values of those predictors. Caseworkers may use specific
variables, such as labor force status, to help them forecast short-run
outcomes as part of a strategy to select as participants individuals likely
to do well on the performance measures. Moreover, the relationship
between such characteristics and D a is of interest in its own right.
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 summarize subgroup estimates of the impact of
JTPA on the earnings and employment of adult females and adult males
in the JTPA experiment, respectively. The first column in each table lists
the values of each subgroup variable. Columns two through five present impacts on earnings in the 18 and 30 months after random assignment and on the fraction of months employed in the 18 and 30 months
after random assignment. Note that the samples differ for the 18 and
30 month outcomes due to survey nonresponse in the second follow-up
survey. We also present p-values from tests of the null of equal impacts
among the subgroups defined by each variable. We present subgroup
impacts conditional on labor force status (employed, unemployed, and
out of the labor force), highest grade completed, AFDC receipt and
month of last employment (if any), all measured at the time of random
assignment. All of these variables predict the level of the 18-month and
30-month outcomes for participants.
For adult females, we reject the null of equal impacts among subgroups in 4 of the 16 possible cases. Two of the rejections (at the 5 percent level) occur for employment over 18 months and earnings over 30
months conditional on AFDC receipt, with larger impacts in each case
for women receiving AFDC. As AFDC receipt is negatively related to
Ya1, this finding suggests that cream skimming may be somewhat inefficient for adult women. The other two rejections occur for earnings and
employment over 30 months conditional on month of last employment.

284 Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith
Table 9.2 Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup, Adult Females
Subgroup
Earnings impacts ($)
Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Labor force status
0.2286
0.4715
0.5745
0.3919
P-value for equal impacts
−0.0158
0.0017
1,487.38
1,223.78
Employed
(0.0168)
(651.64) (2,461.08) (0.0135)
0.0184
0.0112
507.42
428.84
Unemployed
(0.0128)
(507.92) (1,715.10) (0.0112)
0.0184
0.0274
3,274.29
1,543.72
Out of the labor force
(0.0188)
(601.48) (2,089.21) (0.0160)
Education
0.4646
0.8149
0.4641
0.6890
P-value for equal impacts
0.0175
0.0135
Highest grade completed 1,029.22 −2227.56
< 10
(0.0182)
(643.40) (2,577.38) (0.0164)
0.0246
0.0289
3,088.46
Highest grade completed 1,341.37
10–11
(0.0171)
(592.06) (2,179.51) (0.0147)
−0.0053
0.0129
1503.23
460.29
Highest grade completed
12
(0.0129)
(469.73) (1,711.16) (0.0109)
0.0209
0.0115
795.14
971.20
Highest grade completed
> 12
(0.0211)
(816.54) (2,997.34) (0.0172)
AFDC receipt
0.2607
0.0277
P-value for equal impacts
0.0371
0.7224
0.0026
0.0028
Not receiving AFDC
−947.01
712.26
(0.0105)
(392.05) (1,462.17) (0.0087)
0.0211
0.0343
Receiving AFDC
3,624.35
924.57
(0.0127)
(451.07) (1,631.02) (0.0113)
Recent employment
0.0139
0.5708
P-value for equal impacts
0.0492
0.8614
0.0056
0.0138
Currently employed
396.24
1,104.08
(0.0197)
(721.42) (2,851.27) (0.0151)
0.0060
0.0099
Last employed 0–2
979.22
594.01
months ago
(0.0181)
(713.69) (2,485.38) (0.0161)
−0.0589
Last employed 3–5
171.44 −7,677.17
−0.0063
months ago
(0.0220)
(953.91) (3,485.31) (0.0199)
0.0451
0.0502
975.22
Last employed 6–8
1,874.38
months ago
(0.0305)
(1,175.53) (3,721.12) (0.0263)
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Table 9.2 (continued)
Subgroup

Last employed 9–11
months ago
Last employed ≥ 12
months ago
Never employed

Earnings impacts ($)
Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Recent employment
1,679.73
5,244.59
0.0310
0.0636
(1,311.91) (4,437.63) (0.0305)
(0.0382)
1,304.36
4,919.73
0.0341
0.0347
(587.15) (2,020.46) (0.0155)
(0.0180)
610.59 −2,490.44
0.0335
−0.0059
(609.42) (2,736.46) (0.0168)
(0.0191)

NOTE: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1 percent trimming. Estimates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts
are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported
monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4,886 valid observations
for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1,147 valid observations for
the 30-month period after random assignment. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors appear in parentheses.
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).

We have trouble interpreting these estimates, which do not reveal any
obvious systematic pattern.
Considering the estimates in Table 9.2 more broadly, we see three
patterns. First, we lack the data to precisely estimate most of the subgroup impacts. Second, the point estimates often suggest very different impacts by subgroup. Third, the subgroup impact estimates often
change substantially between 18 and 30 months. Taken together, these
findings leave us with a lot of uncertainty about the efficiency effects of
cream skimming. At the same time, it seems unlikely that caseworkers,
who receive little feedback about the long-run labor market outcomes
of participants at either the individual or aggregate level, have more
information about these patterns than we do. Thus, any efforts to select
participants based on these observed variables will likely have little
systematic relationship to impacts, a conclusion quite consistent with
the finding in Bell and Orr (2002) and Lechner and Smith (2007) that
caseworkers cannot predict impacts.
For adult males, statistically significant differences in impacts
among subgroups defined by our set of characteristics emerge only
once, for impacts on 18-month earnings conditional on labor force sta-
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Table 9.3 Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup, Adult Males
Subgroup
Earnings impacts ($)
Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Labor force status
P-value for equal impacts 0.0407
0.3469
0.2679
0.6517
Employed
2,839.24
6,328.20
0.0300
0.0005
(1,145.51) (4,143.22) (0.0166)
(0.0194)
Unemployed
718.84
3,021.68
0.0056
0.0180
(710.16) (2,339.51) (0.0105)
(0.0125)
Out of the labor force
−2,193.85 −2,725.72
−0.0163
0.0289
(1,658.81) (4,693.28) (0.0262)
(0.0281)
Education
0.7939
0.9587
0.7206
P-value for equal impacts 0.6077
1,713.46
0.0114
0.0403
680.26
Highest grade completed
< 10
(0.0225)
(1,193.62) (3,935.62) (0.0203)
−270.18
0.0120
0.0134
−64.77
Highest grade completed
10–11
(0.0188)
(1,020.79) (3,516.67) (0.0163)
552.70
0.0030
0.0105
Highest grade completed 1,438.13
12
(0.0141)
(793.68) (2,729.26) (0.0119)
4,886.81
0.0116
0.0201
Highest grade completed
−92.00
> 12
(0.0221)
(1,238.21) (4,155.34) (0.0172)
AFDC receipt
P-value for equal impacts 0.5948
0.5794
0.3813
0.6678
Not receiving AFDC
722.73
2,933.22
0.0122
0.0161
(556.43) (1,810.58) (0.0085)
(0.0099)
Receiving AFDC
−232.18
−274.82
−0.0132
0.0306
(1,706.56) (5,495.50) (0.0278)
(0.0322)
Recent employment
P-value for equal impacts 0.5995
0.9112
0.7010
0.6193
Currently employed
0.0176
−0.0134
3,053.96
2,668.20
(0.0178)
(0.0212)
(1,230.61) (4,174.11)
Last employed 0–2
0.0168
0.0205
6,126.54
816.36
months ago
(0.0180)
(1,091.14) (3,637.23) (0.0152)
Last employed 3–5
1,248.64
0.0037
0.0119
−425.61
months ago
(0.0209)
(1,162.99) (3,794.83) (0.0176)
−0.0135
0.0312
−790.27
Last employed 6–8
−5.65
months ago
(0.0296)
(1,824.51) (5,453.91) (0.0256)
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Table 9.3 (continued)
Subgroup

Last employed 9–11
months ago
Last employed ≥ 12
months ago
Never employed

Earnings impacts ($)
Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Recent employment
1,191.58 −4,914.81
0.0163
0.0098
(2,328.58) (7,657.02) (0.0384)
(0.0478)
525.44
3,885.63
0.0284
0.0475
(1,333.79) (4,722.38) (0.0224)
(0.0257)
−799.52 −6,377.68
0.0017
0.0145
(1,606.04) (6,242.27) (0.0295)
(0.0319)

NOTE: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1 percent trimming. Estimates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts
are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported
monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4,886 valid observations
for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1,147 valid observations for
the 30-month period after random assignment. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors appear in parentheses.
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).

tus. In this case, the largest impacts appear for men employed at the time
of random assignment. Employment at random assignment correlates
positively with Ya1. As for adult women, the insignificant coefficients
vary substantially among subgroups, and exhibit patterns that are difficult to interpret, such as nonmonotonicity as a function of months since
last employment or years of schooling, as well as substantial changes
from 18 to 30 months. Combined with the general lack of statistically
significant subgroup impacts, the pattern of estimates represents weak
evidence of at most a modest efficiency gain to cream skimming for
adult males. For both men and women, of course, the costs of service
provision may vary among subgroups as well, so that the net impacts
may differ in either direction from the gross impacts reported here.
Other results in the literature that make use of the experimental data
from the NJS echo the findings in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. Bloom et al. (1993,
Exhibits 4.15 and 5.14) present subgroup impact estimates on earnings
in the 18 months after random assignment. Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits
5.8 and 5.9) present similar estimates for 30-month earnings using a
somewhat different earnings measure than we use here.7 Both consider
a different set of subgroups than we do. Only a couple of significant
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subgroup impacts appear at 18 months. At 30 months, the only significant subgroup differences found by Orr et al. (1996) among adults are
for adult men, where men with a spouse present have higher impacts.8
Overall, the absence of many statistically significant subgroup differences, combined with the pattern of point estimates, makes the findings
in Bloom et al. (1993) and Orr et al. (1996) consistent with our own
findings. There exists little evidence of substantial efficiency gains or
losses from picking participants on the basis of X and, even if such
potential gains or losses exist, neither we nor, in all probability, the
caseworkers, have any real knowledge of them.

RESULTS BASED On SUBGROUP vARIATIOn In
ExPERIMEnTAL IMPACTS: REGRESSIOn
We now turn to our multivariate regression analysis of the relationship between subgroup impacts and subgroup average performance
measures. Table 9.4 presents estimates of the relationship between
experimental impacts on earnings and on employment and various performance measures based on short-term labor market outcomes. We
estimate separate regressions for each outcome (earnings and employment for 18 and 30 months) and for each performance measure.9
The four columns of estimates in Table 9.4 correspond to cumulated
earnings and employment impacts for 18 and 30 months after random
assignment. Each cell in the table presents the regression coefficient
associated with the column’s dependent variable and the row’s independent variable, the estimated (robust) standard error of the coefficient, the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the population
coefficient equals zero and the R2 for the regression. We do not report
the estimated constant terms from the regressions to reduce clutter. For
example, the first row of the first column reveals that a regression of
subgroup earnings impacts for the 18 months after random assignment
on the subgroup average hourly wage at termination from the JTPA program yields an estimated coefficient of −$577.61 on the hourly wage,
with a standard error of $304.00, a p-value of 0.0645, and an overall R2
of 0.0809.
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Four striking findings emerge from Table 9.4. First, and most
important, we find many negative relationships between short-run performance indicators and experimental impact estimates at the subgroup
level. In many cases the short-run outcome measures utilized in the
JTPA performance standards system have a perverse relationship with
the longer-run earnings and employment impacts that constitute the
program’s goals. The only evidence supporting the efficacy of shortrun outcome measures comes from the employment-based performance
measures for adult men, which are positive and statistically significant
at the 10 percent level in three cases. These same performance measures
have negative coefficients in seven out of eight cases for adult women.
Second, we find low R2 values throughout. The short-term performance measures have only a very weak relationship with impacts on
earnings and employment for 18 or 30 months. Third, moving from
performance measures based on outcomes at termination from the program to longer-term measures based on outcomes three months after
termination usually weakens the relationship between the performance
measure and program impacts. In particular, the R2 values nearly always
decline and the estimated coefficients sometimes become less positive
or more negative. Fourth, the performance measures often do worse (in
terms of the fraction of variance explained) at predicting impacts for
30 months after random assignment than at predicting impacts for 18
months after random assignment. This indicates that the low predictive
power of the performance measures in our analysis does not result from
reductions in work activity during the periods of program participation
(the so-called lock-in effect), which for some participants constitutes a
nontrivial chunk of the 18 months after random assignment.
In sum, the regression analysis yields three clear conclusions. First,
short-run performance measures do a very poor job of predicting longrun impacts, in terms of explained variation. In general, performance
measures only weakly related to program goals accomplish little as
rewards and punishments often get assigned based on noise. In terms
of the discussion in Chapter 3, the JTPA performance measures do not
solve the principal-agent problem by providing incentives for impact
maximization. Moreover, they clearly fail to provide cheap, quick proxies for econometric impact evaluations. Second, the point estimates
often suggest a negative relationship, indicating that the JTPA performance standards system may have provided an incentive for reduced

Earnings impact ($) measured over:
Employment impact measured over:
18 months after
30 months after
18 months after
30 months after
Performance standard measure
random assignment random assignment random assignment random assignment
Adult females
Hourly wage at time of termination
−577.61
−1,729.66
−0.018
−0.010
(304.00)
(1,280.64)
(0.008)
(0.011)
p = 0.0645
p = 0.1842
p = 0.0202
p = 0.3559
R2 = 0.0809
R2 = 0.0426
R2 = 0.1246
R2 = 0.0208
Weekly earnings at time of follow-up
−3.74
−12.05
−0.000
−0.000
(8.78)
(36.54)
(0.000)
(0.000)
p = 0.6726
p = 0.7432
p = 0.2728
p = 0.3277
R2 = 0.0044
R2 = 0.0026
R2 = 0.0293
R2 = 0.0234
Employment at time of termination
−117.72
−2,065.61
−0.023
−0.029
(941.92)
(3,928.63)
(0.023)
(0.033)
p = 0.9012
p = 0.6019
p = 0.3213
p = 0.3767
R2 = 0.0004
R2 = 0.0069
R2 = 0.0246
R2 = 0.0196
Employment at time of follow-up
1,513.28
−1,873.03
−0.067
−0.024
(1,482.04)
(6,236.83)
(0.037)
(0.053)
p = 0.3132
p = 0.7655
p = 0.0767
p = 0.6521
R2 = 0.0248
R2 = 0.0022
R2 = 0.0745
R2 = 0.0050
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Table 9.4 Relationship between ∆ and Y11 in JTPA: Earnings and Employment Impacts

Hourly wage at time of termination

Weekly earnings at time of follow-up

Employment at time of termination

Employment at time of follow-up

465.41
(394.76)
p = 0.2452
R2 = 0.0328
6.74
(7.42)
p = 0.3690
R2 = 0.0197
2,542.99
(1,384.72)
p = 0.0737
R2 = 0.0778
2,579.24
(2,486.91)
p = 0.3058
R2 = 0.0256

Adult males
−1,405.68
0.003
(1,653.30)
(0.005)
p = 0.4001
p = 0.4914
R2 = 0.0173
R2 = 0.0116
−20.76
0.000
(31.79)
(0.000)
p = 0.5174
p = 0.9921
R2 = 0.0103
R2 = 0.0000
3,673.71
0.005
(5,869.08)
(0.017)
p = 0.5349
p = 0.7559
R2 = 0.0097
R2 = 0.0024
18,716.00
0.050
(9,842.28)
(0.028)
p = 0.0643
p = 0.0848
R2 = 0.0810
R2 = 0.0707

−0.005
(0.010)
p = 0.6230
R2 = 0.0059
−0.000
(0.000)
p = 0.3274
R2 = 0.0234
−0.059
(0.034)
p = 0.0850
R2 = 0.0723
0.021
(0.061)
p = 0.7338
R2 = 0.0029
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NOTE: The actual JTPA performance measures are defined as follows: “Hourly wage at placement” is the average wage at program
termination for employed adults. “Weekly earnings at follow-up” are the average weekly wage of adults employed 13 weeks after program termination. “Employment rate at termination” is the fraction of adults employed at program termination. “Employment rate at
follow-up” is the fraction of adults who were employed 13 weeks after program termination. In our analysis, employment rates were
calculated based on the presence or absence of a job spell within 30 days before or after each reference date (termination or followup). Hourly wages were calculated based on the highest reported hourly wage for all job spells reported within 30 days before or after
each reference date. Weekly earnings were calculated by averaging the product of hourly wages and hours worked per week across all
reported job spells within 30 days before or after each reference date weighted by the fraction of the 61-day window spanned by each
job spell.
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).
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efficiency. Third, we can say little about the efficiency cost to cream
skimming other than that the data do not make a loud statement in either
direction given our sample size and subgroups.

PUTTInG ThE RESULTS In COnTExT
The findings presented in this chapter do not represent an anomaly
in the literature, but rather tell much the same story as the other studies
that perform similar analyses. Table 9.5 summarizes six other studies
that examine the relationship between performance standards measures
based on short-run outcome levels and long-run program impacts; these
six studies include, to the best of our knowledge, all of the published
studies of this type as well as two that appeared only as government
reports.10 For each study, the table provides the citation, the particular employment and training program considered, the data used for the
analysis, the impact measure used (for example, earnings from 18 to
36 months after random assignment), the impact estimator used (for
example, random assignment), the particular performance measures
considered (for example, employment at termination), and the findings.
Four studies, Gay and Borus (1980), Cragg (1997), Barnow (1999),
and Burghardt and Schochet (2001), reach conclusions very similar to
our own. The other two studies, Friedlander (1988) and Zornitsky et
al. (1988), obtain more mixed results. The most positive of the studies,
Zornitsky et al. (1988), examines the AFDC Homemaker/Home Health
Aide Demonstration, which provided a homogeneous treatment to relatively homogeneous clients. This program represents a very different
context from multitreatment programs serving heterogeneous populations such as JTPA and WIA. Moreover, this demonstration program,
with its focus on the skills for a particular high-demand occupation,
most likely did not lead to much postprogram human capital investment.
As noted in Chapter 3, such investments tend to weaken the relationship
between the short-run performance measures and long-run impacts.
Taken together, these studies generally support our finding from the
JTPA data that performance standards based on short-run outcome levels likely do little to encourage the provision of services to those who
benefit most from them in employment and training programs.
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LIMITATIOnS OF OUR AnALySIS
The analysis in this chapter focuses on one particular caseworker
response to the imposition of a performance management system based
on short-run outcomes: changes in who gets accepted into the program. In a model similar to the one presented in Chapter 3, caseworkers attempt to forecast both impacts and performance outcomes using
the information available at the time of the acceptance decisions. In
the case of the subgroup regression analysis, our interpretation assumes
that caseworkers use observed characteristics to forecast both impacts
and performance outcomes and then act on those forecasts. The performance management system causes them to put more weight onto
the performance outcome forecast in making decisions about whom to
serve.
Two important assumptions lurk in the shadows behind this interpretation. First, we must assume that mean impacts and mean performance at the subgroup level do not differ between a world with performance standards and a world without them. This assumption could
easily fail if, for example, service allocations conditional on characteristics change with the introduction of performance management.11 Second, we must also assume that mean impacts and mean performance at
the subgroup level do not differ between applicants and participants.12
Caseworkers see and make choices about applicants, while we have
data only on individuals accepted into the program, as indicated by their
reaching random assignment. The data from the Corpus Christi site in
the NJS considered in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) indicate that
only about one-third of applicants reach random assignment, which
leaves plenty of scope for differences between applicants and participants in the relationship that we estimate.
A final and very important limitation resides in the inability of our
analyses in this chapter (or indeed, in this book) to say anything about
the effect of the performance standards on the technical efficiency (or
productivity) of the local JTPA training centers. By way of illustration,
consider the subgroup regression analysis and suppose that having a
performance standards system increases both the mental and physical
effort levels (more “working smart” and less on-the-job leisure) of program staff. Suppose that this extra effort increases the impact of the
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Table 9.5 Evidence on the Correlation Between y1 and ∆ from
Several Studies
Study

Program

Data

Measure of impact

Gay and
Borus
(1980)

Manpower
Development
and Training Act
(MDTA), Job
Opportunities
in the Business
Sector (JOBS),
Neighborhood Youth
Corps Out-of-School
Program (NYC/OS),
and the Job Corps

Randomly selected
program participants
entering programs
from December 1968
to June 1970 and
matched (on age, race,
city, and sometimes
neighborhood)
comparison
sample of eligible
nonparticipants.

Impact on Social
Security earnings in
1973 (from 18 to 36
months after program
exit).

Volunteers in the
seven states in which
the demonstration
projects were
conducted. To be
eligible, volunteers
had to have been on
AFDC continuously
for at least 90 days.

Mean monthly
earnings in the 32
months after random
assignment and mean
monthly combined
AFDC and food
stamp benefits in
the 29 months after
random assignment.

Applicants and
recipients of AFDC
(varies across
programs). Data
collected as part of
MDRC’s experimental
evaluations of these
programs.

Postrandom
assignment earnings
(from UI earnings
records) and welfare
receipt (from
administrative data).

AFDC HomemakerZornitsky
et al. (1988) Home Health Aid
Demonstration

Friedlander
(1988)

Mandatory welfareto-work programs in
San Diego, Baltimore,
Virginia, Arkansas,
and Cook County
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Impact estimator

Performance measures

Findings

Nonexperimental
“kitchen sink”
Tobit model

Employment in quarter after
program, before-after (four
quarters before to one quarter
after) changes in weeks
worked, weeks not in the
labor force, wage rate, hours
worked, income, amount of
unemployment insurance
received, and amount of
public assistance received.

No measure has a consistent,
positive, and statistically
significant relationship to
the estimated impacts across
subgroups and programs.
The before-after measures,
particularly weeks worked
and wages, do much better
than employment in the
quarter after the program.

Experimental impact
estimates

Employment and wages at
termination. Employment
and welfare receipt three and
six months after termination.
Mean weekly earnings
and welfare benefits in the
three and six month periods
after termination. These
measures are examined both
adjusted and not adjusted for
observable factors including
trainee demographics and
welfare and employment
histories and local labor
markets.

All measures have the correct
sign on their correlation
with earnings impacts,
whether adjusted or not. The
employment and earnings
measures are all statistically
significant (or close to it).
The welfare measures are
correctly correlated with
welfare impacts but the
employment measures are
not unless adjusted. The
measures at three and six
months do better than those
at termination, but there is
little gain from going from
three to six.

Experimental impact
estimates

Employment (nonzero
quarterly earnings) in
quarters 2 and 3 (short term)
or quarters 4 to 6 (long term)
after random assignment.
Welfare receipt in quarter
3 (short-term) or quarter 6
(long-term) after random
assignment.

Employment measure is
positively correlated with
earnings gains but not welfare
savings for most programs.
Welfare indicator is always
positively correlated with
earnings impacts, but rarely
significantly so. It is not
related to welfare savings.
Long-term performance
measures do little better (and
sometimes worse) than shortterm measures.
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Table 9.5 (continued)
Study

Program

Data

Measure of impact

Cragg
(1997)

JTPA (1983–87)

NLSY

Before-after change in
participant earnings.

Barnow
(1999)

JTPA (1987–89)

NJS

Earnings and hours
worked in month
10 after random
assignment.

Burghardt
and
Schochet
(2001)

Job Corps

Experimental data
from the National
Job Corps Study

The outcome
measures include
receipt of education
or training, weeks
of education or
training, hours per
week of education or
training, receipt of a
high school diploma
or GED, receipt of a
vocational certificate,
earnings, and being
arrested. All are
measured over the
48 months following
random assignment.
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Impact estimator

Performance measures

Findings

Generalized bivariate
Tobit model of
preprogram and
postprogram annual
earnings

Fraction of time spent
working since leaving school
in the preprogram period.
This variable is strongly
correlated with postprogram
employment levels.

Negative relationship
between work experience
and before-after earnings
changes.

Experimental impact
estimates

Regression-adjusted levels
of earnings and hours worked
in month 10 after random
assignment.

At best a weak relationship
between performance
measures and program
impacts.

Experimental impact
estimates

Job Corps centers divided
into three groups: high
performers, medium
performers, and low
performers based on their
overall performance rankings
in program years 1994, 1995,
and 1996. High and low
centers were in the top and
bottom third nationally in all
three years, respectively.

No systematic relationship
between the performance
groups and the experimental
impact estimates.

SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002); Barnow and Smith (2004).
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program for all participants by $100 over 18 months. In our regressions of estimated subgroup mean impacts on estimated subgroup mean
performance levels, this extra $100 shows up in the intercept, not in
the slope coefficient, with the result that we do not interpret it as the
effect of the performance standards. To our knowledge, the only evidence of the effect of performance management on technical efficiency
in the context of an active labor market program comes from the United
Kingdom, where Burgess et al. (2004) find evidence of such effects for
small work teams but not for large ones. This lack of evidence comes
as a real surprise, given that the literature on performance incentives in
private firms, well summarized in Prendergast (1999), focuses almost
exclusively on productivity effects.

SUMMARy AnD COnCLUSIOnS
This chapter presents several empirical analyses designed to address
the questions laid out in the introduction: First, do short-run performance measures predict long-run impacts? Second, what are the efficiency costs of cream skimming? We describe the identifying assumptions underlying our analyses as well as their limitations.
Taken as a whole, our empirical analysis reaches two important
conclusions. First, the limited evidence we have suggests that whatever cream skimming occurs in JTPA produces only modest efficiency
gains or losses. In other words, though we must acknowledge the noisiness of the evidence, our results suggest at most a modest efficiency
cost associated with eschewing cream skimming in favor of a focus on
the most hard-to-serve among those applying to the program. Second,
the JTPA performance standards do not promote efficiency because the
short-run outcomes they rely on have essentially a zero correlation with
long-run impacts on employment and earnings. This surprising result
comports with the findings in several other studies that have estimated
this relationship.
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notes
1. This chapter presents results from Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) and borrows in places from their text.
2. In addition to simple mean differences, we can also use regression analysis to
obtain experimental impact estimates. Doing so may generate more precise estimates if the exogenous conditioning variables included in the regression soak up
a lot of the residual variance.
3. This concept has a variety of names in the published literature, including “perfect positive dependence” and “perfect positive rank correlation.” We use “rank
preservation” here because it is short and seems to be gaining ground in the most
recent literature.
4. See, e.g., Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes
(2008); and Djebbari and Smith (2008) for more details on this estimator, including the construction of the standard errors.
5. This correction amounts to using the simple Wald instrumental variables estimator
with treatment status as an instrument for enrollment. See, e.g., the discussions in
Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1998) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999,
Section 5.2) on the properties and origin of this estimator.
6. An alternative strategy would generate predicted individual impacts by including
interaction terms between baseline covariates and the treatment group dummy in
an impact regression; see Barnow (1999) for an application.
7. Their earnings measure combines self-report data with data from Unemployment Insurance earnings records. For more details, see the discussion in Orr et al.
(1996).
8. Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits 5.19 and 5.20) also present subgroup impact estimates
for male and female youth. As expected given the small sample sizes, they find no
statistically significant differences in estimated impacts among the subgroups.
9. To improve statistical efficiency, we use the inverse of the robust standard errors
from the corresponding impact estimation as weights in each regression. Recall
that the dependent variable here is the impact; its estimated standard error is thus
an estimate of the variance of the error term for that impact, which represents one
observation in our regression. Viewed in this way, the procedure amounts to doing
weighted least squares in the presence of heteroskedasticity, where the extent of
the heteroskedasticity is indicated by differences among subgroups in the estimated standard errors of the impacts.
10. We thank Tim Bartik of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research for
providing us with copies of two of the unpublished papers.
11. To see this, consider a simple case with two groups, A and B, two services, Classroom Training (CT) and Job Search Assistance (JSA), and one short-run performance measure, P. For group A, CT yields impact 100 and performance 20 while
JSA yields impact 40 and performance 40. In contrast, for group B, CT yields
impact 30 and performance 10 while JSA yields impact 40 and performance 40.
Suppose further that without the performance management system, program staff
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would maximize impacts by assigning group A to CT and group B to JSA. In
contrast, with the performance management system, they maximize performance
by assigning both A and B to JSA. Thus, the introduction of the performance standards system induces a substantial efficiency loss. Unfortunately, our regression
analysis applied to data collected from this imaginary program after the introduction of performance standards would not reveal the efficiency loss. This follows
from the fact that in the world with the performance standards system, the correlation between subgroup mean impacts and subgroup performance equals zero.
12. To see the issue, consider a simple example. In this example our program has just
one service: CT. Among the applicants, some individuals have a (H)igh impact
of CT because they get along well with the instructor, others would have a (L)ow
impact because they do not. At the same time, applicants also differ in their job
search behavior following CT. Some individuals, call them (F)ast, take the first
job they find after completing CT while other individuals, call them (S)low, search
longer but find a higher paying job in the end, as standard search theory would
predict. Together H/L and F/S define four groups. Assume that these four groups
each constitute one-quarter of the applicants and that the program has sufficient
resources to serve half of the applicants. To make the example concrete, we assign
the following values: H-F individuals have impact 100 and performance 50, H-S
individuals have impact 120 and performance 20, L-F individuals have impact 50
and performance 50, and L-S applicants have impact 80 and performance 10. In
a world without performance standards, caseworkers serve only H individuals,
while in a world with performance standards, caseworkers serve only F individuals. In the applicant population, impact and performance outcomes have a negative
correlation, indicating an efficiency loss from selection into the program based on
performance rather than impacts. In the participant population, impact and performance have a zero correlation because, by construction, performance equals 50
for all the participants regardless of their impact. This example clearly violates
the assumption of the same relationship between impacts and performance among
participants and applicants. It also demonstrates that failure of this assumption can
lead to a misleading conclusion about the efficiency effects of cream skimming
and about whether short-term outcomes predict long-term impacts.
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10
Lessons for Advancing Future
Performance Standards Systems
James J. Heckman
Carolyn J. Heinrich
Jeffrey Smith

The economic recession that started in 2007 led to renewed interest in public employment and training services. At the same time, the
accompanying financial crises also elevated concern for how dwindling
government budgets could be spent more efficiently and effectively to
maximize returns to public investments in training. As discussed in the
introductory chapter, revamping incentive systems in government is a
critical step toward improving government performance and our future
economic outlook.
The chapters in this volume marshal some of the most detailed evidence available on how performance standards and incentives influence
the behavior of program administrators and staff and contribute to program outcomes or unintended consequences. Since each chapter presents a self-contained summary of its main findings, we do not review
the details of each one. Instead, this conclusion presents three main
lessons learned from these essays and discusses some of their policy
implications.

LESSOn 1: AGEnCIES RESPOnD TO InCEnTIvES
Concerns that performance incentives are disregarded by government employees because award levels are low or because benefits are
diffused are not justified. Low-powered cash incentives may, in fact, be
high-powered because of the value of the budgetary awards in establishing the reputation of bureaucrats and the recognition that comes
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with them. Bonuses and award money create leverage in the social services community and are thus frequently highly prized (Heinrich 2007).
The evidence reported by Courty and Marschke in Chapter 7 demonstrates that agencies made placement, enrollment, and termination decisions in ways that were consistent with maximizing their performance
as measured by the JTPA performance standards system. The evidence
presented by Heinrich in Chapter 8 reveals that although caseworkers
claimed to discount performance standards in decision making, they
nevertheless selectively enrolled into JTPA people who were likely to
contribute to the placement goals rewarded under the performance standards system.
Courty and Marschke and Heinrich also present a dark side to the
behavior elicited by the JTPA performance standards system. Training
centers showed remarkable ingenuity in manipulating the JTPA accounting system and reporting requirements in their efforts to boost their
measured performance. Practices included enrolling persons receiving job search assistance or on-the-job training only after they found
a job, using short-term training arrangements in order to maximize the
probability of counting a successful placement, holding persons who
did not find jobs in dead-end job clubs, and releasing poorly performing trainees from the program at strategic accounting dates when it did
least damage to training center performance records. These all represent
behaviors that make perfect sense in terms of the performance standards, but they do nothing to raise participant earnings or increase the
equity with which program services are distributed.
The problem of regulating job-training programs—or any government agency—is that enforceable regulations cannot be written too
finely, and simple rules can and will, as shown in this volume, be subverted. Along these lines, performance standards systems designers
also need to grasp the dynamic properties of performance incentive systems, as discussed in Chapter 5 and illustrated throughout this volume.
An incentive system designer’s understanding of how individuals will
respond to performance standards will inevitably be imperfect prior to
their introduction, and it is only as performance measures and targets are
tried, evaluated, modified, and/or discarded that their responses become
known (Courty and Marschke 2007). Of course, this type of monitoring to assess a measure’s effectiveness and possible distortion requires
a considerable investment on the part of incentive system designers,
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one that has probably been underestimated in the past. And as Heinrich
and Marschke (2010) point out, learning on the part of bureaucrats will
advance over time as well, as they come to better know the distinct
weaknesses of performance measures and how they can be exploited
through their day-to-day experiences. Incentive system designers will
have to expect to regularly review and revise the rules and incentives
they create if they want to avoid the inefficient behavior documented in
the chapters in this volume.

LESSOn 2: CURREnT PERFORMAnCE STAnDARDS DO
nOT PREDICT LOnG-RUn GAInS
While the chapters by Courty and Marschke and Heinrich indicate that the JTPA performance standards system effectively motivated
agency staff and service providers to meet short-run performance standards, they do not indicate whether the measures themselves are appropriate to induce the achievement of the primary program goals, i.e.,
increasing the earnings of program participants (or the value added of
the program). Chapter 9 demonstrates that the short-run performance
measures featured by the JTPA performance standards system were
weakly and often perversely related to the long-term effects of the program on the earnings and employment of participants. Yet it is these
long-term effects that constituted the true goal of the program’s services.
The analysis also reveals that the measurement of wages and employment at a later point following termination represented no improvement in the performance monitoring system. Neither set of measures
was strongly positively related to long-run program impacts on earnings and employment, suggesting that the performance standards system did not promote the program’s key objectives of long-run gains in
earnings and employment for participants. We see no reason to expect
that the relationships between the performance measures and programs
have changed under WIA and thus no reason to think that this problem
has gone away.
From the perspective of policymakers and taxpayers who would
like to maximize the value from government dollars spent on public
programs, the goal of incentive system designers should be to choose
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performance measures so that the effects of bureaucratic actions on measured performance are aligned with the effects of those same actions on
value added. However, we frequently lack the information required to
realize this objective in practice. Empirical research, as Heckman and
Smith suggest, has focused primarily on estimating measures of statistical association between performance and value added, where the value
added of programs has been assessed through the use of randomized
experiments or through sophisticated statistical modeling. The dynamics of performance standards systems, however, may limit the usefulness even of these estimates, as the alignment between a performance
measure and value added may decrease after a performance measure is
introduced and bureaucrats respond by exploring all strategies for raising it, not just those that also increase program value added. Clearly,
this will continue to be one of the most vexing issues for performance
standards system designers for some time to come.

LESSOn 3: ThE CREAM SKIMMInG PROBLEM
IS OvERSTATED
The charge of cream skimming has arisen frequently in public job
training programs, including the Workforce Investment Act program.
In Chapters 3, 6, and 9, we define various uses of this term and present evidence that fears about cream skimming are overstated. For most
demographic groups, experimental estimates of the earnings impacts
of participation in JTPA are uniform over broad skill levels. Only at
the lowest skill levels is there any evidence that impacts were smaller
than at higher levels of the skill distribution. While there is some evidence of a trade-off between serving the most disadvantaged within
eligible populations and allocating program resources most efficiently,
it appears to be a modest one given the modest benefits realized by
program participants.
Cream skimming is usually defined as arising from purposive
screening behavior by bureaucrats. Chapters 6 and 8 present information about disparities in program participation rates among different
demographic groups. Even among eligible persons, there are substantial
differences in program participation rates. It is not enough to compare
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participation rates among the eligible to determine if cream skimming
is an important factor. At issue is how much of the difference in participation rates conditional on eligibility is due to the voluntary choices
of individuals, how much is due to their lack of information about the
program, and how much is due to the decisions of bureaucrats. The
decompositions of participation rates into components due to eligibility, awareness, and acceptance that are presented in Chapter 6 reveal
that personal choices and lack of information play the major role in
accounting for demographic disparities in participation. Administrative
discretion also has some role to play in determining the participation
rates of different groups in public job training programs, but it is not the
dominant factor.
The evidence in Chapters 6 and 8 indicates that those whose characteristics make them more employable and more easily placed were
more likely to be screened into the JTPA system. However, the analysis
of Chapter 6 reveals that the same characteristics that make a person
more attractive in terms of achieving objectives within the job placement system also made that person more aware of the program and
more willing to apply to it. Thus, if resources are going to be used to
improve equity in access to programs with voluntary enrollment, incentive system designers and program administrators should consider
investing more in (or providing incentives for) increasing awareness of
the program among the eligible population.
We realize that there will be some limits to the generalizability
of these findings and the lessons of this collection of studies to other
public program contexts, and that there is inherent variability in the
potential of performance standards systems for improving government
performance in the many different contexts in which they have been
introduced or considered. At the same time, it is clear that there is no
diminishing of demand on the part of policymakers or the public for
greater accountability and a results-oriented focus of government. The
research in this volume suggests that there is considerable work to do
in addressing the flaws of current public sector performance standards
systems as well as investing in research that will guide improvements
and advancements to these systems as their use expands in the public
sector.
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